

Religious Radicalism and Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia

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Preface

Religious Fundamentalism and Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia

Richard Bonney*

It is with very great pleasure that the INPAREL South Asian History Academic Papers Series welcomes Dr Rodney W. Jones' valuable and timely contributions in the area of religious radicalism and nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The author stresses the real dangers of nuclear war breaking out between India and Pakistan. He is also one of the first American commentators to take seriously the growth and intensification of religious fundamentalism in matters of security - in India, with Hindu fundamentalism, as well as in Pakistan with the Islamic counterpart. 'Religious fundamentalism carried into violent channels', he comments, 'both interacts with and compounds the first danger, radically complicating efforts to deal with both. When religious fundamentalism encroaches on the policies, institutions, and crisis decisions of nuclear-armed states, it becomes a nuclear danger in its own right.' Dr Rodney W. Jones provides an important warning to politicians, diplomats and opinion-formers world-wide.

M. V. Ramana and A. H. Nayyar pronounced in *Scientific American*, December 2001 that 'the Indian subcontinent is the most likely place in the world for a nuclear war'. The two authors concluded: 'the limitations of Western non-proliferation policy are now painfully obvious. It has relied primarily on supply-side export controls to prevent access to nuclear technologies. But Pakistan's program[me] reveals that these are inadequate. Any effective strategy for non-proliferation must also involve demand-side measures — policies to assure countries that the bomb is not a requisite for true security. The most important demand-side measure

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is progress toward global nuclear disarmament. Some people argue that global disarmament and non-proliferation are unrelated. But as George Perkovich [formerly] of the W. Alton Jones Foundation in Charlottesville, Va., observed in his masterly study of the Indian nuclear program[me], that premise is "the grandest illusion of the nuclear age".¹ The authors concluded: 'It may also be the most dangerous.'

In an article in *The Hindu* on 30 December 2001, C. Raja Mohan described the purposes of what he called India's 'coercive diplomacy':²

Coercive diplomacy has never been a characteristic feature of India's foreign policy. But by threatening an all-out war with Pakistan that could escalate to the nuclear level, India has entered the uncharted waters of nuclear brinkmanship. This atypical Indian behaviour arises from the exhaustion of all other options in dealing with the threat of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan...

Brinkmanship in this case is about manipulating the shared risks of a nuclear conflict — which neither side wants — to get the other to back down. Brinkmanship is clearly a high-risk strategy that would force India to confront rather difficult choices in the near future if Pakistan does not agree to crack down on the sources of terrorism on its soil.

Dr Rodney W. Jones describes the process whereby the build-up of tensions between India and Pakistan proceeded apace in the first half of 2002. As the retired chief of the Indian Navy, Admiral L. Ramdas, stated on 26 February 2002:³

Right now, India and Pakistan are eyeball-to-eyeball with the largest military build-up in their history — a million soldiers confronting each other at the border. The risks of escalation — from a conventional war over the disputed territory of Kashmir to a nuclear exchange — is greater than it has ever been. The governments of both India and Pakistan must immediately de-escalate the military build-up on the border, revive people-to-people contacts, and come together in the cause of global nuclear disarmament...

India and Pakistan lack effective command, control, communication and intelligence systems. When these

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- 1 <www.sciam.com/2001/1201issue/1201ramana.html> G. Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb* (University of California Press, 1999; updated paperback edition, 2001).
 - 2 <www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/12/31/stories/2001123101351200.htm>
 - 3 <www.ieer.org/latest/ramdaspr.html>

infrastructures are not there, it makes the whole system more sensitive, accident-prone, and therefore dangerous. Global zero alert would be a major step towards providing a de facto security guarantee.

Throughout the early months of 2003 tensions between the two states have remained high. Early in January, the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that any reprisal by India against a Pakistani nuclear strike would leave Pakistan in ruins and warned Islamabad not to engage in loose nuclear talk. 'The Pakistani leadership should not talk of the bomb and not get into the idea of committing suicide because we can take a bomb or two or more,' Fernandes said. 'There will be no Pakistan left when we have responded.'⁴ One might question the degree of concern Fernandes has for his own citizens, when scholarly expatriate Indian studies have demonstrated the sort of damage that could be inflicted, for example, on the population of Mumbai.⁵ A single, low yield (15 kilotons) nuclear weapon, comparable to the one detonated over Hiroshima in 1945, would cause between 160,000 and 866,000 deaths in the first few months. A larger weapon — 150 kilotons — would immediately claim almost 9 million lives. U.S. intelligence estimates projected 9 million to 12 million immediate deaths, and 2–7 million immediate injuries.⁶ In June 2002, M. McKinzie, Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana and A. H. Nayyar calculated the numbers of dead and injured in ten large Indian and Pakistani cities. A total of 2.9 million deaths was predicted by these scholars for the ten cities in India and Pakistan with an additional 1.5 million severely injured (See Table). Even these lower estimates were unacceptably high.

4 Reuters, 8 January 2003, reported by <www.isn.ethz.ch>

5 M. V. Ramana, *Bombing Bombay? Effects of nuclear weapons and a case study of a hypothetical explosion* (Global Health Watch IPPNW Information Series, 3, Cambridge, Mass., 1999).

6 <www.ippnw.org/SACrisis.html>

In January 2003, both India and Pakistan tried to demonstrate that the concerns of Admiral Ramdas were

Estimated nuclear casualties for each of 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities: June 2002 estimates				
City	Total Population within 5 km of Ground Zero	Killed	Severely Injured	Slightly Injured
India				
Bangalore	3,077,937	314,000	175,000	411,000
Bombay	3,143,284	477,000	229,000	477,000
Calcutta	3,520,344	357,000	198,000	466,000
Madras	3,252,628	364,000	196,000	449,000
New Delhi	1,638,744	176,000	94,000	218,000
Pakistan				
Faisalabad	2,376,478	336,000	174,000	374,000
Islamabad	798,583	154,000	67,000	130,000
Karachi	1,962,458	240,000	127,000	283,000
Lahore	2,682,092	258,000	150,000	354,000
Rawalpindi	1,589,828	184,000	97,000	221,000

The table above shows (to the nearest thousand) the numbers of dead, severely injured, and slightly injured persons after a nuclear attack on each of ten large South Asian cities. M. McKinzie, Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana and A. H. Nayyar, 'Nuclear War in South Asia', FPIF Policy Report (June 2002): <www.fpif.org/papers/nuclearsasia.html> misplaced, and that robust command and control mechanisms were firmly in place with adequate civilian safeguards. India announced its command and control structure on 4 January 2003 (Document Four),⁷ while Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri stated at the United Nations Security Council later in the month:⁸

7 <www.thehindu.com/2003/01/07/stories/2003010700591000.htm>

8 <www.dawn.com/2003/01/21/top2.htm>

Pakistan's nuclear assets are under strict safeguards and credible custodial controls. With a vigorous security and monitoring system, there has never been any danger of leakage of nuclear or sensitive technologies in Pakistan. Those entrusted with the responsibility in the strategic field are discharging this with professionalism and commitment.

Few commentators are likely to be impressed by such statements.⁹ A few days after the announcement by the Indian Government, U.S. State Department envoy Richard Haass described tensions between India and Pakistan as greater than those between the U.S.A. and Russia during the Cold War. He advocated 'normalcy' and spoke tersely and directly to New Delhi about the need to mend its fences with Islamabad (Document Seven).¹⁰ Similarly, in his speech at Davos, Switzerland, on 26 January 2003, the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, commented on the need for India and Pakistan to take 'risks for peace':¹¹

From the outset, the Bush administration has viewed both India and Pakistan as countries with which we wish to pursue

9 See, for example, Admiral Ramdas' earlier comments on Shaun Gregory's paper, 'A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia' in *Disarmament Diplomacy* 54 (2001): 'This is not to say that there is absolutely nothing in place by way of command and control systems, but the technologies to ensure safety and to prevent accidental deployment of nuclear weapons are still at an embryonic stage.' He added: 'as for Kargil [in 1999], we only managed to avert a catastrophe by the closest of margins, with some individuals in responsible positions in both countries advocating the use of nuclear weapons. This narrow escape was not due to any special nuclear relationship or understanding, but to heavy international pressure, especially that exerted by the United States. Such pressure worked in this case because the war was limited to Kargil and no international boundaries had been crossed.' Admiral Ramdas also mentioned the rise of religious fundamentalism: 'South Asia is also witnessing a trend of rising fundamentalism. India, Pakistan and Afghanistan each have their own brands of extremists. It will indeed be a frightening day should such groups gain access to nuclear weapons – a possibility which cannot be totally ruled out. Such groups do not work on the basis of conventional political logic or other norms of behaviour, and can therefore be totally unpredictable.'

10 <www.dawn.com/2003/01/09/top4.htm>

11 <www.nytimes.com/2003/01/26/international/27POWE-TEXT.html?pagewanted=5&ntemail0>

expanded agendas. From the outset, we were determined not to have a policy toward India-Pakistan, but to seek productive relations with each in its own right, and we believe that our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were significant in helping the international community ease them back from the brink of war last year.

No American hidden hand, however, can remove the distrust between India and Pakistan. This they must do themselves. The United States has extended a helping hand to both India and Pakistan, and we stand ready to do so again, but it is crucial that they both take risks for peace, risks for peace on that great subcontinent, and that they work to normalize their relations...

Yet, in spite of such prompting from the United States, there is little evidence that the hoped for 'normalization of relations' has taken place. On the contrary, while the U.S. attention has been away from South Asia, with its focus on the impending Second Iraq War, the polemic between India and Pakistan has been heightened rather than diminished. The Indian Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani, recalled on 11 February that Pakistan had 'mid-wifed a *jihadi* state – the state of Taliban in Afghanistan'. He called '*jihadi* terrorism' the 'newest manifestation of despotism'. The ideology of pan-Islamism, he said, did not respect boundaries, and 'claims legitimacy in sending *jihadi* fighters from other countries into Kashmir'.¹² On 26 March 2003, with gross exaggeration, India described Pakistan as 'the epicentre of world terrorism'.¹³ Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha [Jaswant Singh] stated that the U.S. call for a resumption of dialogue with Pakistan after the killing of 24 Hindu Pandits in Kashmir was 'as gratuitous and misplaced' as if New Delhi had asked Washington to open dialogue with Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.¹⁴ At the end of March 2003, the Pakistan government welcomed a joint US-UK call for an early renewal of dialogue between Pakistan and India but rejected outright their statement insinuating that Pakistan had not fulfilled its commitment

12 <www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/stories/2003021204171100.htm>

13 Security Watch: Thursday, 27 March 2003, quoting Reuters. The exaggeration is clear, given that the U.S.A. regards Pakistan as part of the coalition against terrorism (Document 1).

14 <www.dawn.com/2003/03/30/top5.htm>

on cross-border infiltration. Pakistan was further angered by the failure of India to give prior notice about the test-firing of a Prithvi missile, which the Indians had called a 'meaningless' gesture: 'India has chosen to erode the value of confidence-building measures', it stated.¹⁵

In truth, the Indian 'coercive diplomacy' against Pakistan launched in the autumn of 2001, which seeks to expand Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 to encompass 'cross-border terrorism' against Kashmir has continued unchecked in 2003, even though some Indian commentators argue that the experiment has failed: 'coercive diplomacy as practised by New Delhi has blurred its own case as to which was the aggrieved party and which was the belligerent.'¹⁶ S. Kalyanaraman argues that the Indian military mobilization between December 2001 and October 2002 made some limited gains (international acknowledgement that one basic cause of the troubles in Kashmir was Pakistan's support for terrorist activities),¹⁷ but failed to attain its overall objectives: Pakistan's stakes in Kashmir were too high; India lacked adequate leverage to exert full international pressure on Islamabad; there was an expansion of Indian objectives; the measures adopted by India were non-calibrated; and there was a needless persistence with the costly mobilization. The only concession which India seems willing to make to Pakistan was acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir. Since this was unacceptable to Pakistan, New Delhi had no credible offer for a negotiated compromise. Only in October 2002

15 <www.dawn.com/2003/03/29/top5.htm>

16 S. Kalyanaraman, 'Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy', *Strategic Analysis*, 26 (2002), 478–490. The revised draft of the paper was received by the Journal on 22 Nov. 2002.

17 On 3 April 2003, the Press Trust of India (PTI) quoted Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, as stating that Britain had voiced grave concern over the 'increasing evidence' of infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) from Pakistan. Straw wanted to see Islamabad 'encouraging' an end to all kinds of militant and terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir, PTI said. 'At the same time, [Straw] also sought the beginning of political process which would enable people of both sides of the LoC to live in peace and harmony'.
<www.dawn.com/2003/04/04/top10.htm>

did some elements of a 'cost-benefit analysis' result in the Indian decision to pull back some of its troop deployments.¹⁸ 'Indo-Pakistan and the whole subcontinent problem' was part of the 'broader agenda' that the U.S. plans to go back to after [the completion of the second] Iraq [war]', stated Secretary of State Colin Powell. His remarks implied that the India-Pakistan issue would be taken up to ensure that there is no threat of a nuclear war between the two sub-continental rivals. 'I don't know what was the occasion for him to say this but clearly time and tide wait for no-one', stated Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha. 'I must make it clear that the role of outsiders is limited to [reducing?] cross-border terrorism', Sinha emphasized.

U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi Robert Blackwill stated that tensions between India and its western neighbour remained a 'concern' to the US since it had large stakes in the region.¹⁹ What were these large stakes? The maintenance of a balance of power within South Asia and access to Central Asian oil to replenish Saudi oil stocks which were expected to be exhausted within twenty years were two possibilities.²⁰ But the original motivation in the war on terrorism is not easily to be dismissed. Some American commentators had earlier argued that, because of the risk of a nuclear confrontation, the U.S.A. should resolve the Kashmir dispute as a priority

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- 18 Bronwen Maddox in *The Times*, 17 Oct. 2002: <www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,173-449363,00.html>
- 19 <www.dawn.com/2003/01/23/top5.htm> Again on 15 February 2003 the White House reaffirmed that the United States would stay engaged in South Asia to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan: <www.dawn.com/2003/02/16/top5.htm>
- 20 Saudi Arabia would need to produce 22 million barrels a day by 2020 to meet increased world demand, far in excess of its current production of about 8 million barrels. 'The giant and super-giant oil fields are getting old, and some are clearly dying without being replaced', said Ali Morteza Samsam Bakhtiari, a senior official in the National Iranian Oil Company. He questioned whether Saudi Arabia was capable of reaching 22 million barrels a day. When asked about the importance of Saudi Arabian oil, President Bush stated that 'we must have an energy policy that diversifies away from dependence' on foreign sources of oil — including dependence on states that 'don't like America'.: <www.nytimes.com/2002/12/26/international/middleeast/26SAUD.html?todayshdlines>

over defeating the remnants of Al-Qaeda.²¹ But Pakistan's arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ('Al-Qaeda's address book')—on 1 March 2003, and his prompt transfer to the American-controlled Bagram airbase in Afghanistan (and thence to Diego Garcia),²² demonstrated that it remained crucial in the U.S. War against Terrorism. CNN terrorism expert Peter Bergen called his arrest 'the most significant thing that has happened against al-Qaeda since 11 September 2001'.²³ For all its rhetoric of support, India has not handed over any leading international terrorist to the Americans, let alone a key player such as the man believed to have master-minded the 11 September 2001 attacks. Without Pakistan's continued support, there was no prospect of capturing Osama bin Laden and the rest of his terrorist network.

While many commentators were prepared to concede that Pakistan had been unable completely to stop the movement of extremists into Kashmir, EU diplomats recognized that India's continued ruling out of talks with Islamabad did not assist President Musharraf's attempts to clamp down on reported cross-border infiltration. In addition, there was little sympathy in the EU for India's argument that its actions in Kashmir were part of a global combat against terrorism. 'There is no analogy between the international anti-terror drive and border problems in Kashmir', stated an EU diplomat as reported by the Pakistan daily *Dawn*.²⁴

The Indian commentator C. Raja Mohan, who was one of the first to apply the term 'coercive diplomacy' to Indian's military and diplomatic posture after 13 December 2001,²⁵ has

21 George Perkovich, 'Kashmir is more important than Al-Qaeda', *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, 27 May 2002. Perkovich argued: 'Washington must decide that if Pakistan does not act decisively and enduringly, the U.S. will declare Pakistan a state-sponsor of terrorism and suspend budgetary assistance — even if Pakistan counters with threats to suspend cooperation in the hunt for remnants of al Qaeda.' <www.ceip.org/files/publications/PerkovichKashmir.asp>

22 <www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,171-598806,00.html>

23 <www.edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/03/02/cna.bergen/index.html>

24 <www.dawn.com/2003/04/02/top10.htm>

25 The term itself originates with Alexander George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (repr. Boulder, Co., 1994).

stated:²⁶

If there [had been] no war on international terrorism after September 11, India would have had to invent it...

India cannot expect that the world will sit back and watch repeated military confrontations in the subcontinent just because India does not like third party interventions. Even the smallest statistical possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would inevitably draw the world into it, given the consequences of such a war. Armed with nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan are no longer free agents to pursue policies without interference from the rest of the world. The question is no longer whether South Asian security problems are internationalized. It is, whether India can take advantage of the internationalization of the Indo-Pak problems, in particular the Kashmir dispute.

...the Kargil experience told India that international interventions in Indo-Pak disputes need not necessarily be against New Delhi. It is this political assessment that led New Delhi to adopt the strategy of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan following 13 December. The underlying premise was that a credible threat of war would draw in the United States to put pressure on Pakistan to change course on terrorism and Kashmir. That precisely is what happened, at least verbally. The United States and India have extracted promises from Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism. While India waits for these promises to be implemented, there can be no mistaking the central fact that India has chosen to deliberately 'internationalize' the conflict with Pakistan in order to achieve its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan...

Indo-Pak confrontation since 13 December has brought the United States decisively into the subcontinent. After considerable reluctance the Bush administration appears to have decided to make a bid for lasting peace between New Delhi and Islamabad, for it cannot hope to come every once in a while to manage recurring crises between them. It has understood that conflict resolution will have to follow crisis management this time around...

If India can think big and act bold, a peaceful and prosperous subcontinent is within the realm of political imagination. An Indian strategy to shape such a future would involve shedding excessive suspicion of other great powers, finding ways to act in cooperation with them, and discarding the old slogans of 'internationalization', 'bilateralism' and 'reciprocity'...

If India fails to think and act in this bold manner, the dangers are very great. The remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban

26 <www.india-seminar.com/2002/517/517%20the%20problem.htm>

had still not been defeated in April 2003,²⁷ while the precedent of U.S. intervention in Iraq had become a dangerous one for the Indian sub-Continent.²⁸ 'People in the international community... realize that India has a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the U.S. has in Iraq', the Indian External Affairs Minister Jashwant Sinha stated, to which, on 3 April 2003, Pakistan Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamal replied: 'if they are thinking of pre-emptive action, Pakistan knows how to defend itself and respond to any misadventure.' Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri chimed in with the remark: 'India should not harbour any illusion of launching pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan as it would constitute a major miscalculation on India's part, leading to grave consequences.'²⁹ The risks of human error in nuclear brinkmanship have returned once more to the sub-Continent, or the risk that the control of policy succumbs to religious extremism. Rodney W. Jones comments in his introduction on the twin dangers of religious fundamentalism and military rivalry in South Asia:

The importance of reducing the risks of nuclear miscalculation under military pressure cannot be overestimated. Finding a way to achieve an honourable and practical solution to the problem of Kashmir is at the centre of this agenda. Rolling back religious extremism is much easier to visualize if external conflicts are not continually roiling emotions in both countries. No one who has looked into these issues believes quick and magic solutions are simply waiting to be plucked. But the severity of the nuclear dangers that now hang over the subcontinent make it mandatory that renewed energy and imagination be brought to bear to find a way out.

Professor Richard Bonney
Leicester, 4 April 2003

27 Afghan officials expressed concern about an increase in Taliban activity since the start of the war in Iraq, which they claimed appeared to have been orchestrated from Pakistani territory: Security Watch, Friday, 4 April 2003, based on Reuters.

28 Statements such as that of United Press International on 25 March 2003 that the 'U.S. might help India fight terrorism' would tend to emboldened Indian opinion.

29 <www.dawn.com/2003/04/04/top1.htm> <www.dawn.com/2003/04/04/top2.htm>

Introduction

Twin Nuclear Dangers in South Asia: Religious Fundamentalism and Military Rivalry

Rodney W. Jones*

Both India and Pakistan declared possession of nuclear weapons in the course of nuclear testing in May 1998, breaking from their earlier paths of ambiguity. This was a corrosive shock to the nuclear non-proliferation regime that had been built up painstakingly since the late 1950s, and in retrospect can be seen to have had lasting negative consequences. By late 2001, it had become painfully clear to thoughtful observers that at least two profoundly destructive nuclear dangers were percolating in South Asia. These dangers would have their biggest impact on the region, but also could have global consequences.

The first of these nuclear dangers is of nuclear war breaking out between India and Pakistan themselves. It is a danger that arises inherently from their long-standing political and military rivalry, and is stirred by their jockeying for advantage in the thus far intractable and consuming quarrel over the fate of Kashmir. Moreover this danger potentially includes China as a participant.

The second danger is the growth and intensification of religious fundamentalism in matters of security - in India, with Hindu fundamentalism, as well as in Pakistan with the Islamic counterparts. Religious fundamentalism carried into violent channels both interacts with and compounds the first danger, radically complicating efforts to deal with both. When religious fundamentalism encroaches on the policies,

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institutions, and crisis decisions of nuclear-armed states, it becomes a nuclear danger in its own right. Religious fervour and fatalism can be expected in the minds of decision makers to obscure and overwhelm sober awareness of the enormous lethality and irreversibility of nuclear destruction - facts that are intrinsically modern and secular by definition.

In the minds of contemporary Western leaders, the second danger - the nuclear connection with religious extremism - has come to the fore as a result of the events of 9/11. It has validated a concept of trans-national terrorist threat that now drives the US-led 'war on international terrorism' and the current campaign against Saddam Hussain's Iraq. It is taken for granted now that al-Qaeda and certain other international terrorist organizations active in Arab and Muslim countries have tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction and, if they get them, would use them against the West. But this nuclear terrorism phenomenon may be seen as a subset of the encroachment of religious fundamentalism on governments and nuclear security. With respect to South Asia, it is increasingly clear that the problem exists in both countries, even if its international dimensions are more visible and active today in one of them, and still latent or beneath the surface in the other.

Danger of Nuclear War

That there is a general risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, given the bitter struggle over Kashmir, should need little elaboration. Yet there is a curious complacency, almost blindness, about this matter among intellectuals and practitioners in India and Pakistan, and there is a puzzling echo of the same not only among many Western academic specialists but also government practitioners. This complacency is really a disbelief that governments as we know them would actually resort to the use of nuclear weapons, unless they had to retaliate against a nuclear attack. And, as the thinking goes, fear of this retaliation would inhibit any power from striking the other with nuclear arms in the first place.

This logic was inherited in South Asia from the retrospective analysis of the superpower experience with their nuclear

standoff during the Cold War. It has a following in the West from the international relations theories of Kenneth Waltz and his disciples. They argue that rational actors who govern nation states that possess nuclear arsenals will always calculate that the consequences of a nuclear war must be worse than any practical gain. Those rational actors therefore will be self-deterred from initiating nuclear strikes. This is a comforting theory and has been played back reassuringly by Indians and Pakistanis seeking to deflect international pressure against their nuclear weaponization. It is difficult to counter without running into the Indian buzz saw maintaining that the advanced countries sought to impose a form of 'nuclear apartheid'. This conversation stopper has worked more often than not in polite circles. In others, Waltz's arguments have become a matter of reassuring faith, a dogma of congenial discourse, if you will.

Yet the article of faith that a number of militarily deliverable nuclear weapons on both sides of a competitive divide will create a strong presumption of mutual nuclear deterrence and inhibit the aggressive use of military force by either side against the other has been vastly overstated, and must be considered a form of self-deception or wishful thinking. Pakistan's Kargil operation and India's reactive mobilization in 1999 are cases in point, as will be elaborated later.

Before examining the flaws in this argument in South Asia, we can refer briefly back to the revelations about the 'close call' the US and USSR had in avoiding nuclear warfare during the Cuban Missile Crisis - when both superpowers thought they had attained a reasonable level of nuclear maturity and certainly had far more trustworthy nuclear command and control measures than they did early in the atomic era, as for instance, in the early to mid-1950s. But aerial and signals intelligence had its shortcomings and both sides came very close to initiating strikes that had a high probability of escalating to nuclear war.

The most telling revelations highlighted by Russian interlocutors with former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara indicate that whereas the US believed that

nuclear warheads had not yet arrived in Cuba and therefore could not have been mated with operationally ready offensive missiles, retired Russian civilian and military decision makers have revealed not only that some of the Soviet warheads had arrived in Cuba but that local Soviet commanders there had received nuclear use authority and were prepared, in the event of a US attack on Cuba, to respond 'defensively' with offensive missiles that had the range to devastate a chunk of the south-eastern United States. Had President Kennedy employed the fallback US option of a heavy air strike to take out the missile sites, rather than the intermediate step of imposing the naval blockade ('quarantine'), it seems highly likely in retrospect that Soviet forces would have used nuclear missiles in Cuba to strike the United States, and the United States almost certainly would have retaliated directly against the Soviet Union.

If the United States and the Soviet Union came that close to beginning a suicidal nuclear escalation and exchange in October 1962, why should experts, foreign or South Asian, be so ready to accept that the induction of nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan - two contiguous states that have been at war four or five times (depending on what conflicts you count) - is a mature and stable proposition? It may well be true that both superpowers later built such massive arsenals and such prodigious intelligence systems, and also evolved important channels of communication, that the bipolar nuclear deterrence system did become fairly stable in deterring any serious contemplation of first strikes. But those conditions are absent in South Asia today.

Consequently, there are many reasons today to conclude on technical as well as political grounds that the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan today is inherently unstable.

This conclusion does not depend, by the way, on the assumption that the leaders on either side necessarily have itchy nuclear trigger fingers, or that they are somehow comparatively irresponsible - although charges of this kind have been aired. These frequently raised points have been red herrings for the most part, obstructing serious dialogue.

The important point here is that many classical measures of stable nuclear deterrence are missing between India and Pakistan today. Moreover, we should note that stable deterrence does not technically require friendship or trust; indeed, it can coexist with high levels of ideological and political hostility, as was the case through much of the Cold War, provided suitable underlying conditions exist and are respected.

Let me list here the more important of the classical conditions of stable nuclear deterrence from theory, and relate them to the actual conditions in South Asia. Many of the actual conditions in South Asia could be causes of technical or military instability in any nuclear crisis:

Conditions of Nuclear Deterrence Stability and Instability

Confidence in stable nuclear deterrence is easier to attain between rivals whose territories are separated from each other by buffer regions, and whose nuclear deployments are geographically distant from their targets.

India and Pakistan, by contrast, are territorially contiguous, without buffers, and distance to targets is relatively short, especially from India against Pakistan.

Stable nuclear deterrence is easier to achieve between large powers - that is, adversaries that are roughly equal (or symmetrical) in military capacity and that each have significant strategic depth. This was true for the superpowers, and has some resemblance today in Russian and US strategic relations with China, at least with respect to its considerable strategic depth.

Between India and Pakistan, by contrast, only India has strategic depth and its overall military capacity dwarfs that of Pakistan. Except for conventional ground forces and leaving uncertain nuclear capacities aside, the military power relationship is quite asymmetrical.

The critical condition for nuclear 'crisis stability' is that neither side have any confidence in being able to execute a successful disarming (or pre-emptive) strike against the other's nuclear retaliatory capabilities - presenting the surprised party with a 'use them or lose them' dilemma.

This means both sides must have nuclear retaliatory forces that will survive any surprise attack, or withstand any first strike, whether conventional or nuclear.

This condition may or may not hold between India and Pakistan today - as an offence/defence calculation, but is subject to change over time as survivability measures are incrementally improved. By the usual rules of thumb, however, it is possible to doubt even today that Pakistan has nuclear retaliatory forces that would withstand a well planned and successfully executed, protracted conventional air offensive by India.

Conversely, Pakistan does not present a conventional pre-emptive capability against India, nor could its nuclear forces be capable of successfully disarming India's in the foreseeable future.

Cold War experience suggests that good early warning systems, including a near real time or real time overhead surveillance capability, are desirable if not indispensable for strategic and crisis stability. These reduce the risk of misperceiving or miscalculating military activities by the opponent, and help check worst-case tendencies to over estimate the magnitude or readiness of the other's strategic forces. For the superpowers, these capabilities evolved and significant space-based surveillance arrived only in the 1960s. Mutual surveillance eased the road to negotiated strategic arms control, which many believed enhanced the stability of nuclear deterrence.

India and Pakistan are both making some headway in early warning and air- and space-based surveillance, but India has a significant lead over Pakistan in this area, another aspect of asymmetry. It is generally believed that neither yet has the technical surveillance and monitoring assets to be confident that it knows what is happening strategically on the other side in anything close to real time. Insofar as technical means make it easier to contemplate arms control, this incentive does not yet appear to have any purchase in Indian thinking.

Much is made today of the utility of sophisticated nuclear command and control as critical measures to guarantee nuclear crisis stability, if not deterrence stability in general.

The traditional nuclear powers evolved sophisticated capabilities in these respects. Indeed, the area of 'nuclear security' is critical in ensuring that unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is precluded, and that custodial and nuclear weapons handling measures provide safeguards against accidental nuclear detonations. Procedures for ensuring personnel reliability, and thus for preventing theft by insiders or terrorists, or transfer of weapons or sensitive information to outsiders, are, needless to say, vital. Early warning, surveillance and intelligence, already touched on regarding deficiencies in South Asia, are also integral to effective command and control.

Many security analysts who pay attention to South Asia are extremely anxious about the reliability of Indian and Pakistani nuclear command and control organization and procedures. This is, not surprisingly, an opaque area. And the deficiencies are indeed potential causes of loss of control in a nuclear crisis. But three points may be suggested.

First, both India and Pakistan are entering this area long after the advanced nuclear powers developed their own techniques, and the technologies that are widely available today mean that India and Pakistan are not starting from scratch. For instance, communications technologies available to both today are far more advanced than those the superpowers relied on in the early decades.

Second, both India and Pakistan - for reasons inherent in their pluralistic social and political composition, and because of the dispersal in each society of criminal and terrorist pockets - need to be exceptionally attentive to personnel reliability measures.

Third, remedying the shortcomings in early warning and surveillance will not be accomplished overnight, and will be very expensive.

In conclusion, once one adds up the pluses and minuses for India and Pakistan of the prerequisites of stable nuclear deterrence and nuclear crisis stability, many of the objective conditions today are highly unstable. Avoiding nuclear war there, once armed hostilities begin, is a very uncertain proposition.

Propensities for War and Escalation

Our review of the conditions of nuclear stability make it clear why Pakistan, like the US and NATO during the Cold War, does not consider it prudent to adopt, let alone advertise, a nuclear 'no first use' (NFU) policy. Leaving open whether and when Pakistan might fall back on nuclear retaliation against Indian conventional aggression is one of Pakistan's means of compensating for its comparative lack of strategic depth and its inability to match the size and firepower of India's large armed forces.

But we also have to consider political realities, including the levels of hostility between India and Pakistan, and the bitterness of the contest over Kashmir, to judge how serious the 'instability' in their military relationship actually is. It is the political grievances and unresolved disputes that really fuel hostility and carry the potential for war, and ultimately the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange.

The most significant 'data points' on the propensity towards instability under nuclear-armed conditions have been quite recent: (1) the mini-war over Kargil in the spring and summer of 1999; (2) the Indian force mobilization response to that event - so-called 'horizontal escalation' - through the remainder of that year; and (3) the Indian initiation of a massive conventional military confrontation with Pakistan from January 2002 to the present, ostensibly in reaction to the terrorist attack on India's Parliament on 13 December 2001, but actually an exercise in coercive diplomacy designed to focus Western pressure on Pakistan and portray Pakistan as a terrorist state.

Just a point or two about Kargil. This cloaked intrusion by Pakistani forces across the line of control (LOC) opposite Kargil in Kashmir took place roughly a year after the nuclear tests, and just months after the unprecedented Lahore Summit. What struck many Western observers was the brazenness of Pakistan's military action, leading some to conclude that Pakistan was 'testing' its nuclear deterrence of Indian capacity to respond effectively at the conventional level. In other words, many observers believed Pakistan was emboldened by possession of nuclear weapons to undertake 'strategic' moves against India where it was

most vulnerable, with impunity. They were struck by apparent Pakistani military willingness to take unusual risks. In my opinion this is an exaggeration of the motives and calculations of the Pakistani military, who were conducting another tit-for-tat operation as both sides have along the line of control, especially since India's invasion of Siachen in 1983.

But the more important point for nuclear stability, whatever Pakistan's motives and ultimate disappointment in the Kargil context, is that India responded effectively at the conventional military level to reverse the Pakistani gains, albeit at significant cost. India also mobilized forces to threaten 'horizontal escalation' along the international border to make it clear that it was prepared to conduct punitive operations directly against Pakistan, if the withdrawal was not effective. For India to threaten open war with Pakistan runs counter to the complacent theories of nuclear deterrence we touched on earlier.

The Kargil case thus made it clear in 1999 that India was gearing up to threaten limited war against Pakistan, irrespective of, or, if you like, in defiance of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. To do so meant that India was prepared to run risks of partial escalation within the conventional military space to impose its interests in Kashmir on Pakistan. Nothing could make clearer that the potential for both sides to move up an escalation ladder towards nuclear war was latent in that situation. The point was made even more fervently by India in its military brinkmanship during the latest, post-9/11 confrontation.

This brings us to the dimension of religious extremism and terrorism, as yet a further multiplier of the nuclear dangers. It should be noted, however, that the danger of nuclear war between India and Pakistan was quite palpable in Kargil after reviewing the classical conditions of nuclear stability and instability. It was not necessary to throw in there the issue of religious fundamentalism or extremism. But as we know, since 9/11, that issue has come to the foreground too, making the risk of nuclear conflict even more imminent.

Religious Fundamentalist Threats to Nuclear Security

Clarifying Terms

The impact of religious fundamentalism on nuclear stability is the second key danger. In turning to that problem, some clarification of terms and my assumptions is in order. The term 'religious fundamentalism' is often used indiscriminately, and my preference is to use the term 'religious extremism' for the nuclear security issues we have at hand.

'Religious extremism' can also take the form of 'terrorism in the name of religion', but organized terrorism appealing to religion is narrower and more specific than 'religious extremism', and 'religious extremism' is much narrower than 'religious fundamentalism' in general. This could be shown by Venn diagrams. Here is my quick definition of these terms.

Religious Fundamentalism: Religious fundamentalists, whether Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or Muslim are not necessarily predisposed as a general matter to impose their views through violence. The vast majority typically are simply pious or devout persons following religious precepts in their daily family lives and in their civic or community involvements. It is only a fraction, usually a very small fraction, of religious fundamentalists who turn deliberately to violence. Those who turn to violence deliberately should be regarded as 'religious extremists' or 'religious militants'.

Religious Extremism: Religious extremism is a political expression of religious dogmas. The security concern here is when the extremist fractions of religious fundamentalists impose their religious beliefs in politics and government by violent or coercive means. This can take the form of wanton killing of persons of another religious faith, or destruction of their property and livelihoods (usually termed 'communal violence', or, as in recent cases in Africa and the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing'). Religious extremism can manifest itself in generalized 'terrorism' of society, threatening open political systems and economies with breakdown. Religious extremism in politics is a religious variant of more general forms of political extremism - including what we have come to associate with fascism and communism, and violent political revolutions.

Terrorism: Terrorism is often an outgrowth of political extremism, religious or otherwise, and frequently is organized against incumbent political authorities in a sustained campaign for political objectives. Its distinctive trait is to attack ordinary civilians for political effect. States can also exploit terrorist methods to intimidate their own populations, for political objectives.

Interaction of Religious Extremism between India and Pakistan

Even before 9/11, the American optic on religious extremism focused on the Islamic variants of religious extremism that have expressed themselves in terrorist political agendas, whether against Israel or against the United States and its allies. That American focus on Islamic terrorism was, not surprisingly, even sharper after 9/11. What it lost sight of was the steady rise of religious extremism elsewhere, particularly of Hindu varieties in India. That has become a major concern for proponents of democracy in India, just as religious extremism in Pakistan deprives democracy of oxygen there.

More important for security analysis, the evidence is growing that the contemporary tension between India and Pakistan is greatly aggravated by religious extremism in both societies. The spread of religious extremism is now well known about Pakistan, but less remarked in India, at least by Western scholars and media. A corrective is needed here. It should also be said, since my remarks are brief and simplify complex trends that organized religious extremism has a long history in India - in the form of communal violence, and contributed to the emergence of independent Pakistan through partition. What we need to be aware of is that these trends are currently being reborn and expanded in new forms.

Religious Extremism in Pakistan

As we all know, religious extremism in Pakistan gained ground in the 1980s due to three new factors: (1) the utility of *jihad* vocabulary in organizing *mujahiddin* to fight the Soviets

in Afghanistan, a program in which the United States participated methodically behind the scenes until the Soviet intervention was repelled in 1989; (2) the effects of the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, which stimulated Shia sectarian ambitions in the Gulf and both pride and apprehensions within Pakistan's own Shia community; and (3) Saudi private sector propagation of Wahabi doctrinal influence through charitable donations to Sunni mosques and schools in Pakistan, as well as in other countries of the region. This stimulated competitive Shia donations from Iran and certain smaller Gulf states to Shia communities in Pakistan.

Within Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq gave more space to political Islam not only in elections and government representation but also in the continuing process of Islamization of Pakistan's law and institutions - a process quite at variance with the founding tenets of Pakistan articulated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah before his early death in 1948. Islamization further stirred Sunni-Shia sectarian consciousness and competition in Pakistan, and led to an intensification of sectarian violence. Extremist schools of thought - particularly the Deobandi, Wahabi and Ahl-e-Hadith variants - and their offshoots in militant Islamic political organizations flourished in this environment.

Their militancy found outlets not only in Afghanistan, first against the Soviets, later taking sides in the Afghan civil war - primarily with the Taliban; but also in Kashmir, ostensibly to free Muslims subject to oppression there - especially after 1989, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and when coincidentally an indigenous Kashmiri insurgency took off within the Indian-occupied portion of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Pakistani-based Muslim extremist organizations viewed their role in the Kashmir insurgency as a liberation struggle, but in India their violent methods were seen as terrorist. The events of 9/11 and the enormous US campaign against terrorism have enabled India to apply this stigma of terrorism with increasing effect to the Kashmir insurgency as a whole, both to its indigenous elements and to those of Pakistani origin.

In fact, driving the international community to apply the stigma of international terrorism not only to Pakistani extremist organizations involved in the Kashmir insurgency but to Pakistan as a whole was the central political objective of India's massive military mobilization against Pakistan in January 2002. The precipitating action for India's mobilization was, of course, a terrorist armed attack on India's Parliament, which India alleged was committed by Pakistanis and by implication approved by the Pakistani government. By adopting the means of coercive diplomacy and threatening a major conventional war, India mimicked certain aspects of the US model of the 'war against terrorism', making it difficult for the US and the international community to object strenuously at the outset. The 2002 Indian military brinkmanship with Pakistan undoubtedly raised the risks of nuclear war between them to an unprecedented level.

From the Indian point of view, any danger of nuclear war that may have arisen in the 2002 confrontation - and the Indian tendency has been to play down any idea that India would initiate nuclear weapons use - would have been due to Pakistani determination to protect its use of Islamic terrorist assets in Kashmir. By that logic, if there were any danger of religious extremists having a role in triggering general war or subsequent nuclear escalation, it would have been, from an Indian perspective, exclusively on the Pakistani side. India's military mobilization, nevertheless, stepped close to the brink. A punitive Indian invasion could have been triggered by another major act of terrorism, at any time last year, and the pressures that could have led to nuclear escalation would have been set in motion.

Religious Extremism in India

In India today, Hindu religious fundamentalism - or revivalism - is taking hold at the centre of the political system for the first time, and driving a much more aggressive Indian foreign policy than India had for its first 50 years of independence. This rise of Hindu religious consciousness has gone hand in hand with the decline of the once-dominant Indian National Congress party, which had a strong commitment to India's secular constitution and to protecting the rights of all

citizens, irrespective of their religious preference.

The successful ascent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to the apex of India's government in 1998 was accomplished in large part by methodically stirring Hindu nationalism (*Hindutva*) and encouraging the activities of extremist political allies, making them an ever more powerful force in India, especially in the urban areas. Hindu extremists lead and largely populate the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Bajrang Dal, and Shiv Sena. The VHP's financial strength can be attributed in part to the donations of wealthy Indian expatriates, primarily in the UK and the US.

The most important focus, initially, of the BJP's arousal of Hindu fundamentalist political activity was the movement to demolish the Muslim mosque, the Babri Masjid, in Ayodhya, and to construct on the same spot a Hindu temple, a Ram Mandir supposedly commemorating the location as the birthplace of Ram, the most popular Hindu deity. This movement surged in 1992 to demolish the mosque, and continues to this day in the slow legal process of winning permits and assembling materials to build the Hindu temple.

This same issue precipitated a violent attack by Muslims in Godhra, Gujarat, who were offended by taunts from Hindu militants in a railway train who had just returned to that province with their families after celebrating progress in construction of the Hindu temple at Ayodhya. This deplorable Muslim act precipitated, however, a pogrom of Hindu communal retaliation against Muslim communities throughout much of the state of Gujarat. It is alleged, credibly, that the BJP leadership in the state government of Gujarat conspired to let this wave of retaliation continue unimpeded for several days, while the BJP central leadership in Delhi delayed the introduction of the Army to quell the violence - the usual practice when events have spun out of control.¹ The Muslim loss of life and property was huge. The presumed motive for standing by rather than intervening to prevent escalating anti-Muslim violence

¹ *Harvest of Hatred. The Concerned Citizens' Tribunal Report on Gujarat, 2002* (Leicester, INPAREL South Asian History Academic Papers 7, 2003).

was upcoming elections in the state, and the recognition that the BJP would benefit from the resulting polarization of the electorate.

The Muslim trauma in Gujarat was the violent manifestation of a broader process of enforced cultural change by the BJP authorities where they hold sufficient power - to revise the history textbooks in the educational system, and to roll back the special provision for religious communities of autonomy in what is known as 'personal law' affecting matters of family, marriage, and inheritance. In effect, the BJP has set in motion a process of Hinduization analogous to the Islamization process that Zia-ul-Haq instigated in Pakistan.

While the effects of Hinduization to date would not seem to have any immediate bearing on the stability of India's still-evolving nuclear command and control system, the political impulses clearly reinforce the anti-Pakistan sentiments in India's predominantly Hindu society, and set the stage for a more belligerent and militarily coercive approach to Pakistan. But the long term effects of setting religious communities against each other in India certainly could sow the seeds for communal misgivings and reciprocal religious suspicion in hiring in the military forces and sensitive defence programs. This in turn could chill procedures for equal employment opportunity and start a vicious cycle of communally defined debarment and grievance - eventually affecting nuclear command and control recruitment and procedures.

Moreover, intensified communal violence and grievances in India could lead the majority community to view the national loyalties of Muslims as suspect - turning the old Muslim 'two-nation theory' topsy-turvy within India. The implications of such a trend would be particularly dangerous for India, and for stability in its relations with Pakistan, over the long run. Fortunately there are clear-minded Indian leaders outside the current government who have begun to react intelligently to these concerns - India in that regard still has a self-correcting leadership system. The question is whether the religious extremist forces that have been aroused within India can actually be rolled back. Most signs to date are far from promising.

It should also be noted for the future that the revival of Hindu mythologies depicting golden ages of India's past and the headwaters of the sacred rivers could be used chauvinistically to draw maps of a larger India that extends not only across Pakistan (and Bangladesh) but beyond the subcontinent into Tibet, China, Afghanistan, and other adjoining countries. While the evoking of such symbols from the past may seem unsustainable in today's fast-paced and science-filled world, it may be worth remembering that the two world wars were ignited and fuelled by contending nationalisms, including - in the case of Nazi Germany - preposterously contrived symbols of past mythologies.

Internal Threats to Stable Nuclear Command and Control

Could religious fundamentalism or religious extremism threaten stable nuclear command and control and lead to nuclear acts of violence that no responsible government would ever want? A few words on this subject are unavoidable after 9/11, and given the information that has surfaced about past links between Pakistani atomic energy program scientists, albeit retired, and al-Qaeda leaders then present in Afghanistan. The designs of Muslim terrorists who would turn weapons of mass destruction against governments locally as well as in the West put the spotlight on issues of stable national command and control over nuclear weapons.

This spotlight today dwells on Pakistan for what should now be obvious reasons. Al-Qaeda elements and Taliban sympathizers are present in the country. Moreover, for the first time, the Islamic political parties in Pakistan have a significant share of the seats in the National Assembly, and have formed provincial governments in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan.

Is it possible that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could come under the command of religious political party leaders, either by election or by a coup? Is it possible that international terrorist elements operating in Pakistan could seize some of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and brandish them in the name of Islam against India, or take them abroad to use against other countries? Is it possible that religious political

leaders of Pakistan would take a more assertive position against India, and openly threaten the use of nuclear weapons? These questions are on the minds of various analysts today, and perhaps on the minds of Western government officials. Even if my personal views were more optimistic, I have a feeling that these questions are not going to go away.

One could argue that similar questions should be posed about stable control over India's nuclear arsenal and the possibility of religious extremists taking charge of India's defence policies. I have touched on rising belligerency there as a portent of things to come. But to be realistic, it would take an unforeseen crisis - something like an Indian Chernobyl - to arouse the same international apprehensions about India's politics and nuclear arrangements. Otherwise, this type of issue is unlikely to be seen in the same way in both countries. In that light, Pakistan today has a unique burden to provide reassurance.

Practical Implications and Conclusions

The twin nuclear dangers we have reviewed here pose monumental challenges. Once states become nuclear-armed, reversing that course completely seems nearly hopeless - although it need not be viewed as hopeless in the long run. Reversing the growth of religious extremism is also a gigantic problem. But rolling back religious extremism in both societies is not only an urgent task but may be the best place to begin. Expatriates probably have a better initial vantage point for calling attention to this problem than citizens of India and Pakistan. Expatriates are freer to clarify and advocate remedial measures than citizens who are caught up in the politics of their countries. But ultimately, it will depend on leadership in each country, not expatriates, to find the political will to reverse course. Finding ways to insulate politics from religion, and keeping religion in private channels is a necessary condition for domestic harmony and international peace.

As a practical outlet for those who would like to do something about the problem or religious extremism, generating dialogues with the theme of inter-faith harmony

and conciliation has merit, and a variety of groups are already working in that area. Forming study groups to identify positive courses of action that Indian and Pakistani leaders could adopt to lead their political parties and interest groups, and - above all the youth, down fruitful paths of social and economic development could be very useful. Those who have special skills in using the media to attract attention to constructive alternatives and to shape opinion should work together in what are increasingly important international civic society channels.

The importance of reducing the risks of nuclear miscalculation under military pressure cannot be overestimated. Finding a way to achieve an honourable and practical solution to the problem of Kashmir is at the centre of this agenda. Rolling back religious extremism is much easier to visualize if external conflicts are not continually roiling emotions in both countries. No one who has looked into these issues believes quick and magic solutions are simply waiting to be plucked. But the severity of the nuclear dangers that now hang over the subcontinent make it mandatory that renewed energy and imagination be brought to bear to find a way out.

Fresh attention must also be given to the technical and structural dangers of nuclear crisis instability that I have described, and the growing burden of military budgets. These issues would become somewhat more tractable if the political tensions between India and Pakistan are lowered by diplomacy. Vision and political will must be mustered. On the military side itself, new measures to improve the discipline and disposition of forces can provide greater confidence in operational security, possibly raising the nuclear threshold and reducing the chances of a nuclear collision. But faster progress toward the same objectives would be made by eschewing military brinkmanship under the guise of the war against terrorism, and by pulling back heavy forces to their peacetime locations in cantonments and rear areas. Confidence-building measures can also play an important role in institutionalizing restraint and enhancing predictability, although such measures only work if they are both substantive (as opposed to symbolic) and are genuinely respected on both sides.

Coming from the other side of the Atlantic, I am conscious of how much scepticism there is here in Europe about the United States playing an intelligent and supportive role in addressing these problems in the Middle East or South Asia. Progress on resolving the core conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is utterly vital, and has slipped very badly for nearly three years. The events of 9/11 have provoked an understandably tougher posture in the United States, focused as it is on pre-emption of trans-national terrorism and as in Iraq, on stripping out the clandestine acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

US success in these objectives will depend on greater political sophistication and cultural sensitivity than Americans are typically equipped for. The US is fortunate to have coalition partners who insist it face the complexity that it might otherwise brush over. But US energy can make a decisive difference in regional disputes if the leadership of key regional powers such as India and Pakistan converge on serious approaches to resolving their own, most urgent problems. Indian and Pakistani leaders and domestic organizations, however, must bear the lion's share of the responsibility for stemming the tide of religious extremism, and will pay the biggest price if they fail.

The U.S. War on Terrorism: Religious Radicalism and Nuclear Confrontation in South Asia

Rodney W. Jones*

The new approach [to Iraq] is revolutionary. Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ... And the notion of justified pre-emption runs counter to modern international law ... The most interesting and potentially fateful reaction might well be that of India, which would be tempted to apply the new principle of pre-emption to Pakistan.

Henry A. Kissinger, 'Our Intervention in Iraq', syndicated column in *The Washington Post*, 12 August 2002.

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Introduction

Security crises have defined and reshaped US relations with South Asia nearly as often as they have with the adjoining Middle East. Nuclear and war-threatening crises have re-emerged in quick succession lately in South Asia. This makes that region arguably as dangerous to international security as the Middle East - not least when the shadow of a new pre-emptive war against Iraq looms on the horizon. The impact of radicalized religious groups is now a prominent part of these world-shaking regional crises.

To enumerate the most recent crises in South Asia: in May 1998, it was the overt military nuclearization of India and Pakistan - an ominous watershed. In May 1999, the Kargil conflict followed, a low-intensity war in Kashmir under the 'nuclear shadow'. In October 2001, the US counter-attacked al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan after the terrible 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States - a defining moment for much to come. In 2002, it was India's mobilized military confrontation with Pakistan, a defining moment for relations between India and Pakistan. That India-Pakistan military confrontation persists today - even though it seemed to lose some of its threat mid-way through the year.¹ In June 2002, senior American and British leaders finally interceded with some conviction in Delhi and Islamabad. What was this India-Pakistan confrontation all about? What does it tell us about the phenomenon of religious radicalism and violence in that part of the world? How close did India and Pakistan get to the beginning of a hot war before July 2002? What were the odds that the outbreak of a hot war could have degenerated into a spiral towards nuclear war? Would this military confrontation have even arisen from the 13 December 2001 attack on India's Parliament, had the US global 'war on terrorism' not been

¹ The confrontation began to subside, though it did not end completely, after elections in Indian-held Kashmir and the national elections in Pakistan, by October 2002. This study was completed in August 2002. The epilogue was added in November 2002.

underway in Afghanistan, nearby? Did the broader 'war on terrorism' shape India's specific objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan in this confrontation? Is this current confrontation a harbinger of more to come? Does it tell us anything about a deeper issue, namely, whether the ongoing tension between India and Pakistan would be easily resolved if the element of religious radicalism were taken out of the picture? Or is the conflict deeper than that?

This paper is an overview of the meaning of the India-Pakistan military confrontation. The analysis necessarily reflects the impact of religious radicalism and militancy, not only on the confrontation itself, but on the relationship between India and Pakistan, and the US role in that region, since 11 September 2001. It argues that the US 'war on terrorism' radically increased the potential capacity of militant organizations to trigger war between India and Pakistan, a war that neither side would ultimately benefit from and that almost certainly would have catastrophic consequences if it went nuclear. It acknowledges that the 13 December terrorist attack on India's Parliament was a serious provocation, but concludes that it was not sponsored or engineered by the state of Pakistan and was really as much an attack on the government of Pervez Musharraf as on the ostensible target in India.

It further argues that India dangerously overreacted by choosing to exploit military brinkmanship for coercive diplomacy. India's overt aim was to force Pakistan to outlaw militant organizations operating across the line in Indian-held Kashmir and to get the support of the international community to make this permanent. In essence India hoped to seal off Kashmir irrevocably from Pakistani influence, to drain the Kashmiri struggle for independence at its roots, and to turn Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir into a normal state inside the Indian union. India's underlying aims seem to have reached even deeper. Taking advantage of the war on terrorism, India sought to stigmatize Pakistan permanently in the eyes of the world as a terrorist state, thereby marginalizing its external influence altogether. India also sought to convince the United States that it has been the victim all along, partly to defuse the reaction to its nuclear

ambitions. In fact, India largely succeeded in realizing these objectives, at least for the near term, although how far it succeeded in stigmatizing and marginalizing Pakistan remains to be seen.

With this Indian strategy in mind, the paper argues further that while religious extremism has become an ingredient of the India-Pakistan rivalry, the underlying conflict is political and will not be resolved merely by restraining religious zealotry. Moreover, India's incentives to find a negotiated solution to the Kashmir problem with Pakistan actually shrink to the degree that Indian and Western perceptions of the problem are expressed in terms of religious militancy and equated simply with 'terrorism'. The most important implication of this judgment is that the risks of nuclear war between India and Pakistan will remain at a high level because military crises over Kashmir are likely to recur, in the absence of serious trilateral negotiating efforts to achieve a political solution.

As for the changing US role in this region, the paper argues that the military crisis acted as a post-Cold War catalyst which induced US leaders to choose sides between India and Pakistan - on ideological as well as geopolitical grounds. The ideological grounds favoured India given its reputation as a democratic and constitutionally secular state. But the geopolitical grounds were crucial. US interests seemed to mesh with India's vocal opposition to the same international terrorist sources (Arab and Islamic) that are now feared most in the West today.

Pakistan, by contrast, has been stigmatized in the West increasingly, as a consequence of its drift from an essentially secular government before 1977 to one with increments of Islamic content. Its failure to evolve stable democratic institutions, its increasing sectarian violence, its October 1999 lurch back to military rule, and its original sponsorship and continued sympathy for the Taliban in Afghanistan have reinforced an image that does not sit well in the West. In the wake of al-Qaeda's attack on the US homeland and President Bush's mobilization of a 'war on global terrorism', it was ironic but not surprising that the new US administration would

view Pakistan with underlying suspicion and India with greater warmth.²

The net effect on the core issue of India-Pakistan relations has been US gravitation towards an Indian perspective on the violence in Kashmir and away from a clinical understanding of the legal and political origins of the dispute. This further adds to the risks that the subcontinent will be swept up into a holocaust before the Kashmir problem is resolved on a constructive basis.

2 Several ironies surface in closer inspection of these issues. The rise of Osama bin Laden and the Islamic zeal of the guerrilla warfare against the Soviet Union in the Afghan liberation war of the 1980s were encouraged and partially financed by the United States, along with Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. The sponsorship of the Taliban itself, a successor movement that arose well after the Soviet withdrawal, was not US-inspired, but leading Americans, including some highly placed in the current Bush Administration, were advocates of official recognition and normalization of diplomatic relations with an aspiring Taliban regime in Kabul during the mid- and late 1990s.

I. US Policy and Military Operations in Afghanistan: Impact on India and Pakistan

To understand the deeper meaning of the current India-Pakistan military confrontation, it is important to explore the broader geopolitical context. The impact of the US policy reaction to 9/11 on Pakistan and India, and the success of US military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, did much to define this context. President George W. Bush declared the global 'war on terrorism' to be the primary focus of an American effort abroad for as long as it might take, and challenged every nation to choose sides - to join the US against international terrorism, or side with terrorism as a US enemy.³ Then in the cross-hairs, the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan faced the same draconian choice, either to expel Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, or face the full military force of the United States and its allies, backed by the United Nations.

When Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar rebuffed Pakistani intercession and defied the US demand to expel the Taliban's 'honoured guests', President Bush's 'for-or-against terrorism' demand required Pakistan and India - as well as China and Russia, the Persian Gulf states, and the newly independent Central Asian countries - to choose sides. For most of the other Afghan ethnic factions, especially the Tajiks and Hazaras of the Northern Alliance who had barely beaten back Taliban control over the entire country, the choice was obvious. American pressure on each entity was intense after September 2001, because their choices could either impede or facilitate effective US military intervention and pursuit of al-Qaeda elements hiding in Afghanistan.⁴

3 Since dubbed the 'Bush Doctrine', the stark good vs. evil formula announced by President Bush in his 20 September 2001 speech to Congress said: 'Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'

4 While this paper focuses on the post-9/11 dynamics of South Asia, it is crucial to remember that the US response to the terrorist attack on its homeland was comprehensive, politically and financially, using all the tools of diplomacy, intelligence,

Few governments in the region, however, grasped how quickly and skilfully the United States could employ conventional and unconventional warfare in so isolated and primitive a country as Afghanistan. In the first Gulf War, the build-up to drive Iraq out of Kuwait had taken months, with the support of Saudi Arabia allowing the allies to stage forces on its territory. Iraqi forces were heavily equipped, but cumbersome and vulnerable to effective Allied air power. Landlocked Afghanistan, however, was a different situation. Taliban leaders apparently believed US long-distance air strikes would be ineffectual against Taliban forces hidden amongst their countrymen in towns, or bunkered down in mountain fortresses and caves. The Taliban fully expected to deliver to American soldiers who ventured on land the same fate Soviet soldiers had suffered at the hands of Afghan *mujaheddin* in the 1980s. Indeed, Pakistanis, Indians, and Iranians probably wondered whether the US was about to stumble into quicksand and be painfully bloodied by low-tech, guerrilla tactics.

For Pakistan, making the 'right choice' as Bush posed it was not really in doubt. The magnitude of President Bush's commitment to the war against terrorism was conveyed. General Pervez Musharraf came out unequivocally on the US side from the start, abruptly, albeit painfully, abandoning the Taliban. An elected government of Pakistan might well have dithered longer, because the 'right choice' was acutely difficult for Pakistani leaders, for a number of reasons. The most important was that such a choice meant abandoning the Taliban not only as a natural ally but as a creature of Pakistan's decade-long efforts to pursue stability and lasting influence in Afghanistan following the Soviet expulsion. Fortunately Pakistan did not have a stake in al-Qaeda, and no intimate official ties with Osama bin Laden and his Arab associates.

law enforcement, and finance to pursue, isolate, constrain, and starve the components of the globally far-reaching al-Qaeda terrorist network. The military operations focused in Afghanistan have been the most visible part of the 'war on terrorism', but are only one part of a long-term, multi-faceted campaign to root out and crush global terrorist organizations, including others that may cooperate with al-Qaeda leaders.

A. Pakistan's Stakes in the Taliban

As Ahmad Rashid has described so well,⁵ the Taliban (Islamic student) movement sprang from Pushtun refugees in Pakistan, concentrated in temporary camps in western Pakistan. Pushtun young men who had grown up in these camps were drawn back to the Afghan homeland after the Soviet exit, but under civil war conditions in their country. These youths had been trained in the use of small arms (carrying weapons was a natural legacy of their culture) and taught to believe they could impose a peaceful, Islamic moral order on their country. Most had no deep memory of traditional social life in Afghanistan itself, many had lost their parents, and, being displaced, few were accustomed to the valued roles women played in Afghan society. The Taliban religious outlook was a product of the free, but largely Quranic, obscurantist education available to boys in the austere camp environments. Their teachers themselves typically were religious leaders (*maulvis* or *mullahs*) from Deobandi or Wahabi brands of fundamentalist Islam who ran traditional religious schools (*madrassas*) with hostels, frequently using them as recruiting grounds for political ends.

When the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the US essentially washed its hands of responsibility for the future of that debilitated country. Having defeated Soviet power and installed a weak Islamic republic under Tajik cleric Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul, Afghan *mujaheddin* groups increasingly quarrelled among themselves on ethnic and tribal lines and most of Afghanistan succumbed to internal warfare. Pakistan's elected, bureaucratic and military leaders could not so easily ignore this turbulence and groped for a strategy that would restore civil order beyond Pakistan's borders in Afghanistan.

Under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Interior Minister Naseerullah Babur in 1993, the government of Pakistan worked out a two-fold strategy toward Afghanistan: (a) to support the revival of traditional Pushtun rule in the hope of extinguishing inter-tribal war, suppressing banditry,

5 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, 2000).

re-opening roads, reviving trade with Iran and Central Asia, and securing Afghanistan for Western-financed pipeline projects that could provide Afghanistan revenue while transporting natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and on to India; and (b) to pre-empt Pushtun revival of the demand for a separate Pushtun state (Pakhtunistan) that had threatened Pakistan's integrity in the northwest tribal belt for many years after independence, by ensuring the primacy of Pushtun stakes in Afghanistan's future.

The Taliban movement emerging from the refugee settlements provided a natural political vehicle for this Pakistani strategy. It depended on the cooperation of the Islamist political parties that sponsored the Taliban in the camps. The task merely involved lightly arming and training Taliban cadres, and negotiating their entry through Quetta to join those Pushtun militia leaders inside Afghanistan who deplored the country's internal disintegration and aspired, however crudely, to pacify, reunify and rebuild Afghanistan. The Pakistani military intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) - which had served as the main American and Saudi conduit for training, financial support, and transferring arms to the Afghan *mujaheddin* - became the overseers and managers of Pakistan's assistance to the Taliban. This ISI role was secretive, but it was no rogue operation - as some in Pakistan and the United States may now wish to believe. Rather, it was the policy of Pakistan's elected governments from 1993, including that of the Harvard- and Oxford-educated, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's first woman Prime Minister.

The Taliban gained a regional foothold around Kandahar in 1994 and then rapidly spread within southern and eastern Afghanistan, seizing Kabul and asserting a claim to govern Afghanistan in 1996, with all but a north-eastern tenth of the country falling under their sway by 1998. Some financial support for the Taliban came from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Taliban regime was formally recognized by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates as the government of Afghanistan. Other governments and the United Nations either continued to recognize the first *mujaheddin* (Rabbani) government even after it fled Kabul, or declined to recognize the Taliban regime, hoping that

diplomacy and United Nations relief could patch together a workable coalition government more representative of the country as a whole.

Almost invisible to Westerners at the start, the Taliban project at first was not considered objectionable in Washington. The Taliban became anathema only later, after word of its brutality spread. Having seized power in Kabul, the Taliban's inhumane governing practices undercut its once positive reputation for disarming warlord factions and bringing peace in one locality after another. From Kabul, the new regime imposed uniquely harsh judicial procedures and tried to force the surviving remnants of Afghanistan's battered urban society to give up music and entertainment. On pain of beating or even execution, men were forced to grow beards and wear traditional clothes, and women to leave jobs and whenever outdoors to wear the head-to-toe covering known as *burqas*. Western revulsion was aroused by media reports of the Taliban's draconian interpretation of Islamic law, confinement of women, suppression of female education, arbitrary arrests, mutilation or execution as punishments, and intolerance of non-Muslim religious minorities.

However much the Taliban was eventually despised in the West, it was not the offspring of, nor originally associated with, al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden apparently left Sudan in 1996 and moved back to Afghanistan some time in 1997. Thereafter, al-Qaeda gradually extended influence over the Taliban by spending its own resources to win the favour of senior Taliban leaders. Al-Qaeda also provided armed support and guidance to Taliban fighters who were fighting the Northern Alliance forces and other autonomous factions elsewhere in the country. The United States only focused on the significance of the Taliban's grant of sanctuary to al-Qaeda after its bombing of US Embassies in east Africa in 1998.

Towards the end of its tenure, the Clinton administration put considerable pressure on Pakistan to arrange communication with Taliban officials, hoping to persuade them to expel Osama bin Laden and his associates. But the Taliban's counter demand was that it be recognized as

Afghanistan's *de jure* government. This price the United States was unwilling to pay. How deeply the Taliban depended on al-Qaeda for military operations against the Northern Alliance was not apparent to ordinary observers until after 9/11. What was clear, however, was that Pakistan had a major stake in the Taliban's claim to govern Afghanistan, was opposed to the Northern Alliance, and could not disengage from those positions in Afghanistan, short of a world-shaking crisis. 11 September brought just that crisis.

This analysis indicates that Pakistan's stakes in the Taliban were not based in a common religion or on matters of Islamic principle, *per se*. Pakistan was interested in geopolitical objectives, not in the religious aims of the Taliban, or in the Taliban's parochial justification of a strict Islamic discipline. Pakistan hoped to foster order through a client regime in a war-torn country on its borders. In doing so, it aimed to promote the revival of trade, to link Central Asian energy resources with the subcontinent, and to extinguish any Pushtun impulse to tear part of Pakistan away as a separate Pushtun state.

Exploiting reservoirs of Afghan Islamic fervour was useful to Pakistan (as well as to the United States) against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and useful again to Pakistan in helping the Taliban come to power, but the Taliban movement's Islamic fundamentalist orientation was never for Pakistan's government an end in itself. Only a smattering of individual Pakistanis and fundamentalist groups - mainly Pushtun tribes and Islamic political parties with roots in the Pushtun tribal regions - identified with the Taliban cause emotionally or ideologically. For the Pakistani authorities, the Taliban's religious appeal was only a tool.

Far more basic for Pakistan's government, and painful to abandon, was the aim of Pushtun dominance within Afghanistan as a means of resolving the civil war and opening the way to the trans-Afghanistan energy project. In achieving this aim, to cut off the Taliban even after George W. Bush threw down the gauntlet was tantamount to sacrificing Pushtun interests in Afghan politics and undermining Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan's stability

and its own security. Pakistan's view of the power of the Northern Alliance, perhaps mistakenly, was that it jeopardized stability in Afghanistan. Thus, when Pakistani chief Pervez Musharraf turned against the Taliban under US pressure, the decision was acutely difficult. Because Pakistan's strategy toward Afghanistan - and its own security on its western borders - was based on a successful Taliban campaign for power, it required accepting a fundamentally different calculation of Pakistan's national interests.

The new calculation was that Pakistan could not afford to be stigmatized by the West as a terrorist state. Once the Taliban refused to dissociate itself from al-Qaeda, Islamabad recognized that the US would regard the Taliban as a *de facto* 'terrorist' regime, and a legitimate object of military attack. For Pakistan to be associated with the Taliban political cause after that would not only put Pakistan on a slippery slope towards international ostracism but could be used, potentially, to justify military attack on Pakistan itself. Indeed, it was exactly this sensitivity that India latched onto when it initiated a military confrontation with Pakistan after the attack on Parliament in December 2001. But before we examine that crisis, the dramatic progress of the US war in Afghanistan and the potential effects Kashmir side of Pakistan's Afghanistan-related entanglement need separate discussion.

B. The Military Campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda

Pakistan had to decide very quickly whether it would support the US military effort in Afghanistan. Senior Pakistani officials announced on 15 September, *within four days* of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, that they had agreed to give 'full support' to US efforts to combat international terrorism.⁶ President Musharraf's address in

⁶ See Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, 'Pakistan Moving Armed Forces: Focus Shifts from India as "Full Support" for U.S. is Vowed', *The Washington Post*, 16 September 2001, A-9. Pakistani officials indicated that Pakistan would 'provide detailed intelligence information to the United States on bin Laden and the Taliban', seek 'to control illicit fuel and other materials from crossing the border into Afghanistan [and] 'permit US military logistical and technical personnel to operate at Pakistani air

Urdu to the nation three days later informed his people that the United States had demanded military over-flight rights, logistical support, and intelligence cooperation against three targets - Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and international terrorism.⁷ Musharraf noted that the US had won United Nations support and confided to the nation that neighbouring India had offered its military facilities to the US in the hopes of isolating Pakistan and getting it declared a terrorist state. Musharraf made it clear to his countrymen that Pakistan had to assist the US; otherwise

bases, ports and some other locations in support of attacks against Afghanistan.' They suggested that the US had not sought permission to bring ground combat forces into Pakistan but that, if asked, Pakistan 'would consider a request for a multinational force that included representatives of Muslim nations.' The article reported that the Pakistani 'military also was preparing plans to protect the country's ... nuclear facilities ... from the possibility of a stray missile or other aerial accident.' This last point hinted at a deep Pakistani concern that Indian, Israeli, or even US aircraft transiting from India' military capabilities.

- 7 Highlights of President Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, *Dawn*, 19 Sept. 2001, on-line edition. An investigative *Washington Post* article, 'the Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges', 29 January 2002, provides a colourful and pumped up account of the senior Bush administration officials' rush on Musharraf after 9/11. Thinking through what the United States would ask of Musharraf and Pakistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Deputy Richard Armitage put on their list: (1) stop all al-Qaeda operatives at the border, intercept all arms shipments to Afghanistan moving through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for bin Laden; (2) obtain blanket over-flight and landing rights; (3) get access to Pakistan's naval bases, air bases, and borders; (4) obtain immediate intelligence and immigration information; (5) get Pakistan to condemn the 9/11 attacks and 'curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism against the [United States], its friends or allies' (knowing such a demand could not be fulfilled even in the United States); (6) cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and prevent Pakistani volunteers from joining the Taliban; and (7) get Pakistan's commitment, in the event the evidence strongly implicates Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and if the Taliban continue to give him and the network sanctuary, to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end all support for the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his network.

four vital interests of Pakistan would be in jeopardy - its sovereignty, its economy, its strategic (nuclear and missile) assets, and its cause in Kashmir. Musharraf and his advisors apparently drew the line, however, at inserting Pakistani military forces into Afghanistan.

Despite concerns about a violent domestic political backlash from political parties and groups that had links with the Taliban as well as the threat of al-Qaeda or Taliban attacks across the border, Pakistan thus committed itself almost overnight to give the US valuable flight corridors over its territory and access to stage US search and rescue forces at facilities near Karachi in the south and closer to Afghanistan at the Pakistani military airfield near Jacobabad.⁸ Pakistani forces also provided backstopping for US operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban later, by attempting to seal the mountainous borders so as to prevent

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- 8 US access to the Jacobabad airfield reportedly was negotiated as a 'semi-permanent' presence. Pakistan agreed to remove from the facility all but liaison personnel from its own air force, and to allow the US to build air conditioned barracks for US military units. See Kamran Khan and John Pomfret, 'U.S. Extended Presence Agree to by Pakistan: Air Base to Serve as "Key Facility" in Region', *The Washington Post*, 14 December 2001, A-57. But Pakistan had to reclaim partial use of Jacobabad airfield later in late December and January after India launched its military confrontation. By that time, U.S. access elsewhere, including cities within Afghanistan, reduced its need to depend so heavily on Pakistani facilities. Kamran Khan and Thomas E. Ricks, 'U.S. Military Begins Shift from Bases in Pakistan', *The Washington Post*, 11 January 2002, A-1, A-9. US forces also operated from the Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi airfields. Pasni airfield, located at the foot of Baluchistan province on the Arabian sea coast, 10 miles from the Pakistani naval base at Omara, is one of the oldest airfields in the region, having been used during World War II by allied forces. Though small with one major runway, it can handle Boeing 737 jet aircraft. Dalbandin, a small civil airport, is also in Baluchistan, about 230 miles due north of Pasni, and less than 50 miles south of the Afghanistan border. Dalbandin is in use by US forces as a refueling facility for special operations helicopters. Shamsi, in use as a Marine forward operating base, is smaller and in an even more remote part of Baluchistan, near Washki, about 50 miles south of Dalbandin. See Global Security.org pages: <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/pasni.htm>; <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/dalbandin.htm>; <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/shamsi.htm>.

hostile units fleeing across the border into Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence and security forces also cooperated with covert US forces in efforts to hunt down those al-Qaeda and Taliban elements that succeeded in entering Pakistan to take refuge, or to slip out of the country.⁹

Operation Enduring Freedom against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan began with air strikes on 7 October 2001. Saudi Arabia had vetoed US use of facilities on its soil for the attack and Iran denied access through its airspace. This put a much greater burden on US aircraft carriers and other naval forces that assembled in the Arabian Sea, on bombers that had been flown to Diego Garcia and some that flew all the way from the United States, and on the prodigious use of aircraft refuelling capabilities.¹⁰ But to the surprise of most observers, Russian President Putin gave his blessing to the US counterterrorist effort and the leaders of three post-Soviet central Asian states neighbouring Afghanistan - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan - provided the US air access and staging facilities nearby Afghanistan in the north and west. Use of these facilities greatly eased US cooperation with the Afghan Northern Alliance and the Uzbek elements that had re-established a presence under Gen. Rashid Dostum and that would retake Mazar-i-Sharif.

As a result, the US not only was able to use its own infiltrated ground spotters and air strikes to destroy exposed Taliban military assets and installations - there were relatively few big targets - but was able to use its airborne firepower to break down the front lines of the Taliban forces opposite the Northern Alliance, enabling the Alliance and

9 At the height of operations in Afghanistan, in December 2001, the number of US military and special operations personnel in Pakistan had reached a reported level of about 1,500. Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, 'Pakistan May Hold Key to Afghan Result: Musharraf Must Decide How to Deal with al-Qaeda Fighters Fleeing Across Border', *The Washington Post*, 20 December 2001, A-20.

10 While US forces dominated, the British provided an aircraft carrier and helicopter ship and committed 4,200 soldiers to the effort, France and Italy also each provided a carrier and naval task group, and Germany, Canada, Australia and New Zealand each made special contributions to the campaign.

the other anti-Taliban forces that re-emerged to advance, taking Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Herat and Konduz in succession. Mazar-i-Sharif fell on 9 November. Kabul was retaken on 12 November, and Herat fell the same day. Konduz, where a combined force of about 20,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban forces put up a fierce resistance, fell on 24 November.

A thousand US marines were airlifted on 26 November into a remote landing strip (dubbed Camp Rhino) fifteen miles south-east of Kandahar to provide protection for a build-up of helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, and the entry of additional special operations units. This also provided the US with a staging area inside Afghanistan to pursue operations in the Pushtun areas to the north and east, including near the border with Pakistan. Coupled with well targeted air raids, the ground presence of US combat forces helped break the main, residual Taliban resistance in the south, stimulated defections, and forced the hard core to disperse into hiding. Kandahar fell on 7 December.

Aided by the Rome political process of negotiating a new Afghan government, Hamid Karzai's leadership had begun by this time to make significant headway among Pushtun elements in the south and east that could absorb defectors and accommodate the Northern Alliance in forming a new government in Kabul. The US-assisted Afghan meetings in Rome helped negotiate agreed steps to constitute a new, representative government in stages - and made the level of international commitment to rehabilitating Afghanistan clearer.

Special combat operations shifted once Kandahar had fallen to the White Mountains, near Khost, adjoining Pakistan, where al-Qaeda and Taliban forces had taken refuge in fortified and well-provisioned mountain caves and bunkers. The Tora Bora operations heavily bombed the cave complexes and ground units then cleared most of them on the ground by early January 2002. Several hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were taken, with many shipped to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba for interrogation. A significant number of the al-Qaeda Arabs at Tora Bora evidently slipped through into Pakistan, however. In March, US and allied forces gathered in Operation Anaconda to attack a well

dug-in al-Qaeda/Taliban force of about 1,500 fighters in the Shah-e-Kot Mountains south of Gardez in north-eastern Afghanistan. Anaconda produced the largest number of US casualties in a single Afghan operation, but apparently took a heavy toll on the enemy, killing an estimated 400 to 800 opponents. Again, some of the fighters melted away into Pakistan, although in this case Pakistani forces intercepted and fought small units, capturing and turning over a number of al-Qaeda members to the US for interrogation.

In roughly six months, US and allied military intervention coupled with the residual anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan had radically transformed the situation. Momentum increasingly favoured the formation of a new Afghan government - although it was clear that such a government would be hard put to establish order through out the country and develop the capacity, even with international assistance, to conduct a far-reaching economic and social rehabilitation programme. Pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance remained, with a capacity to harass the emerging Karzai government and foment perceptions of disorder, but by summer 2002, these isolated elements no longer held the capacity to counter-attack the US and allied presence in any major way.

During that military campaign, the radical Islamic backlash that the Musharraf government had feared would erupt within Pakistan launched a handful of demonstrations but then largely subsided during the remainder of 2001. Considerable anti-American feeling and anger with Musharraf's decisions percolated below the surface but potentially massive, violent agitation was contained. Meanwhile, the level of violence in Kashmir rose to a degree. Then on 13 December 2001, halfway through the military campaign, terrorists struck the Indian Parliament and precipitated a full Indian military mobilization against Pakistan.

C. Pakistan's Gains from Renewed US Attention

Musharraf's quick and essentially unconditional decision to support US access to Afghanistan through Pakistan's territory and airspace paid important short-term dividends

to Pakistan. The US had been moving away from the sanctions policy toward both India and Pakistan that it had imposed after each country's nuclear tests in May 1998 and used this opportunity to drop temporarily many of the provisions affecting financial and non-sensitive material assistance. The US also approved a financial aid package for Pakistan that permitted the rescheduling of its international indebtedness, lifting a cloud from its economy.¹¹ But the most important gain for Pakistan was the sudden US need for Pakistan's military and intelligence support, a reflection of Pakistan's geopolitical importance in pursuing the initial stages of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan - giving Pakistan an unexpected opportunity to get back into the good graces of Washington.

During most of the 1990s, the Clinton administration had courted India assiduously, even before the BJP's ascent and the shock of the nuclear tests in early 1998, and continued to seek an improved relationship despite the nuclear shocks. Pakistan's covert military operations across the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir near Kargil in May 2001 precipitated a mini-war with India that could have escalated. President Clinton's use of his good offices to persuade Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to end this conflict and withdraw Pakistani para-military forces behind the LOC measurably improved Delhi's disposition toward the United States. Much the same trend towards a closer US-India relationship continued in the Bush administration. The increasing tilt towards India and away from Pakistan was in sharp contrast to the special relationship Pakistan had had with Washington during the Cold War years. But the 9/11 crisis showed, at least momentarily, that India's military and intelligence value to the United States in launching

11 The United States provided Pakistan a grant of \$600 million in November 2001, after US military operations had begun in Afghanistan. The US formalized the agreement restructuring Pakistan's \$3 billion debt nearly a year later, at a signing ceremony on 23 August 2002 in Islamabad. The package included loans from US Aid, US Eximbank, and the US departments of agriculture and defense. Also under discussion has been cancellation of Pakistan's \$1 billion US debt. See Farhan Bokhari, 'Pakistan Debt Schedule Agreed', *Financial Times*, 24-25 August 2002, 3.

the war on terrorism in Afghanistan was less than Pakistan's, once it was clear that Pakistan's cooperation was readily available.

In addition to reviving Pakistan's importance, the US military presence within Pakistan, albeit limited and restricted largely to southern Pakistan, could have been construed to have an implicit deterrent value against direct Indian aggression on Pakistan, at least while the tempo of operations in Afghanistan remained high and Pakistan's active cooperation in pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban elements who fled into Pakistan was needed. This calculated judgment may have eased Pakistan's initial decisions to shift some military capability away from the east, facing India, to seal the borders and provide a form of backstopping of US and allied operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, raising barriers to cross-border infiltration.

It became clear later, however, that this unspoken deterrence was not comprehensive or robust. It did not dissuade India from mounting a sustained conventional military confrontation in December, and the US moved rather slowly in 2002 - staying far quieter about the risk of nuclear war in the subcontinent than its previous policies would have implied - before it began to press India to unwind the confrontation in June and July. Nevertheless, the operations in Afghanistan gave Pakistan opportunities to put its relationship with Washington on a more productive footing, and to compete for Washington's attention after years of losing ground. If momentum is sustained in repairing this relationship, it could pay very significant dividends to Pakistan over time. It is too early to tell at this juncture whether this will be the case.

Judging by the reaction of its media and attentive public, Indians were greatly outraged by the attention Pakistan got from the United States after Musharraf signalled his support to Bush and US military operations in Afghanistan began. This belied the fact that US efforts to build a broader relationship with India not only stayed in high gear but intensified, drawing satisfaction from India's strong rhetorical support of, and offer of its facilities for use in, the war against terrorism. India's disarmingly positive reception of

Bush's decision to withdraw the US from the ABM Treaty, coincidentally announced on 13 December 2001, was received by the Bush administration as an unexpected boon.¹² Thus, while the war against terrorism brought Pakistan back to the foreground, it did not nothing to diminish India's growing influence in Washington, although this would not have been apparent to an outsider watching the intense indignation and recrimination in the Indian press and television.

D. Afghanistan, Islamic Militancy, and the Nexus with Kashmir

Musharraf's ability, or that of any government of Pakistan, to join the US war on terrorism and cut off the Taliban next door posed two other serious risks to Pakistan's interests. One was that Islamic extremists could destabilize Pakistan domestically, making it hard to govern. The other was that Pakistan's influence with India over the Kashmir question (Pakistan's leaders believed this had been revived by the insurgency that began in Kashmir in 1988-9) would now be neutralized. Pakistan's 50-year old claims to that disputed territory might be lost irretrievably. It remains a fundamental tenet of Pakistani politics that no government that makes deep concessions on the future of Kashmir, let alone surrenders it to India altogether, can survive.

These two threats were intimately intertwined in the aftermath of 9/11. Musharraf had to face the dilemma that Islamic militancy would be aroused at home by the assault on the Taliban and extremism could overturn the moderate core and national goals of Pakistan itself. Yet Islamic

¹² US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited India as well as Pakistan in October 2001 to address US needs and the tension between India and Pakistan, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Delhi in November 2001 to mollify India's irritation over the renewed US-Pakistan military relationship, as well as to discuss the possibility of deepening military-to-military contacts with India and US readiness to expedite specific military sales that had been embargoed earlier due to India's nuclear proliferation. Adding Britain's weight to US efforts to combine Pakistan's and India's contributions in a common front against terrorism, Prime Minister Tony Blair twice visited the subcontinent in the same period.

militancy operating within Kashmir itself, led in part by Kashmiri Muslims, was also viewed as a crucial source of pressure on India to negotiate Kashmir's future. Moreover, Islamic militancy was increasingly being seen abroad as the core of 'international terrorism', and this could stigmatize all efforts to free Kashmiris, including native Kashmiri insurgents, as forms of terrorism.

Fundamentalist Islamic political parties and groups emerged in British India long before India and Pakistan became independent, and have always been a troublesome undercurrent in Pakistan's modern politics, much as Hindu extremist groups have been in India. Islamic extremist tendencies during Pakistan's early years were restrained or diffused by the conduct of elections and the moderate outlook on Islam that was prevalent in the subcontinent, as well as by the usual bread and butter issues of all politics. Islamic fundamentalist parties collectively have won relatively few seats in Pakistan's past national and provincial elections.¹³

Nonetheless, the potency of Islamic fundamentalist parties and the violent propensities of their armed militia formations have increased over time in Pakistan. Contributing factors or stimuli came from the military seizure of power from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, the shock effects on the wider region of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the mobilization of *mujaheddin* groups to carry the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s. In the period since the Soviet withdrawal, the smouldering civil war in Afghanistan, a secular slow down in the Pakistani economy, stagnation of the public school system, and the

13 Competition among the various Pakistani Islamic political parties in past elections has split their vote, ensuring that few would win seats against mainstream parties in 'first past the post' election districts. In October 2002, the Islamist parties formed an alliance and picked single candidates to compete for most seats, consolidating rather than dividing the vote of religious sympathizers. As a result, in 2002 for the first time, the Islamist parties won a larger number of seats in proportion to their roughly 20 per cent share of the actual vote. In this respect the electoral strength of the Islamist parties taken together increased only slightly in 2002 over results of the past.

initially spontaneous emergence of a liberation struggle in Indian-held Kashmir have given the Pakistani Islamicist organizations, and not just Islamic extremist groups, additional footholds.

A common analytical theme that has emerged among analysts in the wake of these developments is that a nexus has emerged between extremist Islamic groups and their allegedly terrorist operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir - creating a so-called Kalashnikov culture. While there may be a kernel of truth here, it is also a gross oversimplification to ascribe the aims of these groups and the political linkages that may exist among some of them to the singular design, common inspiration, and coherent direction of Pakistani military and security organizations, notably the ISI. Where official ties with these groups may exist to use them externally, the internal objectives are to play them off against each other and prevent them uniting against the state.

Islamic religious fundamentalism, Islamic political radicalism, and Islamic armed militancy are distinct conceptually, and their organized forms seldom if ever exist under a single roof. There is no homogeneous Islamic fundamentalism, but rather a variety of schools of thought, many cultural variants of each, and even more varieties of styles of Islamic life and behaviour - readily visible when moving from one Muslim society or community to the next. 'Terrorism' as a generic phenomenon - targeted killing of innocents - is as antithetical to Islamic tenets as it is to the mainstream of any world religion, or to the norms of modern civilization. Political violence frequently has a political context without which it is not properly understood. By understanding political violence in any particular instance, one need not condone it or justify it, or hesitate to pursue means to stop or eradicate it. But neither is it productive automatically to equate 'terrorism' with freedom struggles against invaders and occupiers, revolutionary actions against perceived tyranny or oppression, or the use of force in response to force over a historical dispute - whether differences of religion are involved or not.¹⁴

14 Subsequently, Pakistan's foreign minister made similar points at the United Nations Security Council on 20 January 2003.

That said, several Pakistani fundamentalist political groups have not only willingly joined the Afghan wars and the Kashmir insurgency - against 'foreign occupiers' as they see it - but have, like the *ayatollah* and *pasdaran* movements against the secular regime of the Shah of Iran - developed revolutionary aspirations vis-à-vis the liberal constitution and representative governing institutions of Pakistan. Their goals are to replace the existing political order with their own concepts of Islamic society.

Naturally, the actual content of their visions of Islamic society varies from group to group by school of thought and by organizational proclivity. In most cases the vision of an Islamic order is traditional and based on the Sharia, but their styles of interpretation of Islamic law and tradition vary. One of Pakistan's three most prominent Islamicist parties, the Jama'at-e-Islami (JI), actually has a modernist idea of Islamic revival that accommodates genuine learning and even natural science, and thus has strong appeal in certain intellectual, professional, and middle class circles. But the JI counterparts in Afghanistan and Kashmir do not necessarily subscribe to the same programme or ideas, or draw from the same social base, as the JI in Pakistan. While the government of Pakistan actively supported the role of these groups in Afghanistan, their efforts in Kashmir are best understood as an extension of their efforts to

Referring to the issue of religion and attempts at equating Islam with terrorism, Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri said: 'Terrorism has no creed, culture or religion'. He declared that 'Pakistan resolutely rejects attempts to identify our noble religion — Islam — with terrorism'. He rejected India's efforts at equating the Kashmiri people's 'freedom struggle' with 'terrorism', stating that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people. 'Equating such a freedom struggle with terrorism is unjust and unacceptable', he commented. He went on to add: '[the] Kashmir dispute can and should be resolved through dialogue between Pakistan and India.'

<www.dawn.com/2003/01/21/top2.htm> Later still, on 1 April 2003, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, stated: 'No other issue is as central in Jammu and Kashmir as cross-border terrorism' and added: 'to the extent to which any other country would pressure Pakistan as part of the global war on terrorism, it is fine but it is our war.'
<www.dawn.com/2003/04/02/top12.htm>

build platforms for the takeover of political power within Pakistan itself.

Moreover, one should understand the revolutionary aspirations of these Islamic parties not in terms of how many votes or seats they can win in national elections but rather in terms of how they build bastions of local influence, incrementally. This is achieved by the largest and arguably most aggressive of these Pakistani Islamist organizations, the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) - which split many years ago into two branches led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, respectively. The two JUI organizations use intimidation and infiltration of authority, the building of mosques, development of welfare institutions, publication of local language newspapers and magazines, recruitment of supporters, targeting and acquisition of disputed land and property, and accumulation of other resources, at the local levels to aggrandize power and influence in society. JUI leaders pursue these goals in a decentralized way - in districts, towns, and major cities. The armed militias not only provide protection to the leaders and their political activities but also serve as agents in putting the squeeze on vulnerable local property owners and influentials.

Some of these organizations also ruthlessly exploit the sectarian divisions of Islamic society, especially Sunni vs. Shia, confusing their ultimate with near term and situational objectives. The leaders of these organizations are often quite entrepreneurial, and some of the most successful also receive funds from Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states. In their defensive and essentially introspective response within Pakistan, Shia leaders and organizations have also received financial help from Iran. The Pakistan-based extremist groups that have been most active in the fighting in Afghanistan as well as those that have joined the insurgency in Kashmir are generally Sunni by sectarian affiliation.

Views differ on whether the activities in Kashmir of the Pakistani militants were also actively sponsored by the Pakistan government, or provided official assistance by some cabal of bureaucratic and military officials behind the

scenes. But there seems little doubt that successive political and military governments turned a blind eye to the infiltration of these groups into Kashmir to join the insurgency in the early 1990s. It is also possible that even if the militant formations were privately recruited and trained that they found tacit encouragement in Islamabad's official political and military circles. *Mujaheddin* training of Pakistani recruits, and perhaps some combat experiences with groups in Afghanistan were readily transferable to Kashmir. The influx of light arms and ammunition to support the guerrilla war against the Soviets left stockpiles that could be put to other uses.

The insurgency in Kashmir began spontaneously in late 1989, led by native Kashmiri militant groups that recruited fighters from a younger generation of Muslim Kashmiris who were frustrated with Indian political interference in state elections and government. It was some time therefore before groups in Pakistan began to react in an organized way, with the infiltration and support of militants from Pakistani sources broadly welcomed by most politically active Kashmiris in the Vale of Kashmir, especially in the initial years.

In the development of resistance objectives and tactics, several of the Pakistani militant groups developed reputations for taking greater risk and using more aggressive tactics against Indian security forces than their Kashmiri counterparts, but a majority of these groups shunned wanton terrorism - avoiding direct attacks on civilians and ordinary Kashmiri property. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), based essentially on Kashmiris in both Pakistan- and Indian-held parts of Kashmir, for instance, began with a militant approach to Indian security installations (avoiding violence on civilians, and never deliberately terrorist) but changed course later to adopt exclusively political methods.

A handful of Pakistan-origin extremist groups, however, did cross the line during the 1990s to terrorist actions, pure and simple, including capture and execution of foreign tourists, as well as other attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Pakistani-origin groups reportedly associated

with such activities in the early 1990s included al Badr (sponsored by the Pakistani JI) and Harkat-ul-Ansar, later renamed Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin. The Harkat-ul-Ansar was the earliest of these militant Pakistani or Kashmiri organizations to be put on the list of terrorist organizations by the US Department of State. The sponsor of the Harkat was the Sami-ul-Haq branch of the JUI in Pakistan; this branch of the JUI is believed to have had closer Afghanistan ties than any of the other Pakistani Islamic parties, and is suspected of having early contacts with Osama bin Laden, dating back to the late 1980s during the Afghan war against the Soviets.

In the late 1990s, the Lashkar-e-Ta'iba (sometimes written Lashkar-I-Tayyaba), sponsored by the politically invisible but Wahabi-dedicated Ahl-e-Hadith, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, a more recent extremist offshoot of the Sami-ul-Haq branch of the JUI, became active in Kashmir. India fingered the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-e-Ta'iba as the source of the attack on Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001, claimed that the attackers were Pakistanis, and accused Pakistan of sponsoring their attack. The State Department also added these organizations to its official list of terrorist organizations in December 2001. India began a full-scale military mobilization of 700,000 troops opposite Pakistan - along the entire border and in the Arabian Sea - and made a series of demands, including total cessation of Pakistani-origin infiltration and 'terrorism' in Kashmir.

II. Military Brinkmanship: the Indo-Pakistani Confrontation of 2002

Our interest in the military confrontation between India and Pakistan is not merely in the precipitating events but rather its meaning in the larger context of the war on terrorism, Indo-Pakistani relations, and the knotty dispute over Kashmir. India had adopted a higher profile since September 2001 in seeking to brand the insurgency in predominantly Muslim Kashmir as a concerted campaign of foreign 'terrorism' against India - sponsored by Pakistan

and possibly linked with al-Qaeda as well. India had thus set the stage for an intense reaction to Pakistan in the event any major terrorist incident inside could be linked to Pakistan and used as a trigger.

Does India's accusation that Pakistan was behind the 13 December terrorist attack on Parliament stand up under scrutiny? How did Musharraf respond to India's charges? Why did the confrontation last so long? How close to the outbreak of war did the sides come? If India had launched a conventional attack, would this have started a chain of events that might have culminated in nuclear war? Why did it take so long to defuse this confrontation? Once one steps back from it, how much was this confrontation driven by religious extremism? What lessons does it contain for the future regarding religious radicalism and conflict in that region?

A. Terrorist Attack on Parliament Triggers India's Brinkmanship

Indian security guards effectively disrupted the suicide attack by five armed terrorists on India's Parliament building before the gunmen could enter the building. The ensuing shootout resulted in the death of all five attackers (one committed suicide by detonating explosives on his person) and of nine security guards and paramilitary troops. No members of parliament were injured nor, apparently, were even in the line fire. Indian intelligence agencies claimed through tracing cell-phone calls made by the attackers that they belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Ta'iba, among the most violent of the organizations active in Kashmir and well known to be Pakistani in origin.¹⁵

Since the attackers were all dead and the cell-phone links to collaborators pointed to Kashmiris on the Indian side, there was no compelling forensic evidence released at that time that the attackers or collaborators themselves were actually Pakistani citizens.¹⁶ But whether they were

¹⁵ See Rama Lakshmi, 'Indians Blame Attacks on Pakistan-Based Group', *The Washington Post*, 15 December 2001, A-23.

¹⁶ India endeavoured to convince the media that the attackers were Pakistanis. It even allowed the three Indian TV stations

Kashmiris from India's side or Pakistanis, the terrorist attack on India's Parliament obviously was not in Pakistan's interest. It is hard to imagine situations that could have been more damaging to Pakistan's interests at that time.

One can safely assume that the two organizations fingered probably were indeed the perpetrators. But what were the actual motives of those who sponsored or carried out the attack? The effect of the attack on India's Parliament clearly was a serious blow to Musharraf's leadership and to Pakistan's prestige, whether that was a motive or not. Embarrassing and weakening Musharraf and attempting to get him to back away from his support of US operations could have been one secondary objectives of the groups that sponsored the operation, but such a motive would have been more plausible after Musharraf's January 2002 crackdown on extremists. It obviously was a central motive in the kidnapping and assassination of Daniel Pearl in January 2002, and in other attacks on foreigners and Christian institutions within Pakistan that increased in frequency from the spring through the summer and autumn of 2002.¹⁷

It is more than likely that the attackers of India's Parliament gave no thought, even if they were Pakistanis, to the stability or welfare of Pakistan's existing government. A

to interview an alleged suspect named Afzal who reportedly told his interviewers in Hindi that the leader of the operation did a reconnaissance of several possible targets before their boss in Kashmir chose the Parliament as the final target.' This prisoner reportedly told the interviewers that the attackers were from Pakistan and had made calls to their families the night before the attack and informed they they were embarking on a 'big job'. See Rama Lakshmi, 'India, Pakistan Leaders Rule Out Meeting at Summit', *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2001, A-26.

¹⁷ This was a more obvious explanation, however, of the 23 January kidnapping and subsequent assassination of Wall Street Week journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi, six weeks later. It is by no means obvious in the terrorist attack on parliament on 13 December. As to increasing incidences of terrorist violence against Christian churches and hospitals and Western embassy or consular facilities in Pakistan, see the list in Kamran Khan, 'Attacks in Pakistan Linked: Officials Tie Strikes on Western Targets to al-Qaeda, Taliban', *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2002, A-1, A-16.

more ambitious objective might have been inciting an Indian military attack on Pakistan and provoking war between the two countries. This theoretically could serve the domestic political purposes of the sponsors of Jaish and Lashkar within Pakistan, by enraging and radicalizing the Pakistani population, and making them more susceptible to aggressive Islamic leadership. But it is not a convincing explanation for this operation at that time.

Perhaps the most plausible motivation for the attack on Parliament was the aim of weakening India's determination to hold on to Kashmir - two militant groups pursuing their own version of the Kashmir freedom struggle - by striking at India's heart. Interestingly even the Indian exhibition of evidence, for what it is worth, suggests that the operation may have been intended to take members of Parliament hostage for a few days - an act that could have elevated the media visibility of the Kashmir struggle astronomically.¹⁸

India's outrage over this assault on Parliament was understandable and the fact of terrorism in this incident cannot be trivialized, but the length to which India went in reaction seemed utterly disproportionate to the incident. The proximate terrorist aims of the attackers - to assassinate elected Indian national leaders - were totally foiled by the units assigned to protect the Parliament building.

India used this occasion, nevertheless, to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring the attack.¹⁹ Three days after the attack on

18 The police suspect named Afzal (see note 12) who claimed to be familiar with the operation, reportedly told his interviewers that: '[The participants in the operation in phone calls home] said the 10-year-long fight in Kashmir had not brought any good results... unless Delhi was attacked, the Indian government would not yield.' Afzal also said the attackers were carrying food in their bags in the hope of holding lawmakers captive inside the Parliament building for a number of days. If this account is true, it suggests the aim of the operation was not necessarily to kill but rather to seize hostages and, in that case, was completely botched. See Rama Lakshmi, 'India, Pakistan Leaders Rule Out Meeting at Summit', *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2001, A-26.

19 L.K. Advani, Home Minister (responsible for internal security) and apparently being groomed as Atal Bihari Vajpayee's

Parliament, the New Delhi Police Commissioner issued a report that tenuously connected Pakistan's ISI with a collaborator in the conspiracy.²⁰ India quickly mounted a campaign of 'coercive diplomacy' cloaked in the same themes that President Bush used in launching the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, implicitly threatening pre-emptive war on Pakistan to root out terrorists.²¹ India dramatically cut all air, rail, and road links with Pakistan, recalled its ambassador from Islamabad, placed constraints on Pakistan's ambassador in Delhi, and initiated a mobilization

successor as Prime Minister, went on record on the day after the attack to claim that 'a neighbouring country [Pakistan] that has been spreading terror in India' was the source. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh also announced on 14 December that 'India has technical [and credible] evidence that yesterday's terrorist attack on the seat of Indian democracy was the handiwork of a terrorist organization based in Pakistan, the Lashkar-i-Taiba.' Although he refused to give further details, Jaswant Singh demanded that Pakistan take immediate action against both the Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, by arresting their leaders and freezing their assets. Lakshmi, 'Indians Blame Attacks'. Prime Minister Vajpayee joined the accusation chorus the next day, saying 'A neighbouring country was inspiring the terrorists in carrying out subversive acts in India. The sponsors are destined to doom.' Naresh Mishra, 'Pakistan on Alert as India Steps Up Criticism', *The Washington Post*, 16 December 2001.

20 The connection made by the New Delhi Police Commissioner's report in this case offered no evidence that the ISI directed or materially participated in the attack on Parliament but merely alleged that a suspect in police custody [apparently from Indian-held Kashmir] had admitted that he had been trained at an ISI camp in Muzaffarabad in the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir. Whether this testimony was voluntary, whether it would stand up in court, and whether it was directly connected with the attack in question or about an experience long in the past, was not subject to public examination. Nevertheless, the Police Commissioner grandly assured reporters: 'The ISI connection is very clear... The things which have come to notice clearly show that ISI was connected with this, and if ISI is connected with it then Pakistan must know of it.' See 'The World in Brief: Asia: Pakistani Agency Accused in Fatal Attack', citing the Press Trust of India and Reuters, *The Washington Post*, 17 December 2001, A-20.

21 Rama Lakshmi, 'India Wages a War of Words: Pakistan Again Assailed for Attack, U.S. for Its Response', *The Washington Post*, 19 December 2001, A-32.

of the bulk of its armoured and mechanized military forces along the border with Pakistan and began moving the leading edge of its naval combatants towards the Arabian Sea to hover opposite Karachi.²² India maintained this war footing for over six months, and only partially relaxed this posture in late August 2002.²³

Caught up in the heat of the pre-emptive war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the US administration ironically was in no position to seek to contain India's overreaction, and with the shift in mood in Washington in favour of India, perhaps was not exactly inclined to. No doubt, India analysts will claim soothingly, in retrospect, that India was never close to launching war, and perhaps this was the message behind the scenes between Delhi and Washington.²⁴ But

22 India also threatened a variety of other measures. India's deputy foreign minister, Omar Abdullah, said in a 21 December interview that India was considering revoking the bilateral water-sharing treaty with Pakistan - an important milestone of cooperation negotiated in the first decade after independence, might suspend trade agreements, and could request that the U.N. Security Council take action against Pakistan under an anti-terrorist resolution. Two days earlier, the Bush administration placed Lashkar-I-Taiba on the list of banned terrorist organizations and froze its assets. See Pamela Constable and Rama Lakshmi, 'India Recalls Pakistani Envoy: New Delhi Signals Its Anger Over Attack on Parliament', *The Washington Post*, 22 December 2001, A-12.

23 Reporting on the scale of the increasing Indian military buildup, and the Pakistani response, began to appear just before Christmas. By this time, the air in Delhi was thick with reports of India considering military strikes against Pakistan. L.K. Advani talked openly about using 'hot pursuit' against terrorist camps in Pakistan as 'legitimate under international law'. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Pakistan, India Mass Troops: Tensions Escalate as New Delhi Considers Strike', *The Washington Post*, 24 December 2001, A-1 and A-11.

24 That India staged the brinkmanship mainly to force the United States to put additional pressure on Pakistan was reported at the time as a calculated Indian strategy. Mindful of the consequences of an all-out war, some Indian officials privately concede that the troop movements were not part of an offensive strategy, but rather an effort to get the United States to more forcefully push the Pakistani government to crack down on militant groups that strike India from bases over the border. 'We are keeping up the warmongering to get the U.S. to put pressure' on Pakistan, one senior official said. Chandrasekaran,

one can hardly look back at this crisis, whether manufactured or not, without recognizing that it is a foreboding precedent for how future terrorist-driven crises in the subcontinent could erupt and then explode into war.²⁵ At the height of the tension, a second terrorist attack that actually succeeded in killing some of the top Indian leadership or any urban concentration of women and children would certainly have triggered India's opening war at some level against Pakistan.

India set forth a series of escalating demands on Pakistan. In addition to insisting by implication that Islamabad proves that it was not responsible for sponsoring the attack. India demanded that Pakistan immediately halt what Delhi had long called 'cross-border infiltration' and now redefined in slogan-like fashion as 'cross-border terrorism' in Kashmir. India called on Pakistan to ban the organizations and effectively shut down the operations of the Lashkar-e-Ta'iba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and extradite to India of some 20 persons (almost all listed as criminals by Interpol, mostly Muslims, but hardly any Pakistanis) whom India claimed were guilty of acts of terrorism in India. India also shifted the diplomatic burden of muting its own response to action by the big powers, suggesting that only their pressures on Pakistan to comply with Indian demands could bring hope of Indian restraint.

Underneath this Indian brinkmanship, India's prime objectives were threefold. First, and probably most important, was to capture Western energy then being poured into the war on

'Pakistan, India Mass Troops'. Early in the crisis, Brookings South Asia expert, Stephen P. Cohen, also held this view, calling the Indian moves a 'sound and light show' to force the US to play a stronger role with Musharraf. Peter Slevin, 'Pakistan Groups Called Terrorist Organizations: Powell Names 2 in Formal Declaration', *The Washington Post*, 27 December 2001, A-20.

25 India's military leadership joined the coercive diplomacy showmanship just before Musharraf made his major conciliatory speech of 12 January 2002. India's new Army chief, Gen. Sundarajan Padmanabhan made unusually bellicose remarks on 11 January. He reportedly said that Indian forces were 'fully ready' for war and the massive buildup on the border 'is for real'. Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'Head of Army Declares India is Ready for War', *The Washington Post*, 12 January 2002, A-14.

terrorism to vaccinate India's position on Kashmir irrevocably against international intervention, and to remould international views of the nature of the problem. This Indian position is that the major part of Kashmir, which India holds is an integral part of India, and codified in India's constitution; Kashmir is no longer subject to dispute, and Pakistan's claims can be relegated to the dustbin of 'ancient history'. India sought to project the longstanding unrest in Kashmir as solely a product of terrorism waged against the population of the state as well as against the security forces.

The second and intimately related objective was to seize the opportunity to draw the United States and as much of the West as possible into India's corner, as a strategic gambit, by being 'more Catholic than the Pope' in India's own approach to the war against terrorism. Indian officials and publicists subtly reinforced international perceptions that the core problem in South Asia, as well as between Israel and its neighbours, is an Islamic one - a malady of a particular desert religion that invariably goes radical (read 'radioactive') when it is ignited by politics. Even Osama bin Laden's vocation of terrorism against the West is, in this polemical caricature, a natural expression of the belligerent proclivities of Islamic belief, rather than merely a crass manipulation of religion for political ends. Playing judo, India was craftily using the West's new passion for its own ends.

The third Indian objective is as old as Pakistan and independent India itself, to isolate and marginalize Pakistan in international affairs. India's resentment of Pakistan is profound. If Pakistan cannot be diminished to the status of a banana republic, India would still like to shrink its relative importance as a thorn in India's side to Cuba's level against the United States, a testy and noisy but easily manageable problem.

India's capacity to isolate Pakistan during the Cold War failed because the East-West struggle gave Pakistan front-line utility in the Western strategy to contain the Soviet Union, even as late as 1989 when the Afghan war terminated. It failed partly because India's diplomacy never looked for equitable, *quid pro quo* bargains, but rather

assumed it should be treated as a unique power with a great destiny. India traded in prestige rather than geopolitical security and stability - brushing aside the deeper interests of others. Only the Soviet Union, as an underdog, got better treatment by India, and even that was hardly a sterling relationship in Delhi.

Once the Cold War was over, India awakened to a different set of imperatives. The most important of these new imperatives were recognition of the greatly decreased importance of Russia as a bargaining instrument against the West, and the acceleration of China's race to the stature of a great power - especially, but not only, in international trade. In this context, India finally adopted a pro-Western outlook. In this same context, the war on terrorism is a grand opportunity for India to resume its efforts to marginalize and isolate Pakistan.

Was religion the key driver here? In one sense it was - it is the real divide between India and Pakistan, the basis for Pakistan's (and Bangladesh's) separateness. But the longer one watches the rivalry between these states, the more one sees that age-old struggle for power as the main dynamic, defined now in a national context. It is a culturally imprinted struggle, in which memories of past civilizations, Hindu and Islamic, count for a great deal. But this struggle would exist whether religion were radicalized or not, whether extremist groups had formed or not. What the radicalization of religion does is intensify the propensities toward violence, on both sides.

B. Pakistan's Response: Cracking Down on Militant Groups

Musharraf's immediate response to India's brinkmanship was twofold: He put the Pakistan Army on 'high alert', and threatened to retaliate with force if India took 'any kind of precipitous action'.²⁶ He denied any direct role of Pakistan in the terrorist attack and called on India to provide evidence to support its claims.²⁷ Musharraf declared emphatically

²⁶ Mishra, 'Pakistan on Alert'.

²⁷ Pakistan's defence spokesman, Major-General Rashid Qureshi, called for a joint investigation of the incident. See 'The World in Brief: Asia: Pakistani Agency Accused in Fatal Attack'.

'We will take action against anybody involved in Pakistan in these acts, *if at all proved*. We would not like Pakistani territory to be used against any country, including India.'²⁸ But Musharraf sought to protect Pakistan's equities in Kashmir by maintaining the position that Pakistan's moral, diplomatic and political support for the political struggle of Kashmiris was legitimate and totally defensible. He refused to be pushed into a corner that would define all militant activity on behalf of Kashmiri rights as terrorism.

Despite the fact that India provided no specific or forensic evidence to Pakistan at all, either informally or through diplomatic channels, Musharraf took bold action by any past Pakistani standards, in a sustained effort to defuse the crisis and reduce the military pressure on Pakistan. On 24 December Musharraf's government froze the assets of Lashkar-e-Ta'iba, and the following day announced the detention of Masood Azhar, the Pakistani founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed.²⁹ Colin Powell's announcement on 26 December that both Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Ta'iba had been designated terrorist groups by the United States³⁰ added impetus to Musharraf's crackdown on extremist organizations. On 31 December, Islamabad announced the detention of two dozen Islamic militants, including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, head of the Lashkar-e-Ta'iba, and Musharraf announced, 'I want to eradicate militancy, extremism, intolerance from Pakistani society. And ... I would like to eradicate any form of terrorism from the soil of Pakistan.'³¹

By the first week of January, Pakistan had arrested about 200 militants in ten days. It also began to arrest Punjabi leaders of the Sipah-e-Sahabah and Tehrik-e-Jafria,³² Sunni

28 Mishra, 'Pakistan on Alert'.

29 Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Kamran Khan, 'Pakistan arrests Islamic Militant: Massood Azhar Led Group India Blames for Attack', *The Washington Post*, 26 December 2001, A-24, A-26.

30 Peter Slevin, 'Pakistan Groups Called Terrorist Organizations'.

31 Craig Whitlock and Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'Pakistan Detains Islamic Militants', *The Washington Post*, 1 January 2002, A-1, A-15.

32 Craig Whitlock, 'Pakistan Arrests Scores of Islamic Radicals', *The Washington Post*, 5 January 2002, A-18.

and Shia organizations that fought each other with violence on sectarian grounds, neither being deeply involved in Kashmir. Musharraf used the occasion to restrain not only externally oriented extremist organizations but also those that inflicted violence on Pakistanis at home. But the Indian pressures continue to mount. A meeting on the margins of the SAARC summit in Nepal had not been productive.³³

Musharraf finally made a carefully prepared speech on 12 January. In the context both of the war on terrorism and India's demands, the most significant feature was an explicit, wide-ranging condemnation of terrorism and extremism, both inside and outside Pakistan. He specifically condemned the December attack on India's Parliament and the suicide attack some weeks earlier on the Kashmir legislature, and said 'no organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir' (Document Six).³⁴

The Pakistani President's declarations and promised action agenda went a considerable distance to meet the substance of India's concerns about acting to prevent terrorist attacks inside India.³⁵ Musharraf announced a formal ban on Jaish-

33 For the early Pakistani interest in holding a summit meeting to reduce the tension, see Rama Lakshmi, 'India, Pakistan Leaders Rule Out Meeting at Summit', *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2001, A-26. For Vajpayee's rebuff, see Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'Pakistani, Indian Leaders Meet, but Tension Remains: Despite Shaking Hands, Vajpayee Cool to Musharraf', *The Washington Post*, 6 January 2002, A-18.

34 See 'Mr. Musharraf Speaks', Editorial in *The Washington Post*, 15 January 2002, A-18. This editorial further applauded Musharraf's speech as containing: '... a breakthrough of potentially deeper consequence ... Pakistan's president passionately denounced the radical Islamic ideology that fuels terrorism in his country and around the Muslim world. He pledged to root out not just terrorists targeted by India or the West but preachers, schools and other institutions that foment religious intolerance [within Pakistan]. ... The importance of that agenda, if Mr. Musharraf forcefully pursues it, can hardly be overstated: It would not only reverse Pakistan's drift in recent years toward tolerance of Islamic militancy but would also provide an alternative vision to that of government who arrest militants but ignore or even support their ideology.'

35 See report by Craig Whitlock and Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'Pakistan Bans Groups in Reply to Indian Appeal', *The*

e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, the two extremist organizations implicated by Delhi in the attack on the Indian Parliament. Musharraf went further, however, to ban three domestic extremist organizations that had little or nothing to do directly with Kashmir and India. Two were protagonists of sectarian warfare within Pakistan itself, the radical Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shi'ite rival, the Tehrik-I-Jafria Party. The third domestically oriented group then banned was the Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi, an organization that had channelled misguided Pakistani youth to join the Taliban in Afghanistan in fighting the incoming U.S. and allied forces.

Musharraf also announced that the government would introduce other measures to reign in Islamic radicalism domestically, including new regulations over the *madrassas* that would require all foreign students to register, establish registration requirements for opening any new *madrassa*, impose state-designed curricular requirements, and restrict the use of mosques and loudspeakers for political purposes or inciting public protests.

At the same time, Musharraf emphasized in his speech the crying need for India to sit down and negotiate on the Kashmir problem, as the root cause not only of the conflict between India and Pakistan, but also of the rise of extremist tendencies related to Kashmir, in the Kashmir insurgency itself, and within Pakistan's own Kashmir-oriented Punjabi and Pushtun activist communities.

Washington Post, 13 January 2002, A-1, A-27. These crack-down measures against extremist organizations were, incidentally, judicially controversial if not objectionable under the provisions of the constitution. They could be sustained only by a military regime, and then only temporarily - absent evidence that could be presented in court of specific crimes, of murder, assault, treason, or the like. If the shoe had been on the other foot, India would have been hard put to carry out comparable measures itself - absent evidence that could be presented in court, for instance, against the Tamil Tigers, or Hindu extremist organizations such as the Shiv Sena or Vishwa Hindu Parishad - given the individual legal protections under India's constitution. Musharraf clearly caved unilaterally under Indian (and perhaps U.S.) pressure to stave off war, but also to keep Pakistan on the moral high ground with respect to the international war against terrorism.

India's reaction was mixed. While it welcomed the thrust of Musharraf's measures against extremist groups, it ignored the proposals for negotiating on Kashmir. Moreover the overall Indian response was couched to put Musharraf on notice that his sincerity would be judged by results, a theme also in U.S. official statements but framed there in more positive and encouraging tones.³⁶ The proof of his intentions would be in how the promises were implemented. India also immediately converted the expectations in Musharraf's speech into a test in Kashmir. Indian officials insisted that the infiltration of Pakistan-based extremist groups into Indian-controlled Kashmir must stop, extremists still operating in Indian-held Kashmir should be called back, and the net results would also be measured by whether the violence there dropped steadily to much lower levels.³⁷ In effect, India kept the military confrontation in place for the best part of a year, to squeeze maximum concessions from Pakistan during a time of emergency.³⁸ India also used

36 See, for instance, Alan Sipress and Craig Whitlock, 'In Pakistan, Powell Encourages Action: Musharraf Praised for Anti-Terror Vow', *The Washington Post*, 17 January 2002, A-20.

37 Whitlock and Chandasekaran, 'Pakistan Bans Groups'; Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'India Builds for Long Haul on Border with Pakistan', *The Washington Post*, 17 January 2002, A-18; and Alan Sipress and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Powell "Encouraged" by India Visit: New Delhi Officials Signal Approval of Pakistan Crackdown on Islamic Militants', *The Washington Post*, 19 January 2002, A-19.

38 India also exploited its 'fugitive list' to keep the spotlight of the investigatory media on Musharraf and on the issue of 'terrorism'. Otherwise, for India this list probably was a tactical concern. The 20 fugitives were a motley combination of Muslim extremists, Sikh separatists, and organized Indian crime bosses who were accused by Indian law enforcement, in one case or another, of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, gun-running, and drug smuggling. India claimed all had taken refuge in Pakistan. In this context, India did supply to Pakistan some material evidence regarding the violations of these individuals. Pakistan found that only six of the 20 were Pakistani citizens and insisted that in their cases, if evidence of criminal violations supported it, they would be tried in Pakistani courts. With respect to the rest, Pakistan denied that they were residing in Pakistan. Five of the six Pakistanis on the list allegedly were hijackers of an Indian aircraft used in December 1999, to force the release of Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned (without trial) for

missile testing to attract media attention and to stimulate Western anxiety about the nuclear issue, as means of escalating the pressure on Pakistan.³⁹ Between Musharraf's bold January actions against extremist groups and the end of 2002, the manipulated and felt risks of nuclear weapons rose and fell, sometimes in agonizing fashion. However, much of the attention after January shifted to the backlash in Pakistan against Musharraf's efforts to corral and suppress the extremist organizations. The key here was the kidnapping and assassination of Daniel Pearl in January-February 2002, followed at intervals by Islamic extremist attacks on foreigners, foreign institutions or Christians - themselves ostensibly as symbols of foreign influence.⁴⁰

For Pakistan, the effect of India's perpetuating the military emergency was to keep it in a vice, trying gamely to support the United States against terrorism on one side (also trying to minimize the injury to the Pushtun peoples from the sustained assault on the Taliban, and to limit Northern Alliance influence in the emerging government). On the other hand, Pakistan was obliged to look over its shoulder at India, and to worry about possible Indian plans to use air strikes against Pakistani installations or assets, or, worst of all, to launch an outright invasion on the pretext of pursuing terrorism in Pakistan.

years by India, for making inflammatory speeches in Kashmir in the early 1990s. Upon his release triggered by the hijacking, Azhar founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed militant organization. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, 'Fugitive list Becomes Central Issue for India: Pakistan Pressed to Hand Over 20 Suspects', *The Washington Post*, 22 January 2002, A-10.

39 Rama Lakshmi, 'Missile Test by India Raises Nuclear Ante: Pakistan Assails Firing 'at a Time of Tensions'', *The Washington Post*, 26 January 2002, A-17.

40 On the 23 January kidnapping in Karachi of Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Journal, see Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, 'Pakistani Group Says it has U.S. Journalist: E-Mail Demands Release of Countrymen', *The Washington Post*, 28 January 2002, A-16.

C. The Nuclear Dimension

This author has addressed analysis of the nuclear instability inherent in the India-Pakistan relationship more extensively elsewhere (Document Five).⁴¹ The underlying risks of nuclear conflict almost certainly were exacerbated by the Indian military confrontation with Pakistan. How close to nuclear war during the confrontation did the two countries get? How likely is it that one or another crisis between these two countries will lead to war, and potentially to nuclear escalation? Will religious radicalism increase the risks of hot wars and nuclear use between them?

The key structural factors that inherently pose nuclear instability between India and Pakistan relate to the asymmetries of their overall territorial size, strategic depth, and conventional military forces. Additional factors that are matters of concern in crises — specific sources of potential crisis instability — are inexperience and the technical and personnel shortcomings in their respective nuclear command and control systems, shortcomings in their early warning capabilities, and serious issues of survivability of nuclear assets, especially in Pakistan's case

41 See Rodney W. Jones, *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia - An Overview*, prepared for DTRA/ASCO, October 2001, available at: <www.policyarchitects.org> and <www.dtra.mil/about/organization/south_asia.pdf>; also by the same author: *Conventional Military Asymmetry and Regional Stability Among Emerging Nuclear States: India and Pakistan, Fourth Nuclear Stability Roundtable: Conference on Strategic Stability and Global Change*, 12-13 March 2002, available at: <www.policyarchitects.org>; *Force Modernization Trends - India and Pakistan, Conventional Arms Modernization in Asia and the Pacific*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (forthcoming); 'South Asia Under the Nuclear Shadow: Is Stable Nuclear Deterrence Feasible', *The Friday Times* (Lahore), 22-28 February 2002, available at: <www.policyarchitects.org>; 'Debating New Delhi's Nuclear Decision', *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring 2000, 181-187; 'Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence - A Conjecture', *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, Vol XIX, No. 1, January 2000, reprinted in *Regional Studies* (Islamabad), Vol. XVIII, Spring 2000, 3-39; and 'Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia', *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1998, 67-87.

where its narrow geography leaves fewer secure concealment options than India enjoys.

As a result, the nuclear postures of both sides are also asymmetrical. Pakistan's nuclear deterrence calculations require that nuclear weapons be an immediate backup of its conventional defences, which are considerably weaker than India's and theoretically could be easily overrun, risking Pakistan's survival as an independent country. Thus Pakistan's nuclear capability is seen not just as a deterrent against the hypothetical possibility of an Indian *nuclear* first strike but also as a deterrent against India's use against Pakistan of its superior *conventional offensive* capabilities. Pakistan's situation is analogous to the NATO nuclear deterrent during the Cold War against the mightier conventional armies of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. But the dilemma this presents to the Pakistani leadership, the same dilemma that NATO lived with, is that it requires Pakistan's decision makers to leave open the option of striking India first with nuclear weapons. Presumably this would only be contemplated if Pakistan were under concerted Indian conventional attack and presumably only when Pakistan's situation had seriously deteriorated - considering nuclear retaliation as the use of weapons of last resort. Without such a posture, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent would lack credibility.

With enormous conventional military superiority over Pakistan, India has the luxury of claiming that it will never use nuclear weapons in a first strike, but only in retaliation against an opponent's first use of nuclear weapons.

As long as India does not impose conventional war on Pakistan, the likelihood of authorized nuclear use is very low. But clearly the converse is also true, that India threatening Pakistan with conventional war brings Pakistani preparedness to use nuclear weapons to the surface.

In this regard, the Indian mobilization of the bulk of its military forces to confront Pakistan with coercive diplomacy undoubtedly raised the risks of a nuclear conflict to a fairly high threshold. India may have calculated that it would merely threaten Pakistan for political objectives, such as forcing Pakistan to leash Islamic militant and extremist

organizations operating in Kashmir or deeper in India.⁴² But this was a situation prone to politically inflamed miscalculation, which could have caused both sides to become trapped in a spiralling loss of control. A really effective extremist attack on Indian political leaders - which could have happened at any time - certainly would have triggered an Indian invasion, quickly bringing the risk of nuclear use to the fore.

Moreover, the flood of hints from within India during the confrontation that it was considering pre-emptive attacks on extremist training camps in Pakistan nearby Kashmir - and also nearby sensitive Pakistani nuclear installations - had to put Pakistan on a much higher state of nuclear readiness.⁴³ Prudence in the Indian military establishment would have meant it too must have moved to a higher state of nuclear readiness. This drift, not unlike cocking loaded guns, certainly brought both sides closer to nuclear war. It is worth mentioning, however, that neither side overtly threatened the other with nuclear attack; nuclear options were, for the most part, veiled.

What is most surprising given this underlying danger - which U.S. officials did acknowledge publicly - is how relaxed instead of strenuous U.S. efforts were to defuse the confrontation during its early months. The Bush administration evidently encouraged an information campaign against India's brinkmanship only in May 2002 when it became clear that Pakistan's concerns about the threat

42 For reporting on hard-nosed Indian calculations contrary to the conventional Cold War wisdom, buying instead into the notion that 'a conventional conflict would not necessarily spiral into a nuclear exchange,' see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'For India, Deterrence May not Prevent [Conventional] War', *The Washington Post*, 17 January 2002, A-1, A-18. This report also notes some official Indian views that India could easily ride out a nuclear attack by Pakistan, quoting Indian Defence Minister Fernandes: 'We could take a strike, survive and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished.' *Ibid.*

43 Indian military brinkmanship and jawboning reached a particularly intense crescendo on the eve of Musharraf's key speech and new policy initiatives of 12 January 2002. See Rajiv Chandasekaran, 'Head of Army Declares India is Ready for War', *The Washington Post*, 12 January 2002, A-14.

on its eastern border had reduced its capacity to aid US forces in sealing off al-Qaeda exit from Afghanistan.⁴⁴ Perhaps US preoccupation with the deterioration of the Israel–Palestinian relationship partly accounts for this extraordinarily ‘laid back’ approach. It was tantamount, however, to turning a blind eye to all dangers in the subcontinent save those of terrorism, in order to achieve the objectives of destroying terrorist operatives and sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The consequences of a major conventional war, or, more horribly, of an India–Pakistan nuclear exchange, would have made everything al-Qaeda and the Taliban have done pale by comparison.

D. U.S. Diplomatic Intervention: Defusing Confrontation

The U.S. moved rather late in the game to defuse India’s confrontation with Pakistan. A schedule of visits of senior U.S. officials to the region recently had been planned. The precipitating events for a more decisive intervention may have been a resurgence of violence in Kashmir in May 2002, suggesting renewed infiltration of militants from Pakistan

44 Only in the late spring of 2002, as waves of fresh reports appeared on Indian military massing its forces on the borders with Pakistan did an administration-inspired information campaign regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons get underway, as initial steps to restrain India - because, some alleged, Pakistan could not assist the US adequately against al-Qaeda in the west when it had to protect against the Indian threat in the east. One form this information diplomacy took was technical briefings on the human and ecological damage that would result from nuclear weapon exchanges on plausible targets. One assessment had found that a small Pakistani nuclear weapon on Bombay could kill up to 850,000 people. Undersecretary of Defence Douglas J. Feith told a conference on American–Indian defence trade on 13 May that the Bush administration was ‘focused intensely’ on the danger posed by the five-month old mobilization by Pakistan and India and the prospect of nuclear war. His remarks became more significant when a paper by Bruce Riedell, an aide to President Clinton, revealed that during the Kargil conflict US officials believed Pakistan had readied nuclear weapons for use and surprised Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with this disclosure. See Alan Sipress and Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Report: India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in ‘99’, *The Washington Post*, 15 May 2002, A-1, A-23.

after the usual winter lull. Coinciding with the India visit of US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, on 14 May, militants attacked a bus and then stormed an Indian Army camp in Kashmir where soldiers had their wives and children present, killing at least 30 and injuring 47, including 10 women and 11 children among the dead.⁴⁵ Two days later, Pakistan put its military forces in the north on the highest alert, fearing that India was preparing to launch a strike on Pakistan in retaliation for the violence in Kashmir.⁴⁶

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s planned visit to India and Pakistan had suddenly gained a new importance, although it was still two weeks off. Indian officials complained that the U.S. had not adequately brought Pakistan into line, accused Musharraf of betraying his January pledge to stop the infiltration of extremists from Pakistan into Kashmir, and threatened heavy retaliation.⁴⁷ India then launched rounds of mortar fire into Pakistan-held Kashmir across the line of control, ostensibly to suppress infiltrators.⁴⁸ Pakistan soon responded in kind, following a long-practised routine. A day later, India announced the expulsion of Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Pakistan’s ambassador to Delhi, giving him one week to leave; India had ceased communicating with him anyway since the 13 December attack,⁴⁹ but this action hinted that India might break relations with Pakistan altogether - an action that often precedes war.

45 Rama Lakshmi, ‘At Least 30 Killed in Raid in Kashmir’, *The Washington Post*, 15 May 2002, A-23. Pakistan condemned the attack immediately. Two groups, Al Mansooren and Jamiyat-ul-Mujaheddin, claimed responsibility. Indian Home Minister Advani said that Al Mansooren had replaced the Lashkar-i-Taiba when the latter was banned.

46 Karl Vick and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistan Puts Some Forces on High Alert as India Plans Reprisal’, *The Washington Post*, 17 May 2002, A-20.

47 Rama Lakshmi, ‘India Links Pakistan to Attack in Kashmir: Officials Vow to Take Action for Militant Raid’, *The Washington Post*, 16 May 2002, A-18.

48 Rama Lakshmi, ‘India and Pakistan Trade Mortar Fire: Exchange on Kashmir Line is Heaviest in Months’, *The Washington Post*, 18 May 2002, A-16.

49 Rama Lakshmi, ‘India Orders Expulsion of Pakistan’s Envoy’, *The Washington Post*, 19 May 2002, A-17.

India announced additional steps signalling the seriousness of its preparation for war. It streamlined the command structure of the armed forces, putting the border security forces under Army control, and the coast guard under Navy command. The Navy announced the movement of five warships from the eastern coast to reinforce the western fleet in the Arabian Sea. Vajpayee toured Army camps near the line of control in Kashmir to calm the atmosphere after the assassination of moderate separatist Abdul Ghani Lone, and to boost military morale, telling the troops be 'ready for sacrifice... the time has come for decisive battle'.⁵⁰

Once again seeking to defuse India's brinkmanship and to persuade the United States to lend a hand, Musharraf opened himself to a wide-ranging press interview on 26 May with a senior U.S. journalist.⁵¹ Musharraf made several

50 Rama Lakshmi and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'India's Leader Steps Up War Rhetoric', *The Washington Post*, 23 May 2002. The day before, masked gunmen in police uniforms shot and killed Abdul Ghani Lone in Srinagar. Lone was the senior leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a group of Kashmiri political and religious parties that advocate the separation of Kashmir from the rest of India. Lone himself, in contrast to many of the other Kashmiri independence leaders, favoured dialogue with India and had become an opponent of the participation of hard-line militants from Pakistan in the Kashmiri separatist campaign. Rama Lakshmi and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'Moderate Separatist Leader is Assassinated in Kashmir: Muslim Drew Militants' Ire for Seeking Talks with India', *The Washington Post*, 22 May 2002, A-26. See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, 'Indian Leaders Talk of War Over Kashmir: No Deadline Set for Pakistan to Move Against Militants', *The Washington Post*, 24 May 2002, A-24, A-26.

51 Steve Coll, 'Pakistan Says Raids in Kashmir Have Ended: Musharraf Demands Response from India', *The Washington Post*, 26 May 2002, A-1, A-21. Steve Coll is managing editor of the *Washington Post* and was seasoned earlier as his newspaper's correspondent in South Asia from 1989 to 1992. See his trenchant analysis in the same issue, 'Between India and Pakistan, A Changing Role for the U.S.', *The Washington Post*, Outlook section, 26 May 2002, B-1, B-5. In his concise policy recommendations, Coll raises a point that has been brushed aside by virtually every contemporary South Asia expert, that war in South Asia impacts on U.S. vital interests negatively and the point must be made clear in no uncertain terms both to India and Pakistan: 'The first challenge facing U.S. negotiators is to convince India to back off from its war

points. First, he insisted that Pakistan had stuck by his pledges to stop terrorists operating from Pakistan into India or any where else: 'We will ensure that terrorism does not go from Pakistan anywhere outside into the world. That is our stand, and we adhere to it.' He added that Pakistan's fight against terrorism included cooperation with the U.S. against al-Qaeda, and had a third component of suppressing Islamic sectarian extremism inside Pakistan itself. He asserted that militant infiltration across the line of control in Kashmir was not occurring, using the same language four times: 'I repeat: There is nothing happening across the line of control.'

Second, Musharraf demanded India negotiate on Kashmir, with a dialogue and with a process, and reduce its own atrocities in Kashmir by withdrawing forces from the towns and cities. Third, he called for a reciprocal de-escalation of the military confrontation on the borders and at the line of control. Fourth, he warned India that India would pay a price for starting war: 'Pakistan is no Iraq. India is not the United States. We have forces. They follow a strategy of deterrence. [If deterrence fails] we are very capable of an offensive defence... These words are very important. We'll take the offensive into Indian territory.' He made it clear that he was not talking here about using nuclear weapons. Musharraf affirmed Pakistan's interest in peace with honour and dignity. But he also pulled no punches in describing India's approach since December as belligerent 'chest thumping'. He identified the basic problem as India's unwillingness to accept a strong Pakistan as its neighbour: 'They want a subservient Pakistan which remains subservient to them. They are arrogant and want to impose their will on every country in the region.'

Coordinated U.S. and British diplomacy finally went into

threats, while insisting that Musharraf use the breathing space to dismantle the *jihadi* networks in Kashmir. Such an initiative may require high-level talks, backed by private U.S. guarantees, to help push India and Pakistan away from repetitious border scares and toward sustained political negotiation. It may also require an invocation, whether in public or private, that vital U.S. interests would be jeopardized if either party launches another war.'

high gear in South Asia in late May and June, to avert the pressure for war by bringing about a more decisive outcome on India's main bone of contention. This required extracting a still more unequivocal pledge from Musharraf, actively to put a stop to armed extremists moving from Pakistan to the Indian-held part of Kashmir. Musharraf apparently believed he would receive in exchange 'international assurances that India would also take significant steps to end the decades-old stalemate over Kashmir'.⁵² President Bush on tour in Europe finally took the stand himself to urge Musharraf personally to 'show results' in stopping incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁵³ But escalation of tension mounted, with additional violence in Kashmir, missile testing, and a Musharraf speech on 27 May that was both conciliatory and defiant but that riled the Indian establishment. Thus, in advance of Armitage's visit, to be followed by that of Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, the U.S. State Department, the United Nations, and a number of advanced nations urged their citizens and foreign nationals to leave India and Pakistan - hinting obviously at the rising concern that war could begin and lead to nuclear war.⁵⁴

Musharraf and Vajpayee both attended the 16-nation Asian security summit convened by Kazakhstan in Almaty on 4 June, where Russian President Vladimir Putin and China's President Jiang Zemin each attempted to take the two South Asian leaders aside while trying to mediate, but Vajpayee stonewalled Musharraf on any direct dialogue.⁵⁵

52 Alan Sipress and Kamran Khan, 'U.S. presses Pakistan on Incursions: Tensions with India Dangerously High', *The Washington Post*, 25 May 2002, A-1, A-28.

53 Dana Milbank, 'Bush Presses Pakistan on Kashmir Raids', *The Washington Post*, 27 May 2002, A-14.

54 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, 'U.N. to Evacuate Families of Staff: Pakistan Plays Down Talk of Nuclear War', *The Washington Post*, 2 June 2002, A-17. Since most non-essential foreign nationals had already been evacuated from Pakistan months before, this action hit India relatively severely for the first time, by causing a drop in confidence that affected a wide range of international economic activity.

55 Peter Baker and Alan Sipress, 'Kashmir Foes Apart at Meeting: India Declines Pakistani's Offer to Meet as Pressure Mounts', *The Washington Post*, 4 June 2002, A-1, A-12; see also 'Russia Fails to persuade Pakistan, India to Budget: At Summit Rivals

The Armitage visit to Pakistan on 6 June and New Delhi the following day, bolstered by Rumsfeld's visit beginning on 11 June in Delhi, appeared finally to soften the India-Pakistan deadlock and allowed a basis for unravelling the military crisis by stages. Armitage evidently found the formula in Washington's employing the key word 'permanent' to clarify the nature of Musharraf's pledge to 'end' cross-border transit of militants from Pakistan to Kashmir. In New Delhi, Musharraf's pledge would be understood to mean, by virtue of U.S. assurance, bringing infiltration of militants to a 'permanent end', but it would not have been publicly stated that way in Islamabad itself - a 'blue smoke and mirrors' act of diplomacy. In exchange, Musharraf could count on India's de-escalation and on the United States to urge India to enter dialogue on Kashmir. In addition, the doors that had been closed by sanctions to trade and even military procurement would be opened somewhat wider.⁵⁶

While Pakistan could find some satisfaction in this outcome as a way of making the best of a difficult situation, the real benefits to Pakistan are not anything like Indian undertakings to move towards a solution of the Kashmir problem on terms meaningful to Pakistan. But they probably do add up to the opportunity to begin moving towards some form of normalcy in relations with India, and go a long way to allow Pakistan to count on more positive international relations more generally, especially with the West and with the United States. The nature of this arrangement sidestepped Pakistani humiliation but there was no doubt that it requires a rather fundamental shift in Pakistan's outlook about the likely future of Kashmir - where the use of violence must not only be avoided but Pakistani volunteers who would resort to it must be prevented from doing so. From the standpoint of any Western observer, such a shift couple with the long-term dividends that the other mentioned opportunities could yield for Pakistan would seem to be a highly valuable outcome in the long term.

Trade Accusations, Not Handshakes', *The Washington Post*, 5 June 2002, A-17.

56 Glenn Kessler, 'A Defining Moment in Islamabad: U.S.-Brokered 'Yes' Pulled India, Pakistan From Brink of War', *The Washington Post*, 22 June 2002, A-1.

Epilogue, November 2002

India finally began to wind down its confrontation with Pakistan in October and November 2002, standing down a portion of the 700,000 armoured and mechanized troops it had mobilized in Punjab and Rajasthan to exert military pressure on Pakistan. It did so after further visits by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Secretary of State Colin Powell to both countries in August and September - to tamp down another spike in tension between both countries that arose in August, while furthering the agenda of the war against international terrorism in South-east Asia and the Middle East. It became clear in retrospect that India had maintained its pressure on Pakistan partly in order to enhance its chances of minimizing violence in Jammu and Kashmir while it conducted state elections there in September and October 2002. The Kashmir elections were not without violence but nevertheless were relatively free and unrigged, and displaced the long-ruling National Conference.⁵⁷ The elections brought to power in Srinagar a coalition of the new Kashmiri People's Democratic Party (PDP), which favours a lifting of the oppression and greater autonomy within the Indian Union, and the Congress Party, formerly the ruling party of India and the main opposition to the BJP in New Delhi. This outcome potentially sets the stage for negotiations between Kashmiris and New Delhi over a new disposition for Jammu and Kashmir, although steps in that direction seemed slow to emerge by the end of 2002.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, national elections were held on 10 October 2002, resulting in a division of seats among the Pakistan Muslim League, Quaid-e-Azam faction) (PML-Q), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and an alliance of six Islamist parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

57 The chief minister of the new government in Kashmir, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, was selected from the PDP and sworn in on 2 November. See reporting on the Kashmir elections in: Rama Lakshmi, 'Kashmir's Ruling Party Defeated at Polls', *Washington Post*, 11 October 2002, A-28; Ashok Sharma, 'Indian Parties Try to Form Coalition in Kashmir', *Washington Post*, 27 October 2002, A-26; Rama Lakshmi, 'Kashmiri Politics At "Crucial Stage": New Government Raises Region's Hopes', *Washington Post*, 17 November 2002, A-25.

(MMA). No party won a clear parliamentary majority.⁵⁸ The religious alliance, however, won power at the provincial level in the two provinces adjacent to Afghanistan, the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

After weeks of negotiations, a coalition government with a narrow parliamentary majority was formed between the PML-Q, smaller parties, independents, and PPP defectors. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, from Baluchistan, was selected as prime minister. This Jamali coalition, in contrast to the MMA - which is severely critical of Musharraf's relations with the U.S. in the war against the Taliban and the restrictions on militant movement into Kashmir, is likely to support the broad outlines of Musharraf's foreign policy.

Although time will tell, the Jamali government may also be more amenable to a Musharraf-led step-by-step reduction of tensions in the relationship with India than one in which the Islamicist opposition figures more prominently. However, the increased strength of the Islamicists at the national level is likely to circumscribe Musharraf's domestic options, especially in social and reform policy. Imposing controls over the militant Islamic organizations and the reservoirs of militant education in *madrassas* affiliated with the JUI will prove difficult. Thus the objectives of setting Pakistan on a moderate and secular governmental course will remain challenged.

Conclusions

The U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was a defining moment both for Pakistan and India. It created new strategic opportunities for both, but these played more easily to India's advantage. It also

58 For Jamali's emergence as prime minister and the Pakistani national election results, see: John Lancaster, 'Musharraf Ally is Named Prime Minister of Pakistan: Election by Legislators Signals Emergence of Ruling Coalition', *Washington Post*, 22 November 2002, A-30; John Lancaster, 'Musharraf Struggling for Ruling Coalition: Pakistan's Religious Parties Emerge from October Elections as Power Brokers', *Washington Post*, 11 November 2002, A-22; John Lancaster, 'Islamic Parities' Gains May Be West's Loss in Pakistan Vote', *Washington Post*, 12 October 2002, A-22.

imposed new strategic burdens. In the first instance, these fell primarily on Pakistan. In the aftermath, they could also fall on India as well, on its approach to Kashmir, and in its future handling of nuclear affairs. How this will play out remains to be seen, but is of great importance for the future stability and peace of the region.

In the immediate aftermath of 11 September, Pakistan's advantages came to the fore. Its geographic position made Pakistan indispensable, especially in the early stages, for U.S. military access to Afghanistan. Pakistan's intimate ties with the Taliban (who also sheltered al-Qaeda) meant that Islamabad's approach to the war on terrorism also could be pivotal to how the U.S. applied its military and political options. Musharraf's quick and relatively unconditional agreement to provide U.S. logistical access through Pakistan, and to cut off ties with the Taliban, reopened a relationship with Washington of great near term benefit, and potentially long term benefits as well.

Pakistan's ready availability to the United States also sidelined India as far as the immediate military effort in Afghanistan was concerned, much to India's chagrin. Indian, nevertheless, expressed its full support for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan, a position it never would have contemplated during the Cold War and actually had withheld during the Afghan war against the Soviet intervention in the 1980s. The warming of U.S. relations with India that had been given impetus by the Kargil episode in 1999 and by U.S. moves to relax the nuclear-related sanctions, however, gained momentum after 11 September. India too had made clear its readiness to offer the U.S. the use of its own military facilities, should they be needed. This had weighed on Pakistan and may have speeded its own decisions. Musharraf alluded to this in explaining the necessity of Pakistan's decision to cut off the Taliban.

While the agitational backlash in Pakistan from religious parties and extremist groups against his regime did not immediately rise to an unmanageable level, as had been feared, the animosity against Musharraf was clear. Musharraf attempted to strike a balance in his support for the United States between his actions on Afghanistan and

Pakistan's policies toward India. While dropping the Taliban, he steered away from imposing any new constraints on the religious parties and their affiliated militants that would affect their access to the insurgency in Kashmir.

Islamic extremist groups continued their own operations in Kashmir. It now seems clear in retrospect that the most aggressive of these organizations also attempted to provoke India by carrying terrorist operations beyond Kashmir into the heart of India. The motivations of the Jaish-e-Mohammed organization in preparing the December attack on India's Parliament are still far from clear (and the same may be said for the Lashkar-e-Ta'iba, if it was actually part of the same conspiracy). India's own forensic investigations provided hints that the attack on Parliament was not thoroughly pre-planned (other targets in Delhi apparently had been surveyed and considered), and that the rationale of the participants had been to carry the Kashmir insurgency to Delhi because their efforts within Kashmir had not borne fruit in forcing India to negotiate. The founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed had also been imprisoned by India and may have had motivations of personal revenge. Also, although no direct evidence of this has surfaced, one cannot rule out the possibility that those who engineered or directed the attack from a distance may have hoped that it would arouse India to undertake efforts to destabilize Musharraf's regime.

Whatever the exact motivation, it is clear that the *effect* of the attack on Parliament was to provoke India to consider going to war against Pakistan, or at least to retaliate with a major show of force. The Bush doctrine (Document Two) and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan provided a precedent that Indian leaders instinctively embraced - that acts of terrorism could be pursued to their origin and rooted out by military force. Since India alleged that the perpetrators killed in the incident were Pakistanis, the effect of the terrorism in Delhi was to provoke a response that would threaten Pakistan directly, and, given the context, indirectly threaten the Musharraf regime.

India was handed a strategic opportunity on a platter. Rather than squander this opportunity on a quick, punitive

action against terrorist training camps or Pakistani military installations along the line of control (such action would have been militarily ineffectual and probably politically counterproductive as well), India mounted a major military confrontation against Pakistan for coercive diplomacy. This effort was well designed to put simultaneous pressure on the United States to use its influence with Musharraf, and direct pressure on Musharraf himself, to get him to condemn terrorism and block the emigration of extremist groups into Kashmir. By Indian calculations, this could seal off Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistan's influence and terminate the anti-Indian unrest there. The confrontation could have led to Indian military actions, too, if circumstances convinced India's leadership of their utility or necessity.

Caught in a vice between the United States pursuing the war against the Taliban to the west in Afghanistan, and India threatening war from the east, and under pressure from Islamic political parties at home, Musharraf faced more than the ordinary dilemma. Condemning the attack on India's Parliament was easy enough but did nothing to relieve the pressure. Musharraf's problem was to show Pakistan's commitment to suppress terrorism on the one hand without undercutting Pakistan's Kashmir policy on the other. His initial attempts to do this by the measures announced in his 12 January 2002 speech (Document Six). These banned the two extremist groups that India had fingered, confined members of those groups in temporary detention, and declared that Pakistan would not allow the migration of terrorism from Pakistan's soil anywhere outside. This was greeted with scepticism by India. India did not budge from the confrontation. In effect India pocketed Musharraf's promises, but insisted they would have to be monitored before India could adjust its position.

While the confrontation remained in place, the winter weather cut down movement from Pakistan to Kashmir, a regular occurrence, and a modest drop off in the level of violence in Kashmir followed. But India revived the crisis of war threats to a high pitch in mid-May when a bloody attack on an army camp coincided with Christina Rocca's visit. India insisted that Musharraf had betrayed his January

pledges. Anger in India was accentuated by the communal riots in Gujarat (for which Pakistan was blamed, incorrectly, and which took an exceptionally heavy toll on Muslims)⁵⁹ and the BJP's anxiety as it ran up to certain state level elections. U.S. concerns were augmented by Musharraf's trimming of military support against al-Qaeda groups slipping into Pakistan. Nuclear threats were hinted at indirectly by testing missiles, India earlier, and Pakistan later, during in this timeframe. The magnitude of the tension set the stage for a more active U.S. intervention with Armitage and Rumsfeld, Armitage carrying the ball diplomatically, and Rumsfeld giving personal impetus to promises of continued military cooperation.

Attacks on Americans and other foreigners within Pakistan had increased after Musharraf's January actions. The Daniel Pearl murder and the killing of French technicians in Karachi received exceptionally intense attention from the international media. This helped mobilize U.S. pressure too. Thus, under concerted U.S. pressure, and with the additional challenge of staying in power while preparing the ground for national elections scheduled for October, Musharraf became a measure more pliable.

Armitage's principal contribution in visiting Pakistan and India in succession was to nail down more definitively Musharraf's pledge to stop emigration of extremists into Kashmir, adding the word 'permanent' in front of the word 'stop'. Armitage evidently had some assurances from India that he could convey to Musharraf in return, together with additional promises of US support for Pakistan, if Musharraf adhered to his word. This intervention did begin to thaw the tension between India and Pakistan, although India made it clear that it would draw down its military confrontation in steps as it monitored Pakistan's performance.

India won the lion's share of the benefits that U.S. intervention and media attention awarded in the coercive diplomacy exercise. India successfully focused the crisis

59 *Harvest of Hatred. The Concerned Citizens' Tribunal Report on Gujarat, 2002* (Leicester South Asian History Academic Papers, 7, 2003), xii.

on extremist infiltration into Kashmir and related terrorist acts in other parts of India. It not only got US assistance in defining any terrorist problem linked to Pakistan in India's own way, but a more substantial US sympathy towards India on India's own position on Kashmir. India made considerable headway in shifting international perceptions of these problems in the direction of stigmatizing Pakistan.

On the role of religion and religious extremism, or radicalism, in this South Asian set of security problems, one must conclude that the real issues are deeper social and political grievances which makes it possible to use religion as a tool. The more radical the operators, the more terrorism comes into play. Religious hatred and extremism are not new to the region, they have been endemic. The Islamic world has more than its share of this problem, but the fires of Hindu extremism are being fanned by politics in India too.

With two countries possessing nuclear weapons in this region, neither can afford to stoke up deeper conflict. Both must turn to resolving real problems, economic, political, and those of fundamental security. But Kashmir as a core problem stares any objective observer in the face. Apart from the campaign against terrorism, efforts to rehabilitate Afghanistan and with Musharraf's crack-down on extremism, the most hopeful development during the India-Pakistan confrontation was the dawning realization in the international community that the process of resolving the Kashmir problem must begin soon.

Documents

Document 1

U.S. Self-Perception of the War on Terrorism and its Impact on Central and South Asia: the Views of Analysts working for the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations

Coalition States

Pakistan

How did Pakistan respond to September 11?

Pakistan, which had backed al-Qaeda's Taliban hosts before September 11, abruptly reversed course and threw its lot in with the U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition. Under heavy U.S. pressure, Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, condemned the attacks and pledged Pakistan's 'unstinted cooperation' two days later. Pakistan has now become a key U.S. partner in its campaign against al-Qaeda, even as the perpetually turbulent, nuclear-armed Muslim country has teetered on the brink of war with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Experts say Musharraf, who came to power in a 1999 coup, is under enormous strain: America is demanding that he crack down on Islamist militants; Pakistan's religious extremists and some intelligence officials are furious at him for abandoning Afghanistan's Taliban rulers and softening his line on Kashmir; and Pakistan's main political parties are shunning him because he's resisting the restoration of democracy. [Note: these comments were written prior to the elections in 2002].

Do all Pakistanis support the war on terrorism?

No. Despite its government's support for the United States, Pakistan is home to many Islamist extremists, some of whom have links to al-Qaeda. Islamist militants have conducted several terrorist attacks on Americans and other Westerners in Pakistan since September 11, including the February 2002 abduction and murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter

Daniel Pearl and the June 2002 car bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi, which killed 12 Pakistanis. Thanks to both shared Islamist sympathies and ethnic ties, some Pakistanis have also helped Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fleeing from Afghanistan take refuge throughout Pakistan; U.S. officials are concerned that al-Qaeda could regenerate itself in urban areas and in the Northwest Frontier province, a lawless tribal region on the Afghan border inhabited by Pashtuns, the Taliban's dominant ethnic group.

How has Pakistan supported the war on terrorism?

By becoming a major U.S. partner and staging area for the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan granted overflight rights to coalition aircraft, let U.S. forces use two Pakistani airfields, and shared intelligence about suspected terrorists. Pakistan has also worked with the FBI to capture suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives who fled into northern Pakistan—including al-Qaeda operations chief Abu Zubaydah — and in some cases has committed its own troops to hunt down al-Qaeda holdouts.

Have U.S. personnel operated in Pakistan?

Yes. U.S. soldiers have joined Pakistani troops on raids in the tribal border regions, and the FBI is contributing information and agents to the pursuit of al-Qaeda holdouts. U.S. officials say they need Americans on the ground because the Pakistani military is not doing enough on its own, and Pakistan-watchers say that the government remains reluctant to pursue terrorists at home because it fears an internal political backlash. Moreover, Pakistan has not wanted to launch large-scale military operations against al-Qaeda while many of its troops have been amassed along the Indian border due to tensions over Kashmir, a festering conflict that has flared up several times since India and Pakistan were created in 1947.

How does the Kashmir crisis affect the war on terrorism?

It's a large, frightening distraction, particularly since both Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. Tensions over

Kashmir, which spiked after a December 2001 terrorist attack on India's parliament, have diverted U.S. and Pakistani resources away from the pursuit of al-Qaeda. Experts say the fate of the disputed Muslim-majority province is fundamental to Pakistan's national identity and Musharraf's rule; Pakistan-watchers say the general was able to seize power because his predecessor backed down in a 1999 showdown over Kashmir. Meanwhile, India — also an American partner in the antiterrorist coalition — has accused the United States of hypocrisy for working with a Pakistani government that India says continues to support terrorism.

Does Pakistan's government support terrorism?

It has, and experts say that Pakistan's military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) both include personnel who sympathize — or more — with Islamist militants. ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Muhammad, which investigators linked to the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and the February 2002 murder of Daniel Pearl. Musharraf has promised to stop Kashmiri militants from crossing into the Indian-held sector of Kashmir, but India insists that Musharraf still hasn't stopped the terrorists' movements.

How did Pakistan get involved with Islamist terrorists?

By supporting the anti-Soviet brigades of *mujahedeen*, or holy warriors, in Afghanistan. The *mujahedeen* later helped spawn both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pakistan continued to aid some of these fighters as they branched out into terrorism. James Risen and Judith Miller of *The New York Times* reported in October 2001 that ISI has had an 'indirect but longstanding' relationship with al-Qaeda and has used its camps in Afghanistan to train operatives for terrorist attacks against India.

Did Pakistan support the Taliban?

Yes, until 11 September. The Taliban leadership absorbed

their brand of political Islam in Saudi-funded seminaries in Pakistan, which was one of only three countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Pakistan sought a friendly regime to its west, since it shares its eastern border with India, its long-time rival. The alliance also quieted longstanding pressures to unite Pashtuns, who live in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in one country.

Is Muslim fundamentalism widespread in Pakistan?

Yes, and a weak educational system has helped it take root. Pakistani officials estimate that 10 to 15 percent of the *madrasas*, or religious seminaries, in Pakistan promote an extremist form of Islam. But poor Pakistanis often have no other schools available to them. The *madrasas* offer food, clothing, shelter, and an Islamist education of varying degrees of militancy to thousands of Pakistani boys each year.

Nor is radical Islam in Pakistan limited to the *madrasas*. Sunni Muslim militants demanding the imposition of their own rigidly interpreted form of Islamic law have targeted Shiite Muslims and Christians, attacked merchants who sell music and videos, and tried to force women to adopt more 'modest' dress. In many parts of Pakistan, Osama bin Laden remains a hero.

Why has Musharraf cooperated with the United States in the war on terrorism?

Experts disagree. Some analysts say that Musharraf wanted to improve Pakistan's relationship with the United States, which imposed sanctions on Pakistan after its 1998 nuclear tests and again after Musharraf himself overthrew an elected government. Musharraf, they argue, also wants to create a more secular society; in a major January 2002 speech, he asked whether Pakistan wants 'to become a theocratic state' or 'a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state'.

But others say that Musharraf had no choice after September 11, when President Bush declared that countries

were either 'with us or against us'. Still, Washington offered carrots as well as sticks. For its cooperation, Pakistan has secured the lifting of sanctions, hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. aid, the rescheduling or cancellation of some of its international debt, and preferential access to the European textile market.

What has Pakistan done to fight fundamentalism and terrorism at home?

After the United States declared the Kashmiri groups Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba to be terrorist organizations, Pakistan froze their bank accounts and arrested their leaders. In the wake of the December 2001 attack on India's parliament, Musharraf pledged to crack down on extremism and prevent Pakistan from being used as a base for terrorism. He announced new rules to govern extremist *madrasas*, banned several radical groups, arrested more than 2,000 suspected militants, and sealed hundreds of alleged militant offices. Musharraf also replaced some of the leadership of ISI and reportedly began cutting the intelligence organization's ties to militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In June 2002, after terrorists killed 31 people — soldiers, their wives, and their children — in an attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir, Musharraf pledged to cut off infiltrations into Indian-controlled Kashmir. Pakistan also tried and convicted four people involved in the plot against Daniel Pearl.

Is Musharraf committed to rooting out terrorism in Pakistan?

Nobody knows. Musharraf has taken significant steps against terrorism — at considerable political risk to himself. But experts say he has not always followed through on his promises. Pakistan-watchers say that many jailed militants were soon released, that the new rules governing *madrasas* have not been enforced, and that militants from banned organizations have formed new splinter groups.

Is Musharraf's rule threatened by his support for the war

on terrorism?

Maybe, although he's been able to hold onto power longer than some observers expected. The Taliban's swift collapse made Musharraf's life easier, and much of the Pakistani business and intellectual communities support the president's pledges to crack down on Islamist militancy. Still, by turning against Pakistan's former allies, Musharraf has alienated Islamists in ISI, the army, and Kashmiri militant movements, prompting several attempts on his life.

Experts say that decisions blocking the restoration of democracy in Pakistan could also threaten Musharraf's rule. To circumvent parliamentary authority, Musharraf scheduled an April 2002 referendum on whether he should remain president for five more years. Although he reported an overwhelming margin of victory, the election was widely regarded as rigged, and Pakistan's supreme court ruled it unconstitutional. In August 2002, Musharraf single-handedly amended Pakistan's constitution to expand his powers.

Could Pakistani Islamists seize any of the country's nuclear weapons?

Experts disagree. Senior U.S. officials have expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and in November 2001, Pakistan accepted an offer by Secretary of State Colin Powell to train Pakistani officials in 'security and protection of nuclear assets'. Pakistan scholars say that the country's military is highly unlikely to leave the country's nuclear stockpiles vulnerable. However, the investigative reporter Seymour Hersh of *The New Yorker* has written that some Bush administration officials doubt whether American intelligence knows the whereabouts of Pakistan's entire nuclear arsenal.

U.S. intelligence officials also say that some Pakistani nuclear researchers may have shared nuclear technology with al-Qaeda, but they have released no hard evidence to support this.

Is Osama bin Laden in Pakistan?

We don't know. The Afghan-Pakistani border is more than

1,500 miles long, and U.S. intelligence officials say bin Laden might have sneaked through. Moreover, many analysts say that Pakistani officers, ISI members, or tribal leaders sympathetic to bin Laden might help or harbour him.

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India

How did India respond to September 11?

The world's most populous democracy condemned the atrocities, pledged support for the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, and urged America to move against Pakistani-backed terrorist groups attacking India. India has shared intelligence on terrorist training camps used by Osama bin Laden's supporters inside Afghanistan, Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, and Pakistan itself. Indian officials also offered logistical help, such as the use of Indian territory as a staging ground for U.S. troops or equipment for military operations, but India has not been used as an operational base during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Instead, India's adversary Pakistan — which India calls a sponsor of terrorism — has become a pivotal U.S. partner.

How have Indian officials reacted to Pakistan's pivotal role in the coalition against terrorism?

With frustration and anger. Indian officials say their country is a victim of Pakistan-backed terrorism and demand that the United States add Pakistan to its list of states that sponsor terrorism. They also note Pakistan's longstanding ties to the Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence services' links to terrorist groups in Kashmir. India's governing coalition, which is led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, has openly scoffed at the notion of Pakistan assuming a leading role in a global campaign against terrorism. "Our fight against terrorism did not start on September 11," Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said pointedly shortly after the attacks. "We have been fighting this battle alone for years now. Pakistan has spawned, encouraged, and sustained terrorist activities in Kashmir."

What prompted the build-up of troops along the India-Pakistan border?

On 13 December 2001, gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing nine people. The two terrorist groups that India says planned the attacks, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, are reportedly trained and equipped in the portion of Kashmir under Pakistani control. India's main spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, says attacks are launched against India from at least 17 terrorist training camps in Pakistan-controlled areas of Kashmir. After the parliament attack, a million Indian and Pakistani troops faced off along their 1,800-mile joint border. War fears erupted again in May 2002 after Lashkar terrorists raided an Indian army base in Kashmir, killing 31, including soldiers' wives and children. Tensions eased somewhat after Musharraf pledged to end cross-border infiltrations into Indian-held territory in Kashmir, and in October 2002, the two countries agreed to withdraw hundreds of thousands of troops from their shared border — but announced that the forces massed along the Line of Control dividing Kashmir would remain.

Does India have nuclear weapons?

Yes, as does Pakistan. India tested five nuclear devices in May 1998; Pakistan conducted nuclear tests of its own weeks later. India is thought to have enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium for up to about 95 nuclear weapons, and Pakistan is thought to have enough for up to about 50. Although India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it has declared a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear tests. In late January 2002, on the eve of its annual Republic Day display of military might, India test-fired updated versions of its Agni ballistic missile, which could carry a nuclear warhead. Seeing two nuclear powers facing off over a contested piece of territory has led some experts to call Kashmir the world's most dangerous flashpoint.

Why has India not been used as a staging base for the war in Afghanistan?

U.S. officials say that geographically, it made more sense to use Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan. America also has a stronger history of cooperation with Pakistan. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the main staging ground for the 1979–89 U.S.-backed anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan; India was a founding member of the movement of non-aligned states and turned to the Soviet Union as its chief source of economic and military assistance. Russia remains India's main supplier of military hardware today. Still, since the end of the Cold War, successive Indian governments have strengthened ties with the United States, and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes recently indicated that India would also be buying more weapons from the United States.

How did the hostility between India and Pakistan start?

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 when colonial British India was partitioned into two states. Pakistan was created expressly to provide a home for India's Muslim population. (Pakistan initially consisted of two geographically separate regions, one of which became the independent state of

Bangladesh in 1971.) During partition, more than 1 million people were killed, and some 16 million people crossed the new border between India and Pakistan.

In 1947, the population of the state of Kashmir was predominantly Muslim, but the state was ruled by a Hindu prince. Immediately after partition, when Kashmir's *maharaja* had yet to declare his allegiance to either Pakistan or India — both of which border Kashmir — a tribal revolt broke out, instigated by Pashtun tribesmen backed by Pakistani troops. The *maharaja* sought military assistance from India and subsequently decided to place Kashmir under Indian control. Fighting broke out, and a U.N.-brokered ceasefire was reached in 1948. But roughly a third of Kashmir remained under Pakistani control, and the region continues to be a source of dispute between the two countries. Since 1948, India and Pakistan have fought two more wars over Kashmir.

Does Hindu-Muslim unrest in India have to do with terrorist groups?

Not really. Experts say that India's Muslim minority is not a significant breeding ground for terrorist activity, although it is a focal point of communal violence and rioting. (India is overwhelmingly Hindu, but nearly 12 percent of its population of 1 billion is Muslim.) The recent unrest in the western Indian state of Gujarat was prompted when Hindus rampaged to 'avenge' an arson attack against a train carrying Hindu activists back from a disputed holy site. Hundreds died, marking India's worst sectarian violence in almost a decade.

Is India's only terrorist problem with Islamist separatists?

No. Both former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv were assassinated by terrorists. In 1984, Indira Gandhi was killed by Sikh extremists, who in the early 1980s launched a terrorist campaign to force the Indian government to create an autonomous Sikh republic in India's Punjab state. Gandhi launched a tough military crackdown on the movement and was subsequently killed by her own

Sikh bodyguards. Her son, who also became prime minister, fell victim to terrorist fallout from Sri Lanka when he was killed at a 1991 election rally by a Tamil separatist suicide bomber.

What role does India want to play in post-Taliban Afghanistan?

India's special envoy to Afghanistan has said that India's main objectives include ensuring that the Taliban has no future role in Afghanistan and that the new Afghan regime is free from outside interference—in other words, experts say, not too closely aligned with Pakistan. Afghanistan's interim leader, Hamid Karzai, has paid a state visit to India and accepted \$10 million from the Indian government, which has promised to contribute as much as \$100 million in aid.

This fact sheet draws on March 2002 interviews with Sumit Ganguly of the University of Texas at Austin and Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.

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China

How did China respond to September 11?

Chinese President Jiang Zemin called President Bush the day after the terrorist attacks, expressed his condolences, and offered to help work against terrorism. Chinese counterterrorism experts have met with U.S. officials to share intelligence on the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network. Although China's leaders have expressed reserved support for U.S. war aims in Afghanistan, they have firmly opposed broadening the war on terrorism to Iraq. Some Chinese citizens have been even less sympathetic; a few political analysts and some more nationalistic Internet chat sites have called September 11 an understandable response to what they see as U.S. arrogance and attempts to dominate the world.

Why has China's cooperation in the war been important?

Mainly for political reasons, China experts say. On the military front, Beijing has shared some intelligence with the United States and, in what some experts call the clearest sign of support for the U.S.-led efforts, taken the noteworthy step of letting a U.S. aircraft carrier stop in Hong Kong in November 2001 on its way to the war in Afghanistan. But experts say that China's diplomatic support has been even more important, making it easier for the United States to build an international coalition against terrorism. China voted for the 2001 U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution condemning terrorism and gave the embattled government of Pakistan — the key staging area for the war in Afghanistan — both moral and financial support. In sharp contrast, China has opposed other recent American-led military campaigns, especially the 1999 war in Kosovo.

What do the Chinese expect in return for their cooperation?

China wants the world to see its campaign against Islamic separatists in Xinjiang province — which borders on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and has a mostly Muslim population — as part of the global war on terrorism. In the past, the United States has criticized China for

human rights abuses against Muslims in Xinjiang, and the Bush administration was initially reluctant to link the Xinjiang issue to the war on terrorism. In August 2002, however, the State Department listed as a terrorist organization an obscure group of Xinjiang rebels that China says has links to al-Qaeda.

Have Islamist terrorists attacked China?

Chinese officials blame Muslim militants from the Uighur minority group for more than 200 violent incidents between 1990 and 2001. China accuses Uighur separatists in Xinjiang province of receiving financial and material aid from al-Qaeda in their struggle to establish an independent state.

Have Chinese militants been linked to al-Qaeda?

There is little evidence here. Some Muslim Chinese have been captured fighting in Afghanistan, but most experts think that these are individual cases, not evidence of formal links to al-Qaeda. Still, China's government says that it has recently arrested more than 100 Chinese terrorists who were trained in Afghan camps, and the Bush administration seemed to give more credence to China's charges in August 2002 by adding the East Turkestan Islamic Movement — which China accuses of having close ties to al-Qaeda — to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations.

Did Sino-U.S. relations improve after September 11?

Yes, for now. Although the often tense relationship between the United States and China had already been improving after a low point in 2001 following a U.S. surveillance plane's collision with a Chinese jet fighter, China's cooperation in the war on terror has clearly improved relations, experts say. But China watchers are unsure whether this warming trend will continue; the two countries continue to disagree on such major issues as Taiwan, human rights, trade, and missile defence. Chinese analysts of the United States are similarly uncertain. Many of them worry that the war on terrorism will expand to other states after Afghanistan and lead to a long-term U.S. military presence in China's Central

Asian backyard.

Does China have ties to states accused of sponsoring terrorism?

Yes. For years, Chinese arms sales to 'rogue states' have been one of the most contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations. China has been accused of selling nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran; missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya; materials used to make chemical weapons to Iran; and advanced communications equipment to Iraq, North Korea, and the Taliban when they ruled Afghanistan. Such arms exports earn money, experts say, and they strengthen ties to important regional actors such as Pakistan and Iran. Although the Chinese have made some progress on controlling their exports, their systems do not yet meet international standards.

Did China have contact with the Taliban before 11 September?

Yes, but not officially. Before 11 September, China wanted to keep an eye on neighbouring Afghanistan and was concerned about possible links between al-Qaeda and Muslim separatists in Xinjiang province. While China never recognized the Taliban as the rightful Afghan government, Chinese companies did supply advanced communications equipment to Afghanistan — although most experts say that such projects halted after 11 September. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has also noted that Chinese-made weapons had been found in caves occupied by pro-Taliban forces. But it's still not clear how and when the weapons got there, especially because arms dealing has been going on for decades in Afghanistan.

How has the war on terrorism affected China's relations with Pakistan?

Before the 11 September attacks, Pakistan was China's oldest and most stable ally. China was Pakistan's largest supplier of weapons, and it allegedly provided technology and materials for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in

the early 1990s. Most analysts say that since the attacks, China has been worried by the speed with which Pakistan — shunned by the West after testing its first nuclear weapon in 1998 — has swung behind America, in return for which America has lifted sanctions and offered billions of dollars in aid and debt rescheduling. The Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, has already visited China twice since the attacks, assuring his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, that 'the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy is its close association and relationship with China.'

Would China support expanding the war on terrorism to Iraq?

No, Chinese officials say. Three days after the beginning of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, China declared that only specific terrorist targets should be attacked and warned America not to spread the war to other countries. China has consistently asked to see 'concrete evidence' linking Iraq to terrorism and has warned that it would probably consider U.S. strikes against Iraq unjustified. China protested President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, which called Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an 'axis of evil', adding that the speech was seeking 'to prepare public opinion' for unjustified strikes against the three countries 'under the banner of anti-terrorism'.

Has China tried to organize a regional response to terrorism?

Yes. In 1996, Beijing helped set up a regional diplomatic grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with members including China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO seeks to increase trade relations and foster cooperation against 'terrorism, extremism, and separatism'. Some analysts expected the SCO to play an important role in Asian politics, but others say it may become merely a 'talking shop'.

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Kyrgyzstan

What role is Kyrgyzstan playing in the war on terrorism?

The largely Muslim, authoritarian former Soviet republic has

become an important Central Asian partner for the United States. It's now hosting about 1,500 coalition troops — including U.S., French, and South Korean soldiers — who are building an important base at the country's main airport, located near the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. The base will eventually accommodate more than 3,000 soldiers and other personnel, who will be used for re-supply and re-fueling operations, humanitarian relief missions, and perhaps combat missions inside nearby Afghanistan. The base will also give coalition planners increased flexibility, letting them fly U.S. warplanes into Afghanistan from the north if tensions between India and Pakistan ever make it impossible for U.S. planes to reach Afghanistan from aircraft carriers to the south.

Does the United States own the base?

No. A December 2001 agreement lets the United States use the base for one year. Kyrgyz officials say decisions on renewing the agreement will depend on the situation in Afghanistan.

Why was the base built in Kyrgyzstan?

U.S. planners decided to use Kyrgyzstan because it's close to Afghanistan. They had previously considered using neighbouring Tajikistan instead but concluded that its Soviet-era military facilities would be inadequate because of poor runways and security concerns.

What kind of country is Kyrgyzstan?

Kyrgyzstan is a former Soviet Central Asian republic that became independent in December 1991. It has a population of 4.7 million. The Kyrgyz, most of whom are Sunni Muslim, were largely nomadic until Soviet rule was imposed in the 1920s. The country features dramatic terrain and some of the highest mountains in the former Soviet Union. Unlike neighbouring countries that border on the Caspian Sea, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan lacks significant energy resources or mineral deposits. Recent reforms have helped stabilize the Kyrgyz economy, which grew 5 percent in 2000.

Who is Kyrgyzstan's ruler?

President Askar Akayev, who was first elected in 1990. The authoritarian Akayev, a former scientist and anticommunist activist, was initially courted by the West after the Soviet collapse, but his reputation has since been tarnished by his government's lack of respect for democratic practices and human rights. Akayev's regime suppresses internal dissent, arrests political opponents, and censors the media. In May 2002, Akayev's cabinet and other top officials resigned under criticism that they had mishandled a March 2002 demonstration in which five people were killed. A series of protests followed, including a June 2002 rally that called for Akayev's resignation — increasing fears of political instability and even civil war.

What has the United States provided in return for Kyrgyzstan's cooperation?

In the run-up to the war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration courted Kyrgyzstan and other frontline countries intensively. The United States offered closer political and security ties, which have been strengthened by a stream of high-level visitors, including Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks. The United States is also paying fees to Kyrgyzstan for use of the air base.

The Bush administration and the European Union are also seeking to expand assistance programs in Kyrgyzstan, including a program to train and equip Kyrgyz border guards. Many of these programs preceded September 11 and were originally created to help Kyrgyz authorities fight the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization linked to al-Qaeda. At U.S. prompting, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have also stepped up their activities in the region; in December 2001, the IMF reached agreement with Kyrgyzstan on a new \$93-million loan.

How controversial is the U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan?

Not very. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not voiced objections to the U.S. military presence in Russia's Central Asian backyard. American officials have been careful to insist that they have no plans for permanent U.S. military bases in Kyrgyzstan. They add that the United States is not competing with Russia to expand influence in the area, although the U.S. military is unlikely to depart anytime soon.

Kyrgyzstan's eastern neighbour, China, has also not complained publicly about the U.S. presence. Indeed, China has reached out to Kyrgyzstan, seeking expanded cooperation against Uighur separatists (a Turkic minority group living in China and Central Asia) and radical Islamists, some of whom reportedly have ties to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network and are active in China's north-western Xinjiang province, which has a large Muslim minority. Human rights advocates, however, worry that closer U.S.-Kyrgyz ties will undercut long-standing U.S. pressure on Akayev to improve his regime's human rights record. In response, U.S. officials say that they have stressed human rights concerns in their dialogue with the Kyrgyz leadership, and many high-level U.S. visitors to Kyrgyzstan have made a point of meeting with prominent members of the political opposition there.

Has Kyrgyzstan been targeted by terrorists?

Yes. Kyrgyzstan has spent the last few years trying to counter attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a radical Islamist terrorist group with ties to al-Qaeda. The IMU, which seeks to establish an Islamist government throughout Central Asia, has attacked targets in Kyrgyzstan since 1999 and has carried out high-profile kidnappings of American and Japanese citizens. It has found strong support for its cause in the economically destitute Fergana Valley, which straddles Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. But while the IMU may remain a threat, experts say it was dealt a powerful blow by the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, in which the IMU lost some of its key leaders.

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This fact sheet draws on interviews with Andrew Weiss, former National Security Council official.

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Uzbekistan

What role is Uzbekistan playing in the war on terrorism?

It is cooperating with the United States in several ways. Approximately 1,500 U.S. troops are now deployed in southern Uzbekistan, only a few hundred miles from the Afghan border. The troops are preparing for an extended stay at the Soviet-era Khanabad air base there to help finish uprooting the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In deference to Uzbek and Russian

sensitivities, the Bush administration has said that it does not plan to base American forces in Uzbekistan permanently. Officially, the role of the troops in Uzbekistan is limited to humanitarian relief and search-and-rescue missions inside Afghanistan, but a joint U.S. Special Forces command centre at Khanabad reportedly played a key role in directing the activities of U.S. Special Forces personnel during the early phase of the fall 2001 U.S. attacks on the Taliban. Information about current day-to-day activities of U.S. forces remains shrouded in secrecy.

What sort of a country is Uzbekistan?

Uzbekistan, situated on Afghanistan's northern border, gained its independence in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With 24 million people, it is the most populous of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. President Islam Karimov, a former Communist Party boss, has maintained Soviet-style control over the country's political system and economy and has one of the worst human rights records in the region. Political dissent of any kind is harshly suppressed, and beatings and torture of detainees is commonplace, U.S. officials and human rights groups say.

Why is Uzbekistan cooperating with the U.S.-led war on terrorism?

Because its government also sees a threat from radical Islamist groups. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a radical Islamist opposition group with links to al-Qaeda, has waged a campaign of terrorism and violence against the Karimov regime. Karimov, in turn, has imprisoned more than 7,000 people he says were actual or potential IMU supporters. The State Department has raised concerns about the IMU, which it listed as a foreign terrorist organization in 2000, and also about Karimov's response; a 2001 State Department report says that 'victims of the [government] crackdown included members of the secular opposition, human rights activists, thousands of overtly pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups.'

Do radical Islamists in Uzbekistan have ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

Yes. President Bush discussed the IMU's connections to al-Qaeda in a speech to a joint session of Congress shortly after September 11. The IMU was formally founded in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, and its leadership developed close bonds with the Taliban, experts say. The leader of the IMU, Juma Numangani, reportedly led Taliban and al-Qaeda forces into battle against the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance. Numangani was reportedly killed in battle in November 2001.

How dangerous is the IMU?

Well equipped and well trained, the IMU has been a formidable foe for Karimov. Before 11 September its estimated 2,000 members conducted military operations in various parts of Central Asia from bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. But the U.S. war in Afghanistan hurt the IMU badly by killing several of its leaders and destroying its Taliban and al-Qaeda allies. The U.S. military commander in the region, General Tommy Franks, has pledged to cooperate with the Uzbek armed forces in future operations against the IMU. 'I will not minimize the potential danger associated with the IMU,' Franks said during a January 2002 visit to Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent. 'I'll just simply say that we will continue to rout them out until we have the very last of them.'

Did cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan begin only after 11 September?

No. Defence and intelligence cooperation have increased substantially in recent months, but the United States and Uzbekistan have worked together on regional security for several years. Uzbekistan has participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace, American soldiers have trained Uzbek military officers, and in 2000 the U.S. provided Uzbekistan with equipment to combat terrorism. Moreover, U.S. and Uzbek intelligence services have been working together in secret for several years. According to the *Washington Post*,

'the CIA's Directorate of Operations recruited, trained, paid or equipped surrogate forces in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and among tribal militias inside Afghanistan, with the common purpose of capturing or killing bin Laden.' The CIA reportedly used secret facilities in Uzbekistan in late 2000 to fly unmanned Predator surveillance planes over bin Laden's training camps, although the short-lived mission collapsed amid bureaucratic and technical problems.

What has the United States provided Uzbekistan in return for its help?

High-level U.S.-Uzbek ties have been cemented by a mid-March 2002 White House meeting between Presidents Bush and Karimov, as well as by numerous visits to Tashkent by senior Bush administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and General Franks. A 'Strategic Partnership' document signed during Karimov's visit to Washington called on the United States 'to regard with grave concern any external threat' to Uzbekistan. An October 2001 U.S.-Uzbek agreement called for talks 'to draw up proper measures immediately in case of a direct threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.'

The United States also has tripled its aid to Uzbekistan, to a total of \$160 million per year. Much of this goes toward training and equipping Uzbek law enforcement and border security forces trying to stem the flow of drugs, illicit nuclear material, and other contraband across Uzbekistan's territory. The Bush administration has also encouraged the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to provide assistance to Uzbekistan, and in December 2001, the World Bank announced a \$36-million loan to help restructure Uzbekistan's agriculture sector.

Is U.S. cooperation with Uzbekistan controversial?

Somewhat. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not objected to the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, but experts say Putin's studied calm belies occasional expressions of concern from Russian military officers and politicians.

Meanwhile, Western human rights groups have generally recognized the need for some ties to Uzbekistan to secure military bases near Afghanistan, and no major organization has called for suspending U.S.-Uzbek military cooperation. Still, human right advocates and regional experts warn against efforts to condone or whitewash Uzbekistan's domestic repression and argue that Karimov's fierce crackdown has only stoked popular anger against his regime and generated new recruits for the IMU and other Islamist groups.

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Other Central Asian States

What role are Central Asian and Caucasus countries playing in the war on terrorism?

America's most prominent new partners are [Uzbekistan](#) and [Kyrgyzstan](#), which are providing important logistical support for the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan; both countries now host several thousand U.S. troops on their territory. But several other nearby states are also playing roles — albeit far smaller ones. The involvement of other Central Asian and Caucasus countries remains focused largely on increased cooperation with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies trying to dismantle al-Qaeda's networks.

Besides Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, are other Central Asian countries hosting U.S. troops?

Yes. Tajikistan has hosted a handful of U.S. forces. The activities of these forces are shrouded in secrecy, but they're thought to have involved support for search-and-rescue missions in Afghanistan. Small numbers of French and Italian troops also were deployed there, using the country as a transit point for travel into and out of Afghanistan early in the war.

Kazakhstan has also offered to host U.S. troops. After talks with U.S. officials, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev agreed to let U.S.-led coalition forces use Kazakhstan's international airport in cases of emergency, including renewed war in Afghanistan or an upsurge in terrorism. But the need for a Western base in Kazakhstan has been lessened by the rapid build-up of U.S. and coalition forces elsewhere in Central Asia.

Are other nearby countries participating in the war on terrorism?

Yes. Azerbaijan has opened its airspace to U.S. military aircraft bound for Afghanistan and has let its military airfields be used for refuelling. Secretary of State Colin Powell has praised Azerbaijan for also providing 'critical intelligence cooperation'.

What has the United States provided in return for these countries' help?

Warmer bilateral ties and more aid from the U.S. government and international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and countries in the region were courted by the Bush administration during the run-up to U.S. military action in Afghanistan. High-level ties have been cemented through visits by senior administration officials, including Powell, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and General Tommy Franks, the commander of the operation in Afghanistan.

Particularly dramatic changes occurred in U.S.-Azeri relations, experts say. For nearly a decade, defence-related U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan was largely blocked by congressional sanctions designed to punish Azerbaijan for its long-running conflict with Armenia over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. But President Bush waived these restrictions in January 2002, opening the door to increased military cooperation and other joint efforts in the war on terrorism.

The United States has also stepped up aid to Tajikistan,

by far the poorest of the post-Soviet countries. Tajikistan shares a 750-mile border with Afghanistan. It will receive border-monitoring equipment worth \$7 million, as well as significant humanitarian assistance.

Kazakhstan has also won warmer ties to the United States after a lengthy period of chilly relations. Kazakhstan, which is rich in oil and natural gas resources, has a booming economy; it's therefore seeking closer trade and energy ties and less outright aid.

Is al-Qaeda active in these countries?

Yes. Both Tajikistan and Kazakhstan worry about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has links to al-Qaeda. Founded in 1998, the IMU seeks to establish an Islamist state throughout Central Asia. It has drawn support from al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and radical Islamist groups in the Persian Gulf. Before the 11 September attacks, the IMU's estimated 2,000 members conducted attacks across Central Asia from bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. But experts say U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan have apparently battered the IMU and killed several of its key leaders.

In Azerbaijan, meanwhile, local security services have recently clamped down on terrorist cells and Islamist charities tied to terrorist networks. In October 2001, an Azeri court convicted an Iraqi man for plotting with Chechen militants to kill Russian President Vladimir Putin during his January 2001 visit to Baku, the Azeri capital. Azeri officials said that the man trained in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, fought in Chechnya, and had contacts with al-Qaeda associates.

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Flashpoint: Kashmir

Who commits acts of terrorism in Kashmir?

Mostly Islamists from outside Kashmir, affiliated with groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some attacks have been linked to local pro-Pakistan and pro-independence groups.

Who commits acts of political violence in Kashmir?

Indian security forces, Islamist militants, and other separatist groups. According to Human Rights Watch, both Indian security forces and Islamist groups are responsible for systematic human rights violations, including executions, torture, and rape.

What role has the United Nations played in Kashmir?

Since the 1949 ceasefire, U.N. troops have monitored the ceasefire line, but their presence does not deter violence and the U.N.-mandated plebiscite has never taken place.

As of November 2001, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan comprised 45 military personnel and 90 civilians.

Is the United States involved in the conflict over Kashmir?

For decades, Kashmir was a lesser concern of U.S. foreign policy, but this changed in 1998 after India and Pakistan both tested atomic bombs. Now that Kashmir could lead to a nuclear conflict, some analysts call the region the most dangerous flashpoint on earth. America was dragged into the conflict in 1999, when India and Pakistan exchanged artillery fire for ten weeks after militants supported by Pakistan crossed into Indian-controlled Kashmir near the town of Kargil. U.S. diplomacy contributed to ending the fighting in Kargil.

What is the U.S. position on Kashmir?

According to the State Department, 'the United States considers all of the former princely state of Kashmir to be disputed territory'. The United States advocates a peaceful resolution that involves input from the people of Kashmir. The State Department lists three Islamist groups active in Kashmir as foreign terrorist organizations: Harakat ul-Mujahedeen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Has Kashmir been an issue since 11 September?

Yes. Pakistan has been a key member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition, and the United States has pressured Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, to cut off government support for Islamist terrorists in Kashmir. That has enraged Islamists and nationalists in Pakistan who see Musharraf as a sell-out, which could threaten his rule; the 1999 coup that brought Musharraf himself to power was partially inspired by his predecessor's response to U.S. pressure to rein in Kashmiri militants.

U.S. diplomats have worked hard to keep both India and Pakistan in the coalition against terrorism, manage India's demand to add Pakistan to the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism, and keep periodic Kashmir crises from

spiralling into outright war. In December 2001, U.S. diplomacy was riveted by an attack on the Parliament House at New Delhi, which Indian officials blamed on Pakistan-supported terrorists active in Kashmir. India recalled its diplomats from Pakistan, cut off international transportation routes, and massed troops along the border; Pakistan followed suit. In May 2002, terrorists in Kashmir killed more than 30 Indians, further worsening tensions between Pakistan and India. With war fears again looming, Musharraf in June 2002 began moving to halt cross-border infiltrations into Kashmir by Islamist militants, and in October 2002, the two countries agreed to withdraw hundreds of thousands of the troops massed along their shared border—but announced that those forces along the Line of Control dividing Kashmir would remain.

Can the status of Kashmir be resolved peacefully?

Perhaps. Both India and Pakistan pay lip service to Kashmiri self-determination, but neither supports independence, as some Kashmiris do. Since the 1998 nuclear tests, several international efforts have been made to bring peace to Kashmir, but hard-liners in both India and Pakistan see compromise on Kashmir as a fundamental betrayal of their countries. Some Kashmiri groups pursue non-violent solutions to the conflict, as does the United Nations. However, the reinforced U.S. interest in containing hostility between India and Pakistan could lead to progress on Kashmir.

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Document Two

National Security Strategy of the United States of America

President George W. Bush, The White House, 20 September 2002

... Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favours human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today,

that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.

To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal — military power, better homeland defences, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbour terrorists — because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defences against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. Today, the international community has the best chance since the

rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side — united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security. We are also increasingly united by common values. Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great powers — even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, trade, and cultural advancement.

Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of 11 September 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders

George W. Bush

The White House, 17 September 2002

I. Overview of America's International Strategy

... This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American

internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

And this path is not America's alone. It is open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will:

- champion aspirations for human dignity;
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centres of global power; and
- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

... America's experience as a great multi-ethnic democracy affirms our conviction that people of many heritages and faiths can live and prosper in peace. Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society.

... Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international bodies.

We will:

- speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom;
- use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take;
- make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and
- take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.

We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it.

III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends

... The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.

In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them.

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes — some seen, some unseen.

Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbour, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.

Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate.

We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.

The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative financial networks.

However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek. We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

- direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and

destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and

- denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities. We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.

This includes:

- using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behaviour that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose;
- supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation;
- diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk; and
- using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.

While we recognize that our best defence is a good offence, we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter attack. This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defence. Centred on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector.

This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bio-terror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.

While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide.

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbours, and provide a haven for terrorists.

In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

IV. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts

... Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid explosive escalation and minimize human suffering. In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate

suffering and restore stability.

No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action — direct or indirect — is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind:

The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.

The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of human suffering, because of America's close relationship with the state of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region's importance to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic development, increased humanitarian assistance, and a program to establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to

withdraw fully to positions they held prior to 28 September 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them.

In South Asia, the United States has also emphasized the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes. This Administration invested time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a constructive role when tensions in the region became acute. With Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more open and tolerant society. The Administration sees India's potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly. Our involvement in this regional dispute, building on earlier investments in bilateral relations, looks first to concrete steps by India and Pakistan that can help defuse military confrontation...

V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

... Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defence that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain

destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbours, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defence system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

Proactive counter-proliferation efforts. We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities — detection, active and passive defences, and counterforce capabilities — are integrated into our defence transformation and our homeland security systems. Counter-proliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

Strengthened non-proliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for non-proliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.

Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defence. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbours. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behaviour of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction — weapons that can

be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on 11 September 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support pre-emptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just ...

Document Three

Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Command-and-Control Mechanism

Disarmament Diplomacy - Issue No 43

Pakistan Announcement of Nuclear-Weapons Command-and-Control Mechanism, 3 February 2000; text of announcement by Associated Press of Pakistan (APP)

In accordance with Pakistan's well known nuclear policy of responsibility and restraint as reaffirmed by the Chief Executive on several occasions, and with the objective of creating an institutionalized command and control mechanism, consistent with Pakistan's obligations as a nuclear power, the National Security Council on 2 February approved the establishment of National Command Authority (NCA). The meeting was chaired by the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf. NCA will be responsible for policy formulation, and will exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. It will comprise two committees, including, Employment Control Committee and Development Control Committee as well as Strategic Plans Division which will act as Secretariat. The apex 'Employment Control Committee' will be chaired by the Head of the Government and include Minister of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Chairman), Minister of Defence, Minister for Interior, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Services Chiefs, Director General Strategic Plans Division (Secretary) and Technical Advisors/others as required by the Chairman. The Development Control Committee will also be chaired by the Head of the Government and include CJCSC (Deputy Chairman), Service Chiefs, Director General Strategic Plans Division and representative of the Strategic organisation and scientific community. The Committee will control development of strategic assets. Strategic Plans Division, headed by a senior army officer has been established in the Joint Services Headquarters under CJCSC. It will act

as the secretariat for NCA and will perform the functions of planning and coordination in particular for establishing a reliable command, control, communication, computers and intelligence (C4I) network for the NCA.'

Source: The Acronym Institute, 2000.

<www.acronym.org.uk/43candc.htm>

Document Four

India reviews nuclear command and control structure

Reaffirms 'No First Use' and Commitment to a 'Nuclear Weapon Free World'

India's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met on 4 January 2003 to review the progress in the operationalization of India's nuclear doctrine and the existing command and control structures.

The Committee summarized India's nuclear doctrine as follows:

- (i) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
- (ii) A posture of 'No First Use': nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
- (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage;
- (iv) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority;
- (v) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
- (vi) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;

- (vii) A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests;
- (viii) Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister and an Executive Council chaired by the National Security Advisor. The Political Council is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons while the Executive Council provides inputs for decision-making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.

The CCS approved the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command, to manage and administer all Strategic Forces. It also reviewed the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack, and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch and expressed satisfaction with the overall preparedness.

Source:

<<http://www.india-emb.org.eg/Archives%20Eng%202003/Jan5,%2003.htm>>

Document Five

Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview: Final Report

1 October 2001

Rodney W. Jones

Summary of Key Findings

In testing nuclear weapons as de facto nuclear weapon states in May 1998, India and Pakistan both espoused nuclear restraint. Their senior officials soon embraced the language of 'minimum credible deterrence'. India declared a 'no-first-use' nuclear posture soon after the tests.

Pakistan declined to rule out first-use options for reasons explained below.

India's official statements did not identify nuclear adversaries, leaving open which national arsenals or threats it would use as reference points to define its own nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear force size. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to US President Clinton, however, alluded to China as a neighbouring nuclear threat. China and Pakistan are India's known rivals and probably Indian nuclear weapon planners' main reference points.

Pakistani nuclear declaratory statements are clear that India is regarded as its sole nuclear adversary and thus the focus of its nuclear deterrent.

Although the term 'minimum' rapidly became a fixture of the public nuclear discourse in South Asia, neither India nor Pakistan officially clarified what the term 'minimum' means, leaving this open to speculation. Does 'minimum' imply the sufficiency of small numbers of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons held in reserve? Low readiness or alert rates of a nuclear force? Renunciation of nuclear war fighting? Mainly counter-value targeting? Or does the term 'minimum' merely make a virtue of today's facts of life in the subcontinent - limited resources, scarce weapons material, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped technical military capabilities?

Neither India nor Pakistan overtly *deployed* nuclear forces after the 1998 tests, nor was known to have done so by October 2001, when this assessment was prepared. By not deployed, we mean neither state was believed to have mated nuclear weapons with delivery systems on standby status, ready for immediate alert or use upon central command.

Judging potential nuclear arsenal size even for a non-deployed force is feasible if enough is known about fissile material production. India's and Pakistan's 'dedicated weapon facilities' continue to produce fissile material. Their outputs can be thought of as 'nuclear weapon equivalents' (NWEs). Although the actual number of operational weapons in either's arsenal is not known, analysis suggests that India has, and probably will retain, a significant lead over

Pakistan. We estimate India had over 100 NWEs from its dedicated facilities by 2000 — at least twice and perhaps three times as many as Pakistan. India's NWEs from dedicated facilities are far fewer than China's estimated arsenal of about 450 weapons. By appropriating fissile material from its unsafeguarded civilian power reactors, however, India could reach a potential of several hundred NWEs, exceeding estimates of China's operational nuclear stockpile.

The risk of nuclear war in South Asia is significant and not to be taken lightly. The potential for nuclear crisis instability is inherent in the conventional military imbalance between Pakistan and India. India's steadily growing conventional military superiority over Pakistan, coupled with Pakistan's geographic vulnerabilities to pre-emptive conventional air strikes and rapid invasion, and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear forces are smaller, means that Pakistan could be driven to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict India. Pakistan's posture which preserves a nuclear first-use option by default, reflects these military and geographic asymmetries.

For bilateral deterrence, India and Pakistan both have nuclear-capable aircraft that could be put on alert and used for nuclear delivery on short notice. Both have acquired ballistic missile delivery systems, although the combat readiness of the missiles is not altogether clear. India's missile development program aims to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Chinese cities, but a ready force of such missiles does not now exist. If forced to improvise, India has a few long-range aircraft that could be used to reach China's interior with nuclear payloads. India's tactical strike aircraft could also be used, but only on a one-way flight profile.

While Pakistan has no officially stated strategic or tactical nuclear doctrines, technical considerations and writings by experts suggest that its core nuclear strategy is to hold Indian cities hostage by counter-value targeting, against a conventional Indian invasion or pre-emptive air attack that could threaten Pakistan's defences with collapse.

India has declined to elaborate nuclear policy and doctrine beyond a second-strike retaliatory posture, evidently on the grounds that its capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons should deter nuclear attack absolutely. But India's officially convened National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) recommended that India rely on a posture of *credible* minimum deterrence. The term *credible* is a much more demanding criterion than 'minimum deterrence' might imply by itself. The NSAB recommended India procure a triad of air-, ground-, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems along with robust command and control and space assets to ensure the survivability of retaliatory forces and a capability for a rapid response after any imaginable nuclear first strike. It also recommended that India achieve the capacity for proactive conventional military response to nuclear threats. These recommendations stopped short only of a nuclear war-fighting capability, strategic missile defence, and extended deterrence.

While the Indian government declined to treat these Advisory Board recommendations as official policy, and experts acknowledged that they would be very costly to implement, the actual profile of Indian defence research and development and military technology acquisition closely parallels the Advisory Board's recommendations. This implies that India probably will follow the main recommendations in defining requirements and building nuclear forces, but do so gradually within its limited resources. Over time, this could lead to an expansive nuclear strategy and force structure, with a capacity to respond in a graduated or massive fashion to potential nuclear threats from all directions.

If India's nuclear strategy and forces evolve along these ambitious lines, they would not constitute a 'minimum deterrence' posture, as that term is generally understood.

While it is unlikely that Pakistan could achieve or maintain nuclear parity with India, Pakistan probably will enlarge and diversify its nuclear inventory to make its own forces survivable, as prerequisites for confidence in a secure second-strike capability against India. This also implies that Pakistan will pursue a strategy and acquisitions in the near

term that exceed what outsiders might believe is sufficient, based on a common sense understanding of 'minimum deterrence'. Outsiders tend to perceive India as a status quo power, but this is not the prevailing view in Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani officials profess that they expect to avoid nuclear arms racing. Once the facts are examined, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they have been in an arms race that will continue, albeit with continued conditions of asymmetry and at a pace that is limited by resource constraints.

On nuclear command and control systems, Pakistan and India followed different paths after declaring themselves nuclear weapon states in May 1998. In 1999, Pakistan set up a national command authority for decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons, together with a joint service command and control hierarchy for military planning, management, custody, development, and control of nuclear weapons, making this known in early 2000. While Pakistan thus served notice that it is militarily prepared to execute nuclear missions, the prevailing evidence is that its nuclear weapons and delivery systems still are not deployed in the field or ready for prompt use.

India evidently left the articulation of a formal nuclear command and control system in abeyance after May 1998. Ultimate authority on decisions to use nuclear weapons probably resides with the Prime Minister in cabinet. Custody of nuclear weapons apparently stayed with the Department of Atomic Energy, under the nuclear scientific establishment that developed the weapons. Control was not transferred to the Indian military services. Nuclear-capable aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, such as the Prithvi, are in service with the Indian Air Force and Army. India's longer-range nuclear-capable missiles such as the Agni, however, are still in the research and development process under the Defence Research and Development Organization, are believed not to be in serial production, and secure deployment in silos or on rail-mobile launchers — concepts that have been discussed — probably is years away.

India has had active programs in air defence and has been acquiring high-altitude Russian SAM systems that may have

some tactical anti-ballistic missile capability. Pakistan has a less robust high-altitude air defence program but is seeking new capabilities in this area as well.

Kargil was the first unambiguous case of crisis management between India and Pakistan as nuclear-armed rivals. It sobered Indian nuclear experts who had assumed India's 'minimum nuclear deterrent' would contain Pakistan absolutely. Kargil indicated to the outside world that there is a high risk of nuclear conflict in the subcontinent. The experience may have strengthened Pakistani advocates of the view that the nuclear deterrent is an instrument only of last resort. Kargil clarified an Indian view that nuclear deterrence does not preclude conventional conflict.

Source: <www.policyarchitects.org>

<www.dtra.mil/about/organization/south_asia.pdf>

Document Six

General Pervez Musharraf's speech against Terrorism, 12 January 2002

In the name of God, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful

Pakistani Brothers and Sisters!

As you would remember, ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true perspective. In my first speech on 17 October 1999, I had said and I quote; 'Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred; universal brotherhood, not enmity; peace, and not violence'. I have a great respect for the Ulema and expect them to come forward and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith? After this, I initiated a number of steps in this regard. First, in the year 2000, I started interacting with the Taliban and counselled them to inculcate tolerance and bring

moderation in their ways. I also told them that those terrorists who were involved in terrorist acts in Pakistan and seeking refuge in Afghanistan should be returned to us. Unfortunately, we did not succeed.

In the year 2001, I think it was January, we sealed the Pak-Afghan borders and I gave directions that no students of any Madarissah (religious seminaries) should be allowed to cross into Afghanistan without relevant documents. After this, I despatched a number of delegations to meet Mullah Omar. I continued to advise them tolerance and balance. Later, on February 15, 2001, we promulgated the Anti-Weaponisation Ordinance. Through this law, we launched a de-weaponisation campaign in Pakistan.

On 5 June, on the occasion of the Seerat Conference, I addressed Ulema belonging to all Schools of thought and spoke firmly to them against religious extremism. On the 14 August 2001, we finally took a very important decision to ban Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad and placed Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP (Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan) under observation. In addition, on a number of occasions, I called Ulema and Mashaikh and held extensive consultations with them. The objective was to take them on board in our campaign against terrorism and extremism. These measures have been continuing since our government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all this to you in great detail only because of the fact that the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest. We are not doing this under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are conscious that it is in our national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid society of extremism and this is being done right from the beginning.

This domestic reforms process was underway when a terrorist attack took place against the United States on the 11 September. This terrorist act led to momentous changes all over the world. We decided to join the international coalition against terrorism and in this regard I have already spoken to you on a number of occasions. We took this decision on principles and in our national interest. By the grace of God Almighty our decision was absolutely

correct. Our intentions were noble and God Almighty helped us. I am happy to say that the vast majority of Pakistanis stood by this decision and supported our decision. I am proud of the realistic decision of our nation. What really pains me is that some religious extremist parties and groups opposed this decision. What hurts more was that their opposition was not based on principles. At a critical juncture in our history, they preferred their personal and party interests over national interests. They tried their utmost to mislead the nation, took out processions and resorted to agitation. But their entire efforts failed. The people of Pakistan frustrated their designs. As I have said, I am proud of the people of Pakistan who support correct decisions and do not pay heed to those who try to mislead them.

I have interacted with the religious scholars on a number of occasions and exchanged views with them. I am happy to say that our discussions have been very fruitful. A majority of them are blessed with wisdom and vision and they do not mix religion with politics. Some extremists, who were engaged in protests, are people who try to monopolise and attempt to propagate their own brand of religion.

They think as if others are not Muslims. These are the people who considered the Taliban to be a symbol of Islam and that the Taliban were bringing Islamic renaissance or were practising the purest form of Islam.

They behaved as if the Northern Alliance, against whom the Taliban were fighting, were non-Muslims! Whereas, in fact, both were Muslims and believers. These extremists were those people who do not talk of 'Haqooqul Ibad' (obligations towards fellow human beings). They do not talk of these obligations because practising them demands self-sacrifice. How will they justify their Pajeros and expensive vehicles? I want to ask these extremists as to who was responsible for misleading thousands of Pakistanis to their massacre in Afghanistan? These misled people were let down by the very people in whose support they had gone. All of us should learn a lesson from this. We must remember that we are Pakistanis. Pakistan is our identity,

our motherland. We will be aliens outside Pakistan and be treated as aliens.

Pakistan is our land. It is our soil. If we forsake it, we will face difficulties. This lesson we must learn.

Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years. Everyone of us is fed up of it. It is becoming unbearable. Our peace-loving people are keen to get rid of the Klashinkov and weapon culture. Every one is sick of it. It was because of this that we banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad. Yet little improvement occurred. The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to become a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state? The verdict of the masses is in favour of a progressive Islamic state. This decision, based on the teaching of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) and in line with the teachings of Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal will put Pakistan on the path of progress and prosperity. Let us honestly analyse what the few religious extremists have attempted to do with Pakistan and Islam. First, with regard to Afghanistan, they indulged in agitational activities.

Look at the damage it has caused! Pakistan's international image was tarnished and we were projected by the international media as ignorant and backward. Our economy suffered. A number of export orders already placed with Pakistani industry were cancelled and no new orders materialised. This led to closure of some factories and unemployment. The poor daily wage earners lost their livelihood. Extremists also formed a Pakistan-Afghanistan Defence Council! Apart from damaging Pakistan, they had negative thinking and had no idea of anything good for Afghanistan. Did they ever think of bringing about peace to Afghanistan through reconciliation among the Taliban and Northern Alliance? Did they counsel tolerance to them? Did they ever think of collecting funds for the welfare, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-ravaged Afghanistan, or to mitigate sufferings of the poor Afghan people? Did they think of a solution to the hunger, poverty and destruction in Afghanistan? To my knowledge, only

Maulana Abdul Sattar Edhi, God bless him, and some foreign NGOs and the UN organisations were providing the Afghans with food and medicines. These extremists did nothing except contributing to bloodshed in Afghanistan. I ask of them, whether they know any thing other than disruption and sowing seeds of hatred? Does Islam preach this?

Now, let us see their activity outside Afghanistan. They initiated sectarian feuds.

Sects and different schools of thought in Islam have existed since long.

There is nothing wrong with intellectual differences flowing from freedom of thought as long as such differences remain confined to intellectual debates.

Look at what this extremist minority is doing? They are indulging in fratricidal killings. There is no tolerance among them. Quaid-e-Azam declared that Pakistan belonged to followers of all religions; that every one would be treated equally. However, what to speak of other religions, Muslims have started killing each other.

I think, these people have declared more Muslims as Kafirs (infidels) than motivating the non-Muslims to embrace Islam. Look at the damage they have caused? They have murdered a number of our highly qualified doctors, engineers, civil servants and teachers who were pillars of our society. Who has suffered? The families of the dead, no doubt. But a greater loss was inflicted on Pakistan because, as I said, we lost the pillars of our society. These extremists did not stop here. They started killing other innocent people in mosques and places of worship.

Today, people are scared of entering these sacred places of worship. It is a matter of shame that police have to be posted outside for their protection. We claim Islam as Deen or a complete way of life.

Is this the way of life that Islam teaches us? That we fight amongst ourselves and feel scared of fellow Muslims, scared of visiting our places of worship where police have to be deputed outside for protection? Mosques are being misused for propagating and inciting hatred against each other's sect and beliefs and against the Government, too.

I would like to inform you that a number of terrorist rings have been apprehended. In Karachi, the Inspector General of Police, while briefing me, informed that the leader of one of these groups is the Pesh Imam (Prayer Leader) of a Mosque in Malir. The Imam has confessed to murdering many people himself. This is the state of affairs. To what purpose are we using our mosques for? These people have made a state within a state and have challenged the writ of the government.

Now, I would like to dwell upon the subject of Madaris or Religious Schools in some detail. These schools are excellent welfare set-ups where the poor get free board and lodge. In my opinion, no NGO can match their welfare aspects. Many of the madaris are imparting excellent education. In addition to religious teachings, other subjects such as science education and computer training are also being imparted there.

I am thankful to them for undertaking excellent welfare measures without State funding. I would also like to say that I have projected madaris internationally and with various heads of states time and again. I think no one else in Pakistan has done so much for their cause. However, there are some negative aspects of some madrassahs. These few impart only religious education and such education which produces semi-literate religious scholars. This is a weakness. Very few madaris, I repeat very few of them, are under the influence of politico-religious parties or have been established by them. I know that some of these promote negative thinking and propagate hatred and violence instead of inculcating tolerance, patience and fraternity. We must remember that historically, the madarasa was a prestigious seat of learning. They were citadels of knowledge and beacon of light for the world.

When Islam was at its zenith, every discipline of learning e.g.: mathematics, science, medicine, astronomy and jurisprudence were taught at these institutions. Great Muslim luminaries such as Al-Beruni, Ibn-e-Sina (Avesina) and Ibn Khuldoon, were the products of these same madaris. And if we study history, we see that from the 7th to 15th century AD, transfer of technology took place from the

Muslims to the rest of the world.

Look at Muslims' condition today. Islam teaches us to seek knowledge, even if it involved travel to China. I am sure you are aware that the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) had told prisoners of war in the Battle of Badar that they would be set free if each of them imparted education to ten Muslims.

Quite obviously, this education could not have been religious education as the prisoners were non-Muslims. So the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) was actually referring to worldly education. If we do not believe in education, are we following the teachings of Islam or violating them? We must ask what direction are we being led into by these extremists? The writ of the government is being challenged. Pakistan has been made a soft state where the supremacy of law is questioned. This situation cannot be tolerated any more. The question is what is the correct path? First of all, we must rid the society of sectarian hatred and terrorism, promote mutual harmony. Remember that mindsets cannot be changed through force and coercion. No idea can ever be forcibly thrust upon any one. May be the person changes outwardly but minds and hearts can never be converted by force. Real change can be brought about through personal example, exemplary character and superior intellect. It can be brought about by Haqooq-ul-ibad (Obligation towards fellow beings).

Have we forgotten the example of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) where Islam was spread by virtue of his personal conduct, true leadership and that is how changes in the world took place at that time. We have forgotten the teaching of revered personalities of Islam like Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Fareed Ganj Shakar, Baha-uddin Zakria etc.

Was Islam spread by them through force and coercion? No. They preached Islam by personal example. I give these examples because it hurts me to see where we have relegated ourselves now. We must restore that status of Madaris to what it originally was. We have to change the state of affairs and take them on the path of improvement. The second thing I want to talk about is the concept of

Jihad in its totality. I want to dilate upon it because it is a contentious issue, requiring complete comprehension and understanding. In Islam, Jihad is not confined to armed struggles only. Have we ever thought of waging Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger? This is the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion, needs to wage Jihad against these evils.

After the battle of Khyber, the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) stated that Jihad-e-Asghar (Smaller Jihad) is over but Jihad-e-Akbar (Greater Jihad) has begun. This meant that armed Jihad, i.e. the smaller Jihad was now over and the greater Jihad against backwardness and illiteracy had started.

Pakistan needs Jihad-e-Akbar at this juncture.

By the way we must remember that only the government of the day and not every individual can proclaim armed Jihad. The extremist minority must realise that Pakistan is not responsible of waging armed Jihad in the world.

I feel that in addition to Haqooq Allah (Obligations to God), we should also focus on Haqooq-Al-ebad (Obligations towards fellow human beings). At Schools, Colleges and Madaris, Obligations towards fellow beings should be preached. We know that we have totally ignored the importance of correct dealings with fellow humans beings. There is no room for feuds in Islamic teachings. It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and harmony, which is the true spirit of Islam. We must adopt this. We must shun negative thinking.

We have formulated a new strategy for Madaris and there is need to implement it so as to galvanize their good aspects and remove their drawbacks. We have developed a new syllabi for them providing for teaching of Pakistan studies, Mathematics, Science and English along with religious subjects. Even if we want these Madaris to produce religious leaders they should be educated along these lines. Such people will command more respect in the society because they will be better qualified. To me, students of religious schools should be brought in to the mainstream of society. If any one of them opts to join college or university, he

would have the option of being equipped with the modern education. If a child studying at a madrasa does not wish to be a prayer leader and he wants to be a bank official or seek employment elsewhere, he should be facilitated.

It would mean that the students of Madaris should be brought to the mainstream through a better system of education. This is the crux of the Madrasa strategy.

This by no means is an attempt to bring religious educational institutions under Government control nor do we want to spoil the excellent attributes of these institutions. My only aim is to help these institutions in over coming their weaknesses and providing them with better facilities and more avenues to the poor children at these institutions.

We must check abuse of mosques and madaris and they must not be used for spreading political and sectarian prejudices. We want to ensure that mosques enjoy freedom and we are here to maintain it. At the same time we expect a display of responsibility along with freedom. If the Imam of mosques fail to display responsibility, curbs would have to be placed on them. After this analysis, now, I come to some conclusions and decisions:

First, we have to establish the writ of the Government. All organizations in Pakistan will function in a regulated manner. No individual, organization or Party will be allowed to break law of the land. The internal environment has to be improved.

Maturity and equilibrium have to be established in the society. We have to promote an environment of tolerance, maturity, responsibility, patience and understanding. We have to check extremism, militancy, violence and fundamentalism. We will have to forsake the atmosphere of hatred and anger.

We have to stop exploitation of simple poor people of the country and not to incite them to feuds and violence. We must concern ourselves with our own country. Pakistan comes first. We do not need to interfere and concern ourselves with others. There is no need to interfere in other countries.

Now I turn to other important issues. In my view there are

three problems causing conflict and agitation in our minds. They include; first the Kashmir Cause, secondly all political disputes at the international level concerning Muslims and thirdly internal sectarian disputes and differences.

These are the three problems which create confusion in our minds. I want to lay down rules of behaviour concerning all the three.

Let us take the Kashmir Cause first. Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan and the world knows this. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir. The Kashmir problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the United Nations resolutions. We have to find the solution of this dispute. No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of 11 September, 1 October and 13 December. Anyone found involved in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly.

Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country. Our behaviour must always be in accordance with international norms.

On this occasion, as President of Pakistan, I want to convey a message to Prime Minister Vajpayee: If we want to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and bring harmony to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully through a dialogue on the basis of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Solving the Kashmir Issue is the joint responsibility of our two countries. Let me repeat some of the observations made by you, Mr. Vajpayee, some time back, and I quote: 'Mind-sets will have to be altered and historical baggage will have to be jettisoned.' I take you on this offer. Let us start talking in this very spirit.

Now as Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, I wish to convey another message. The Armed Forces of Pakistan are fully prepared and deployed to meet any challenge. They will spill the last drop of their blood in the defence of their country. Let there be no attempt of

crossing the border in any sector as it will be met with full force. Do not entertain any illusions on this count.

I would also like to address the international community, particularly the United States on this occasion. As I said before on a number of occasions, Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestation.

Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world. Now you must play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of lasting peace and harmony in the region. We should be under no illusion that the legitimate demand of the people of Kashmir can ever be suppressed without their just resolution. Kashmiris also expect that you ask India to bring an end to state terrorism and human rights violations. Let human rights organizations, Amnesty International, the international media and U.N. peacekeepers be allowed to monitor activities of the Indian occupation forces.

Now we come to the second problem, which causes confusion in our minds and is of our particular concern. It relates to conflicts involving Muslims. Our religious leaders involve themselves in such conflicts without giving serious thought to them. I don't want to talk at length on this.

It is for the government to take a position on international issues. Individuals, organizations and political parties should restrict their activities to expression of their views. I request them to express their views on international issues in an intellectual spirit and in a civilized manner through force of argument.

Views expressed with maturity and moderation have greater convincing power.

Expressing views in a threatening manner does not create any positive effect and anyone who indulges in hollow threats is taken as an unbalanced person by the world at large.

I would request that we should stop interfering in the affairs of others.

First, we should attain the strength and the importance where our views carry weight when we express them.

Now we come to internal decisions.

The third issue causing conflict in our minds relates to sectarian differences. As I have already pointed out that writ of the Government will be established. No individual, organization or party will be allowed to break the law of the land. All functioning will be in a regulated manner and within rules.

Now I come to the extremist organizations. Terrorism, and sectarianism must come to an end. I had announced a ban on Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad on 14 August last year. On that occasion, I had pointed out that Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP would be kept under observation.

I am sorry to say that there is not much improvement in the situation. Sectarian violence continues unabated. We have busted several gangs involved in sectarian killings. You would be astonished to know that in year 2001 about 400 innocent people fell victim to sectarian and other killings.

Many of the gangs apprehended include people mostly belonging to Sipah-e-Sahaba and some to TJP. This situation cannot be tolerated any more.

I, therefore, announce banning of both Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP. In addition to these, TNSM (Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi) being responsible for misleading thousands of simple poor people into Afghanistan also stands banned.

This organization is responsible for their massacre in Afghanistan.

The Government has also decided to put the Sunni Tehreek under observation. No organization is allowed to form Lashkar, Sipah or Jaish. The Government has banned Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Any organization or individual would face strict punitive measures if found inciting the people to violence in internal or external contexts.

Our mosques are sacred places where we seek the blessings of God Almighty.

Let them remain sacred. We will not allow the misuse of mosques. All mosques will be registered and no new mosques will be built without permission. The use of loudspeakers will be limited only to call for prayers, and Friday Sermon

and Vaaz. However, I would like to emphasise that special permission is being given for 'Vaaz' (Sermon). If this is misused the permission will be cancelled.

If there is any political activity, inciting of sectarian hatred or propagation of extremism in any mosque, the management would be held responsible and proceeded against according to law.

I appeal to all Pesh Imams to project the qualities of Islam in the mosques and invite the people to piety. Talk of obligations towards fellow beings, exhort them to abstain from negative thoughts and promote positive thinking. I hope that all Nazims, Distt. Police officers and Auqaf Department officials will take quick action against violators of these measures.

On Madaris, a detailed policy will be issued through a new Madressa Ordinance. The Ordinance will be issued in a few days. I feel happy that the Madressa policy has been finalized in consultation with religious scholars and Mashaikh. I have touched on the merits and shortcomings prevailing in the Madaris. Merits have to be reinforced while shortcomings have to be rooted out. Under the Madressa policy, their functioning will be regulated.

These Madaris will be governed by same rules and regulations applicable to other schools, colleges and universities. All Madaris will be registered by 23 March 2002 and no new Madressa will be opened without permission of the Government.

If any Madressa (religious school) is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity or possessing any types of weapons, it will be closed. All Madaris will have to adopt the new syllabi by the end of this year. Those Madaris which are already following such syllabi are welcome to continue. The Government has decided to provide financial assistance to such Madaris. The government will also help the Madaris in the training of their teachers. The Ministry of Education has been instructed to review courses of Islamic education in all schools and colleges also with a view to improving them. So far as foreign students attending Madaris are concerned, we have set rules for them. Foreign students who do not have proper documents would be

required to comply with the formalities by 23 March 2002 otherwise they can face deportation.

Any foreigner wanting to attend Madaris in Pakistan will have to obtain required documents from his/her native country and NOC from the government.

Only then, he or she will get admission. The same rules will apply to foreign teachers.

Some Ulema were of the view that some poor people who come to Pakistan for religious education should not be deported to the countries of their origin.

I agree that this is a genuine demand but such people should regularize their stay in Pakistan through their respective embassies. As I have said, all such activity has to be regulated and the writ of the Government must be established.

With a view to ending conflict, I have explained to you at great length the three areas causing confusion in our minds. Making rules, regulations and issuing ordinances is easy but their implementation is difficult. However, I feel all the measures I have announced are of utmost importance. We have to implement them. In this regard, the law enforcement agencies including police must perform their duty.

We are introducing reforms in the police with a view to improving their efficiency. A great responsibility lies on their shoulders.

I have directed the police to ensure implementation of the steps announced by the government and I have no doubt they will be motivated to perform their duty. After reforms we expect they will be better trained and equipped to discharge their duty. Rangers and civil armed forces will be in their support.

We are also taking steps in consultation with the judiciary for speedy trial of cases relating to terrorism and extremism. Anti terrorist courts are being strengthened and necessary orders will be issued in a few days.

Apart from these issues, I would also like to inform you, my brothers and sisters, that we have been sent a list of 20 people by India.

I want to clear our position on this. There is no question of

handing over any Pakistani. This will never be done. If we are given evidence against those people, we will take action against them in Pakistan under our own laws. As far as non-Pakistanis are concerned, we have not given asylum to any one. Any one falling under this category will be proceeded against whenever one is found.

My brothers & Sisters, Pakistan is an Islamic Republic. There are 98 percent Muslims living in this country. We should live like brothers and form an example for rest of the Islamic countries. We should strive to emerge as a responsible and progressive member of the community of nations.

We have to make Pakistan into a powerful and strong country. We have resources and potential. We are capable of meeting external danger. We have to safeguard ourselves against internal dangers. I have always been saying that internal strife is eating us like termite. Don't forget that Pakistan is the citadel of Islam and if we want to serve Islam well we will first have to make Pakistan strong and powerful. There is a race for progress among all nations.

We cannot achieve progress through a policy of confrontation and feuds. We can achieve progress through human resource development, mental enlightenment, high moral character and technological development. I appeal to all my countrymen to rise to the occasion. We should get rid of intolerance and hatred and instead promote tolerance and harmony. May God guide us to act upon the true teachings of Islam. May He help us to follow the Quaid-e-Azam's motto: 'Unity, Faith and Discipline.' This should always be remembered. We will be a nonentity without unity.

Source: <www.speeches.commemoratewtc.com/epilogue/musharraf.php>

Document Seven

U.S. State Department Envoy Richard Haass on tensions between India and Pakistan, 9 January 2003

The United States — as much as India — wants to devote the time we spend talking about the threat of conflict in South Asia to other, more positive issues. America — as much as India — is eager to see a thriving, peaceful and democratic India take its place in the world.

But it is simply a fact of life that India will not realize its immense potential on the global stage until its relationship with Pakistan is normalized. If India were to have a better relationship with Pakistan, it would be free to emerge as the major world actor that it ought to be. The festering conflict with Pakistan distracts India from its larger ambitions, helps create the environment that scares off capital, and absorbs valuable resources.

The ability of both Pakistanis and Indians to reap the benefits of the 21st century will depend to a large degree on their willingness to build a more normal relationship with one another..

In the absence of the most basic contacts and the most minimal lines of communication, tension between India and Pakistan constantly risks sparking a broader conflict with potentially cataclysmic consequences — for India, for Pakistan, for the region, and, if I might say, for the United States.

But, even if such a conflict never materializes, the omnipresent spectre of it has huge tangible costs. It limits the ability of both India and Pakistan to seize opportunities to better the lives of their peoples.

Given the wide repercussions of Indo-Pakistani tensions, it is no wonder that the international community has repeatedly called on the Indian and Pakistani governments to normalize their relationship. It is a responsibility they have to their own peoples, to their neighbours, and all of humanity.

The world is not asking India and Pakistan to do anything that other states have not done. Numerous countries have moved beyond their own contentious histories in order to secure a better future. Look at Germany and France, Japan and Korea, Brazil and Argentina. And now the United States and Russia.

A more normal relationship between India and Pakistan is not impossible to envision. Normalcy does not mean an absence of disagreement. Rather, normalcy means a resilient relationship that would allow India and Pakistan to weather inevitable shocks and setbacks without the risk of violent conflict or a nuclear crisis.

Normalcy means that differences are resolved through diplomacy, not force. In this time of heightened tension, we are in an unusual situation where neither country has a High Commissioner in the capital of the other.

But even in less tense times, diplomatic presence and exchange was minimal. An expansion of diplomatic links could facilitate people-to-people contacts and lay the groundwork for greater bilateral cooperation on a range of common interests.

Normalcy also means a relationship wherein Indians and Pakistanis from all walks of life can easily travel to the other country for family visits, tourism, sports or business. It should not take more time to fly from New Delhi to Islamabad than it does to fly from Delhi to London...

Developing natural commercial links could bring greater prosperity to both countries and, in the process, build constituencies for normalization and increase the stake that each country has in the peaceful resolution of disputes. In this regard, it is time to take practical steps to bring about a South Asian Free Trade Area.

Most of all, normalcy means that Kashmir would be addressed peacefully. In fact, much has already changed in Kashmir, even since my last visit to South Asia this past autumn...

I cannot predict what a solution to the Kashmir problem might look like or when it will come. But there are a few things about which I am certain. First, the status of the

Line of Control will not be changed unilaterally.

Second, the LoC will also not be changed by violence. To the contrary, in the absence of a jointly agreed Indo-Pakistani alternative, everyone should act to ensure the continued sanctity of the LoC. For its part, the US will continue to urge President Musharraf to do everything in his power to permanently end infiltration into Kashmir. Pakistanis must realize that this infiltration is killing their hopes for a settlement to Kashmir...

I would hope that New Delhi would respond to these changes by taking small steps — beyond the welcome reduction in military deployments on the international border. India could acknowledge encouraging events where they exist, including Pakistan's assistance in the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, President Musharraf's vision of a reformed Pakistan, and the emergence of civilian leaders.

India should look for opportunities to reach out to and reinforce the new civilian government in Islamabad. Supporting positive developments in Pakistan does not mean condoning or overlooking the many serious matters that Pakistan still must address. But it does mean saying and doing things that help encourage favourable trends within Pakistan and make possible more normal ties with it...

<www.dawn.com/2003/01/09/top4.htm>

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